



UNIVERSITY OF  
LIVERPOOL

Heseltine Institute for Public  
Policy, Practice and Place

# The Hattersley and Mottram housing estate: *An evaluation of its regeneration*

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## REPORT HEADLINES

In October 2017, the Heseltine Institute was commissioned by Onward Homes to evaluate the impact of interventions made by Peak Valley Housing Association (PVHA) in the regeneration of Hattersley and Mottram, a large former council housing estate in Greater Manchester.

This evaluation is a snapshot of an ongoing process of regeneration, which has a further 10 years to run, that aims to provide lessons for Onward, the wider housing sector, policy makers in local and central government.

Our evaluation found that the regeneration interventions have been largely successful and significant progress has been made in meeting the original objectives of the 'Collaboration Agreement', the founding legal document for the regeneration partnership. The quality of housing stock has been considerably improved – both the upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new housing. There is now a greater mix of tenures with an unprecedented increase in new-build owner occupation, and all housing stock now meets the Decent Homes Standard. Tenants feel that it is 'a much nicer place to live' and they '...feel safer moving around the estate at all times'. They are also happy with improvements to the railway station and its use is up 30%. A new district centre has been developed with Tesco Extra which employs over 100 local people and has helped fund the development of the Hub, the new local community centre.

Given that there are a further 10 years to run on the regeneration programme, much has been achieved thus far. As Onward enters the next phase of regeneration, we have identified priority areas that require specific attention and on which action is already being taken. In particular, improvements to the public realm are lagging behind and common concerns among tenants have focused on the lack of usable green space, play facilities for younger people and the lack of enhancements to streets, parking and verges. There are plans in place to address these issues and Tameside MBC will launch a public consultation this year on options for public realm investment, including their long-term management and maintenance. Significant improvements are also needed in the design and use of the Hub which suffers from under-use by the community and local public service agencies. An architect has been commissioned to look at the design of the Hub, including its disabled access and the position of the library.

There are many lessons for future regeneration projects such as this. Referred to frequently by interviewees as a singular 'act of genius', the Collaboration Agreement has been the cornerstone of the regeneration programme, leveraging in private sector investment to pay for transformations to the estate's housing, retail, community and transport infrastructures while retaining public control of the land and regeneration process. Much too can be learnt from the 'relational' as opposed to 'transactional' approach of PVHA which has been instrumental in cementing valued and trusted working relationships with all stakeholders. The over-arching approach to regeneration through tenure diversification coupled with school catchment area restructuring has been pivotal in encouraging social mixing between tenure groups, particularly for young people.

This evaluation, however, has also underlined how deep-rooted, intractable socio-economic problems cannot be tackled through the actions and regeneration programmes of housing associations and local authorities alone, but require concerted action by a range of actors led by national, targeted policy interventions.

The above lessons will help inform Onward's approach over the next ten years of regeneration. We have identified other considerations to help guide their future course, including ensuring there is sufficient community involvement in the design of public realm improvements, addressing the lack of social space on the estate for community association, and embedding a governance mechanism that addresses concerns that Onward will function more remotely.

# REPORT SUMMARY

## REPORT SUMMARY

1. In October 2017, the Heseltine Institute was commissioned by Onward to evaluate the impact of the interventions made by Peak Valley Housing Association in the regeneration of Hattersley and Mottram, a large former council estate located in Tameside Metropolitan Borough in Greater Manchester. Our evaluation focuses on the period since 2006, the date when the Collaboration Agreement - the founding legal document for the regeneration partnership - was agreed and underpinned the stock transfer of Hattersley and Mottram from Manchester City Council to Peak Valley Housing Association. In 2017, Symphony Housing Group, of which Peak Valley was a part, was renamed as Onward.
2. Built in the early 1960s by Manchester City Council to rehouse tenants decanted from inner-city areas such as Gorton that were subject to 'slum clearance', Hattersley and Mottram was originally home to around 15,000 people – the second largest overspill estate in Greater Manchester. By 2006, its population had fallen to around 6,600<sup>1</sup>. Through this period of inexorable decline, the estate suffered the now all-too-familiar symptoms of 'residualised' council estates: socioeconomic isolation, unemployment, spatially-concentrated poverty, crime, housing vacancies, physical neglect and territorial stigma.
3. We have situated our evaluation within a narrative-driven methodology that deploys resident and stakeholder interviews as testimony to the ways in which various governments' urban regeneration policies, the local agency of residents, and that of Tameside MBC have interacted to shape the estate's social and physical infrastructure. In doing so, we have distinguished and assessed the key role played by Peak Valley in the regeneration of Hattersley and Mottram.
4. Our evaluation should be interpreted in light of the fact that the regeneration process in Hattersley and Mottram is ongoing. The Collaboration Agreement commits its signatories to a further ten years of regeneration activity. Onward commissioned this report to ensure that the lessons thus far are captured and shared. This report, then, is a snapshot of an ongoing process of transformation that aims to provide lessons not only for Onward but the wider housing sector and policymakers in local and central government.
5. For ease of reference, we use the term 'Hattersley Estate', or 'Hattersley' in the remainder of the report.

## Regeneration Interventions

5. We have evaluated in detail the interventions made by Peak Valley since 2006. In order to assess the overall success of the regeneration process itself, and the contributions of specific interventions, we have evaluated Peak Valley's progress against the original regeneration objectives set out in the Collaboration Agreement. Our overall assessment of regeneration on this measure to date is positive (**See Figure 10: Regeneration Objectives and their achievement pages 27-28**). Residents largely feel that it is a '...much nicer place to live' and they '...feel safer moving around the estate at all times'. Tenants are happy with the improvements made to their housing in particular – both the upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new housing' – as well as other physical infrastructures such as the railway station. This general success is reflected in the rising satisfaction rates recorded by Peak Valley's own tenant surveys.
6. The following summarises our overall assessment of the main interventions made by Peak Valley since 2006:
  - (i) **Housing upgrading:** The priority for Peak Valley was to demolish the stock that was unfit for purpose to make way for new-build housing, both social rented and private sale. Since 2006, over 500 housing units have been demolished. The housing built in its place – both the new-build Barratt homes for sale and the replacement social housing stock – is of far superior quality than comparable housing in other estates.
    - a. **Barratt Homes:** The homes that Barratt have built – and are continuing to build – have been a huge success. This totals 830 new homes across 24 sites on the estate. Due to the unique circumstances of the Hattersley regeneration process, Barratt were asked to build to a much higher design standard than they would do usually. This was partly due to the influence of English Partnerships which insisted on high design specifications on the projects it helped fund. Barratt's last completed site on Hattersley was one of their fastest selling developments in the country. However, one potential problem is the growing incidence of private rented accommodation on the estate. This is the result of homeowners earlier Right to Buy sales selling on their homes to private landlords, who are often absentee, speculative landlords with little interest or commitment in maintaining their houses to the standards expected of Peak Valley.

- c. **New social housing:** Just as diversifying tenures was a key priority of the regeneration partners so too was diversifying housing typologies for Peak Valley. This was done in order to meet demand for different housing types, such as bungalows and apartments, in ways which would ensure that all age groups and family situations could be accommodated in the estate and thereby help stem the flow of outward migration. The design process for the new social housing schemes was carried out in consultation with residents and there was a certain amount of flexibility in the approach as phases were completed so as to reflect changing local demand. The participatory approach by the architects has resulted in a very high standard and is almost universally appreciated by tenants.
- d. **Existing stock improvements:** All housing stock now meets the Decent Homes Standard. Residents are generally satisfied with improvements made. One problem is the relative lack of investment in privately-owned ex-council houses bought through the Right to Buy scheme, particularly in terms of roofing, but which now lie outside Peak Valley's remit.
- (ii) **Public realm:** Compared to the achievements made with new and existing housing stock, improvements to the public realm are lagging behind. Common concerns amongst tenants and other stakeholders coalesce around three principal issues: the density of the infill housing and consequent lack of usable green space; the lack of facilities for younger people, particularly for play and games; and the lack of improvements to the streets, parking and verges. The delay in addressing these issues was the result of financial difficulties following the 2008 crash, which has forced Barratt to concentrate efforts on delivering housing construction. However, there are now plans to in place to address these issues. The strength of the partnership-working embodied in the Land Board is such that Tameside MBC are now in the process of developing an alternative plan to deliver all the public realm improvements via their own commissioned agency with Barratt contributions as per the Collaboration Agreement. Tameside MBC will launch a public consultation on options for public realm investment this year, including how it will be maintained and managed into the future.
- (iii) **Railway Station:** The interventions made by Peak Valley and the Land Board to Hattersley's railway station have been successful. The Land Board spent some of the regeneration funds procured through the Collaboration Agreement on redesigning Hattersley Road West in order to re-route the road closer to the station. A bus stop on the road now connects the train to the local bus network for quick, easy and safe access to the station. Consequently, station use has already risen by 30%. These initial improvements have opened up possibilities and interest in further improvements. The Land Board has secured £750,000 investment from the Greater Manchester Growth Fund to replace the existing booking

office, and there are plans to replace the covered walkway to the station. The open land surrounding each side of the station is now being redeveloped by Barratt as homes for sale which will contribute further to place-making efforts in creating a safe, well-used, connected and distinctive urban realm. A local community group, Friends of Hattersley Railway station, continue to play a significant part in driving this improvement forward.

- (iv) **New District Centre:** One of the highest priorities in regenerating Hattersley was redeveloping the District Centre. Whilst incomplete, it has to-date delivered a new Tesco Extra and a multi-purpose community facility, The Hub. Bringing Tesco on board has been a success in terms of local employment where approximately 90% of its workforce live locally and either walk or cycle to work. However, Tesco drove a hard bargain for retail space that adversely affected the Hub's design and created problems with how it is used by the local community. Apart from the Library, the building suffers from chronic under-use and, we would argue, local public service agencies. It is in danger of becoming a 'white elephant'. Reasons for this include: the multi-level design of the building, the co-location of public agencies with community facilities, management issues both in the Council's contractor and voluntary groups (which are being addressed) and insufficient branding as a community space. Tameside MBC has also commissioned an architect to look at how the use and design of the Hub could be improved, including its disabled access and position of the library.
- (v) **Community investment Strategy:** Since 2013 Peak Valley has committed to delivering a Community Investment Strategy with the aim of developing sustainable communities through a process '...that recognises that successful neighbourhoods, and therefore successful tenancies, depend on a complex balance of social, economic and environmental conditions.'<sup>2</sup> By Peak Valley's own measure of social return on investment, this strategy has been successful in delivering social impact for local residents. However, there is also a wider sense in which Peak Valley and its highly-regarded staff have gone the extra mile in community investment. This is evident in how they have fostered a close working relationship with local schools, with staff now sitting as governors in the two local primary schools.
- (vi) **Skills development:** The success of skills development has been more uneven with the Tesco initiative representing a high point in offering much needed local employment. Other initiatives, such as jobs fairs, apprenticeship schemes, BASE courses and Talent Match have achieved small successes but not enough to offset the high levels of deprivation on the estate. Reasons for this lack of success are varied but focus on an abiding sense of social insularity. Related to this are the inherent difficulties in constructively engaging with a tightly bound community. These are issues which the tenure diversification approach may have begun to address, such that future attempts at skills development may prove more fruitful.

<sup>1</sup>Tameside MBC, "Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram," 2004, <https://www.tameside.gov.uk/tmbc5/hattersleyspg.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup>Sam Cooper, "PVHA Community Investment Strategy: June 2014" (Peak Valley Housing Association, 2014).

## The lessons of regeneration

7. The Hattersley case establishes a set of principles that can help guide the successful regeneration of any area suffering from multiple deprivation and historical neglect. Our assessment highlights five fundamentally important factors which have implications for estate regeneration policy and practice:
  1. The Collaboration Agreement underpinning the stock transfer process and the regeneration masterplan, which enabled private sector investment whilst ensuring public sector control, high design standards and punctual delivery, and prevented speculative 'land banking';
  2. The overarching approach to regeneration through tenure diversification coupled with school catchment area restructuring;
  3. Peak Valley's 'relational' – as opposed to 'transactional' – approach to the management of the estate and its relationships with residents and key regeneration partners, notably Tameside MBC;
  4. The robust governance structure - the Hattersley Land Board - constituted by the Collaboration Agreement; and
  5. Tackling the deep-rooted, structural socio-economic problems often evident in regeneration estates like Hattersley is inherently complex and multi-faceted and cannot be achieved through the actions and programmes of housing associations and local authorities alone. The regeneration of Hattersley has, by necessity, focused on physical improvements to housing, amenities, safety and security and infrastructure over more social and economic programmes. This is borne out in the Government's most recent Indices of Multiple Deprivation (2015) which show that Hattersley remains in the top 5% of most deprived areas in the country. This may point to a wider national failure, despite government policy, to develop sustainable local policy solutions that work with and for local communities.
8. We address each of these in turn, before concluding with recommendations for moving Onward.

## The Collaboration Agreement

9. The successful physical transformation of the Hattersley estate can be traced back to – and is founded upon – the unusual, if not unique, way in which the stock transfer process to Peak Valley in 2006 was funded and the original masterplan created through the seminal Collaboration Agreement between central and local government, the private and third sectors, and the local community. This initiated a highly innovative mechanism

of land value capture that levered in private sector investment to pay for substantial transformations to the estate's housing, retail, community and transport infrastructures whilst precluding speculative land banking and maintaining overall public control of the land and of the regeneration process itself. Moreover, it instilled an institutional culture of close partnership working that has ensured a high level of commitment by all public and private partners to complete the regeneration process.

10. The Collaboration Agreement was a singular '*act of genius*'<sup>3</sup> without which the regeneration of the estate could have taken a very different turn. The demolition of some of the worst social housing and redevelopment as new homes for sale was the key strategic move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that paid for all other improvements, including to the existing stock and to the public realm, as well as for new retail, transport and community facilities. Moreover, the decision not to sell the land but only a licence to build and sell new homes was key to keeping the private sector developer on, albeit a slightly delayed, schedule particularly given the financial crash of 2008. This was supported by English Partnerships (now Homes England) – the government agency which provided the crucial financial guarantee in the Collaboration Agreement to underwrite the investments – who were at the time influenced by the Mixed Communities policy agenda.

## Tenure diversification programme

11. Tenure diversification had two functions in Hattersley: first, to offer a source of private sector funding otherwise unobtainable to pay for all other improvements, including upgrading the existing housing stock; and, second, to inject a new, more diverse mix of tenures into what was a socio-economically isolated mono-tenure social housing estate in the hope of bringing new investment and residents with higher spending power for local goods and services, providing new opportunities for social mixing for existing residents, and raising aspirations particularly among young people. The latter aligned with the Mixed Communities agenda. This held that tenure diversification was itself a direct mechanism for regeneration, acting to counteract the additional disadvantages accruing through the spatial concentration of poverty – 'neighbourhood effects' – over and above deprivation per se, such as that deriving from an unfavourable labour market position.
12. The Mixed Communities agenda sought to tackle spatially-concentrated poverty through a "more sustainable mix of housing types and tenures"<sup>4</sup> – where housing tenures were seen as a rough proxy for socioeconomic class.<sup>5</sup> At the heart of the mixed communities rationale is the 'neighbourhood effect' hypothesis

which focuses on the *spatial* effects of poverty: defined by UK policy-makers as the "additional disadvantages that affect poorer people when they are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods."<sup>6</sup> Despite ambiguous evidence for their existence, neighbourhood effects are seen to reinforce poverty through poor access to public services, social networks, role models, and employment opportunities.<sup>7</sup>

13. It is extremely difficult to measure how the introduction, for the first time on the estate, of new-build private homes for sale has affected the life chances of existing residents. This is a notoriously tricky question in the social sciences which hinges around the methodological controversy over whether 'neighbourhood effects' exist in any real or observable way, and rests on the cumulative assumption that spatial proximity leads to social mixing between tenure groups which in turn creates new opportunities for the most disadvantaged. Broadly consistent with the academic literature, we found little evidence of any significant social mixing between residents of the new build private houses and the longer-standing tenants of Peak Valley, but equally little evidence of any significant tensions or conflict developing between the latter and the new tenure group of owner-occupiers.
14. Hattersley's tenure diversification strategy avoided the hostility that is usually associated with mixed communities. Perhaps the most damning critique of the Mixed Communities agenda is its tendency to displace existing residents in favour of more upwardly-mobile incomers – that it is 'gentrification by stealth'; a form of 'state-led gentrification'<sup>8</sup>. Such a charge cannot be levelled at the Hattersley regeneration programme, for all tenants of the old housing demolished to make way for the new have been rehoused by Peak Valley in better new-build housing. In many respects, this is one of its greatest achievements – to be able to fund improvements and replacement of existing stock, as well as new infrastructure and facilities, through the introduction of homes for sale, without displacing any existing residents.
15. Resonating with the academic critique of the Mixed Communities agenda, the regeneration process in Hattersley appears to have done more to improve the material environment and cosmetic image of the area – thereby attracting newcomers and 'diluting' the deprivation – than to directly improve the life chances of existing residents themselves. The lack of any significant change in deprivation scores in Hattersley over the past decade, despite visible improvements to the estate and to facilities, supports this assessment. Nonetheless, this has done much to abate the persistent 'territorial stigma'<sup>9</sup> that has come to mark the estate, which may lower some of the barriers that many residents face in finding opportunities.
16. Despite the lack of evidence to support the purported causal

mechanisms of mixed communities, the tenure diversification project in Hattersley has had some positive – and some negative – impacts on the estate:

- (i) Breaking up specific mono-tenure concentrations of social housing and moving families to new homes spread out across the estate has helped break down what many see as highly inward-looking, isolationist micro-communities on the estate; helping overcome through higher spatial mobility some of the more negative aspects of close-knit communities, such as gang culture, that were hindering upward mobility. Residents' perceptions of crime and safety have improved as a result.
  - (ii) Imagined territorial barriers, such as that between the 'Hattersley' and 'Mottram' sides of the estate, have become more permeable. This process was strengthened by rebuilding and relocating the district centre with community facilities, public services and Peak Valley's offices at the centre of the divide, on Stockport Road, renamed The Hub, thereby creating a symbolic bridge between the two sides.
  - (iii) A problematic adverse effect of breaking down boundaries and increasing spatial mobility has been the displacement of anti-social behaviour and minor criminality from Hattersley to neighbouring town centres, such as Hyde. This reflects a common concern with the Mixed Communities agenda – that by moving people around and encouraging spatial mobility it tends to displace issues rather than resolve them directly<sup>10</sup>.
17. Tenure diversification can be seen to have had most impact in combination with Tameside MBC's earlier interventions in restructuring school catchment areas, thereby encouraging social mixing between tenure groups but in particular for young people. The process of territorial stigmatization of Hattersley also extended to school students on the estate, whose employment prospects were often hampered the moment they left school by unfavourable associations in the minds of local and perhaps even national employers. Part of the problem with one large feeder school serving a mono-tenure ex-council estate – besides from stigma – is that it concentrates children from disadvantaged families in one learning space which may therefore mean lower standards are achieved due to the compound effects of fewer resources to address greater learning needs. Moreover, as a microcosm of the estate itself, this situation intensified over time as social housing was 'residualised' – increasingly an option of last resort, rather than a mainstream tenure of choice.<sup>11</sup> By demolishing Hattersley Comprehensive – located at the centre of the estate, now being developed as new homes for sale – and building new schools in neighbouring areas through a council-led Private Finance Initiative (PFI) programme, this self-reinforcing cycle of decline may have been broken.

<sup>6</sup> ODP, *Sustainable Communities: People, Places and Prosperity: a five year plan from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister*. (2005): p.52

<sup>7</sup> Alan Berube, "Mixed Communities in England: A US Perspective on Evidence and Policy Prospects," *Water*, 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees, eds., *Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth?* (Policy Press, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> Loic Wacquant, "Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality," *Thesis Eleven* 91, no. 1 (November 1, 2007): 66–77

<sup>10</sup> David Imbroscio, "Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 34, no. 1 (February 26, 2012): 1–20.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Harloe, *The People's Home?: Social Rented Housing in Europe and America* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1995).

<sup>3</sup> This and similar remarks can be attributed to various participants and stakeholders interviewed as part of this project.

<sup>4</sup> ODP, *Sustainable Communities: Homes for All: A Five Year Plan from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister* (ODPM, 2005): p.53

<sup>5</sup> Rebecca Tunstall and Alex Fenton, "In the Mix: A Review of Mixed Income, Mixed Tenure and Mixed Communities," 2006.

## Peak Valley's relational governance approach

18. In examining Peak Valley's role in the regeneration of Hattersley and its interaction with its community there has been no criticism of their approach. This we attribute to their 'relational' – as opposed to 'transactional' – approach to the delivery of their housing service. Such an approach potentially embodies and harnesses the concept of 'social capital' – high levels of which have been associated with socially and economically prosperous communities.<sup>12</sup> It has also been instrumental in cementing valued and trusted working relationships with all stakeholders and embedding successful governance of the estate with key partners: the local community; Tameside MBC; and, Barratt Homes, the developer of the new-build homes.
19. Faced with an existing local community infrastructure, Peak Valley's challenge was to develop and manage the inter-related component parts of social capital, namely trust and the networking features of bonding and bridging capital. It is evident that Peak Valley has developed trusted relationships. However, given the prevailing high level of deprivation on the estate, it is not yet clear if it managed the nurturing of bridging capital – important for developing inclusive and prosperous communities – whilst maintaining healthy levels of bonding capital, a feature of strong, robust communities. As mentioned above, tenure diversification and school rationalisation may deliver the required levels of bridging capital, but it is apparent that some residents are mourning the loss of associational activity and community spirit. We argue that while this may be a function of the lack of appropriate social space to congregate (see below) it is also likely to be a function of age. Existing community activists, particularly those associated with the still influential Hattersley Community Forum, are elderly and nostalgic for their past successes. Interestingly, the new build homes may serve to supply this missing generation of community activists as it appears that it is largely the 24-44 age group that are moving into these properties.
20. Peak Valley's relational approach has important implications for a current debate amongst practitioners and public administration academics about how public services can better address the increasingly complex needs of residents. The New Public Management paradigm – a bureaucratic, market-led means of service delivery – rested upon assumptions that public services were products that were delivered to people. Some commentators<sup>13</sup> argue that this has proven to be an inefficient, often unjust and costly way of meeting contemporary requirements of individuals and communities. Rather, what is required now is a new model<sup>14</sup> of governance that emphasises a holistic, inter-agency and relational approach to service delivery;

and, moreover, one that is predicated upon a notion of public service delivery as a process, the end outcome of which is likely to be more effective the more involved the service user is in the design and delivery of that process, towards a process of co-production.

21. In the absence of a more detailed comparative study it is also hard to assess the extent to which Peak Valley embodies the more relational principles promoted by the protagonists of 'New Public Governance'<sup>15</sup> – as opposed to New Public *Management* – models of service delivery. It is arguable<sup>16</sup> that small housing associations, such as Peak Valley, are particularly well-suited to delivering these kinds of relational services: they generally deliver a local housing management service; they have knowledge and understanding of the area; and, they tend to have strong relationships with local networks that can help make things happen.
22. Peak Valley's approach has been enhanced by their physical presence on the estate. This is not solely about the on-site location of a local housing office, though the accessibility of this is an important factor – it is also about how Peak Valley have embedded themselves into the living fabric of the community, through for example: hiring local residents to staff the office; enabling staff to become governors of the local primary schools; their involvement in the local football club; and, sponsoring community garden projects. It is this depth of immersion in the everyday, quotidian life of the estate that explains how the organisation has become, certainly in one resident's eyes, *'...like family'*.

## Partnership-based governance

23. The governance of the estate has been largely successful, principally due to the close partnership working between key public partners, which was written into the Collaboration Agreement from the outset. The following summarises our assessment of the governance of Hattersley since 2006:
1. **Community:** Peak Valley did not step into an empty cultural or political space when assuming housing management responsibility for the estate. A cadre of community activists had been developed in the years up to 2006, largely through adversity, when they *'...were the only ones running the estate'*. Regeneration interventions by Tameside MBC – most notably the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and Neighbourhood Partnership Pathfinder initiative – had further developed this layer of community activism. They were a key component part of the governance platform, the Hattersley Land Board, which facilitated Peak Valley's role in the regeneration process.

2. **The Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership** no longer exists but it was an influence on the estate for almost ten years, four of those coinciding with Peak Valley's tenure. Its legacy is contested. For some it delivered little impact relative to its resources; for others it was an important arena for connecting those participating residents – and by extension their networks – with governance issues, a way of developing bridging social capital. For the local ward councillors, the Neighbourhood Partnership was an important initiative as it co-ordinated different agencies' activity on the estate. This, they feel, is a current gap in public service delivery on the estate.
3. **Tameside MBC** has been highly invested in the Hattersley estate for several decades, which has helped drive forward the regeneration process beyond the capabilities of Peak Valley alone. Part of this derives from the loyalty and political commitments to Hattersley shown by a number of powerful local politicians, many of whose constituents live on the estate. Some of these councillors have taken on key functions of the Land Board and helped direct council funds towards the regeneration of Hattersley. Council officers too have played an important part. The move to develop more bridging capital on the estate had already begun with Tameside MBC rationalising and relocating Hattersley's schools. This is arguably one of the most decisive factors in the regeneration process.
4. **Land Board:** The primary mechanism for the governance of the regeneration of the estate is the Hattersley Land Board. This was established to deliver the Collaboration Agreement, and currently functions as an effective working partnership that facilitates *'robust discussion'* between the key agencies of Tameside MBC and Peak Valley. Also represented are the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) – incorporating English Partnerships and now Homes England – alongside four residents from the estate. There was some legitimate concern about the representativeness of residents attending the Board; in other words, it is not clear that any of the residents are representing any other views other than their own. However, the meetings are also attended by Hattersley's ward councillors who provide an alternative route for local democratic representation.

## Tackling socio-economic problems

24. Urban regeneration policy at the time of the stock transfer, driven as it was by recommendations of the Urban Task Force<sup>17</sup> and concerns of the New Labour Government's Social Exclusion Unit<sup>18</sup>, was based upon narrowing the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of the country to achieve the vision that *'... in ten to twenty years' time nobody should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live.'*<sup>19</sup>
25. Our evaluation attempts to explain a singular paradox: Peak Valley's tenant surveys<sup>20</sup>, and indeed its own legacy review<sup>21</sup>, reveal high, widespread and rising levels of satisfaction with all aspects of the organisation's activities; and yet Hattersley remains in the top 5% of the most deprived areas in the country, a position it has maintained since Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) were first collected in the 1990s. It is now estimated that around 95% of Hattersley residents live in the top 20% of the most deprived areas in England as captured by income, employment, education and health domains<sup>22</sup>. Almost half of the children (47%) on the estate live in poverty<sup>23</sup>. The causes of such persistent spatially-concentrated deprivation are complex and not the purview of this report. The fact that tenant satisfaction and service performance have continued to rise in Hattersley since 2006 despite no improvements in life chances, is instructive of the positive impact of the interventions made by Peak Valley and its regeneration partners.
26. Our findings point to a number of explanations:
- (i) The Hattersley estate regeneration has focused primarily on physical improvements to housing, amenities, safety and security, and infrastructure over and above more social and economic interventions. Indeed, the IMD score that relates to barriers to housing and services shows an improvement for Hattersley, in stark contrast to consistently high deprivation on other domains. For the physical and financial accessibility of housing and local services, the area is only in the bottom half of most deprived areas in England<sup>24</sup> – suggesting a very high performance in this area relative to other domains. Consistent with this picture, we found that residents largely feel that it is a *'...much nicer place to live'* and they *'...feel safer moving around the estate at all times.'* Tenants are happy with the improvements made to their housing in particular – both the upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new housing – as well as in other physical infrastructures, such as the railway station, whose redesign has proven a significant success in making it safe and attracting greater use.

<sup>17</sup> Department for Environment Transport and the Regions, 1999 'Towards an Urban Renaissance'

<sup>18</sup> Social Exclusion Unit (2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: national Strategy Action Plan, London SEU.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid* page 8

<sup>20</sup> See Peak Valley STAR surveys

<sup>21</sup> see Peak Valley Performance Legacy Review 2017

<sup>22</sup> Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*. Poverty here is defined as living in in families in receipt of out of work benefits, or in receipt of tax credits where their reported income is less than 60% median income.

<sup>24</sup> English Indices of Deprivation 2015 available online <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015>

<sup>12</sup> Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (Simon & Schuster, 2000).

<sup>13</sup> Osborne, S (2013) A New Theory for Public Service Management: Toward a (Public) Service-Dominant Approach. *American Review of Public Administration* 43 (2) p135-158

<sup>14</sup> Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR

<sup>15</sup> Osborne, S. (2006). The New Public Governance? *Public Management Review*, 8(3) 377-387

<sup>16</sup> Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR

(ii) The statistical paradox suggests that regeneration efforts undertaken by housing associations and local authorities are not enough alone to address fundamental structural inadequacies in the local economy, largely created by the economic restructuring of the 1980s, with which successive governments' urban regeneration policies and area based initiatives have struggled to contend. This has left local governance organisations such as Peak Valley with limited agency to effect and offset these deep and complex socio-economic problems. This may point to a wider national failure, despite government policy, to develop sustainable local policy solutions that work with and for local communities.

(iii) Within this constrained context, the post-2006 regeneration process may nonetheless have made significant impacts on life chances, but which have yet to materialise. Whilst relatively cosmetic improvements and consequent changes in satisfaction levels have been quick to emerge, the socioeconomic impacts of the regeneration of the Hattersley estate have been slower to take effect. There is a time lag between the interventions made and their translation into socioeconomic benefits; whilst satisfaction levels are more immediately discernible from general service and environmental improvements. We believe this is due to the generational nature of the specific regeneration process in Hattersley: young people have most to gain and are only beginning to enter the labour market. The fundamental intervention that will affect the life chances of younger generations is the innovative dual strategy of school catchment area restructuring and housing tenure diversification.

## Moving Onward

27. As noted above, this evaluation of the impact of the interventions by Peak Valley on the regeneration of Hattersley is premature. The Collaboration Agreement commits its signatories to a further ten years of regeneration activity. Moreover, as we have emphasised, the ongoing generational impact of tenure diversification and school rationalisation may yet affect the social and economic prosperity of the estate. It is arguable that it is only at this future point that the impact of Peak Valley can be fully appraised. Nonetheless, it is evident that Peak Valley have made a remarkable contribution to Hattersley's regeneration, one that has left a largely positive legacy for Onward to contemplate. In summary, Peak Valley have:

- made a significant contribution to the regeneration of the estate by developing innovative approaches to funding, designing and delivering largely successful interventions;
- garnered an enviable institutional reputation for integrity – we found this to hold true for all stakeholders involved in the regeneration process;

- provided a local, accessible housing management service;
- afforded sufficient weight to their social responsibilities to make a positive difference to how they are perceived upon the estate.

28. Almost all participants in this research, however, were concerned about the future of Hattersley once Peak Valley's governance structure was fully incorporated into Onward's. They fear the return of a more remote landlord. One resident in pointing to the end of their involvement on the Board of Management asked '*... how will they know us?*'

29. In light of these concerns – and the themes raised in the report – the main issues for Onward to address are the following:

- Ensuring that there is sufficient community involvement in the design of public realm improvements being developed by Tameside MBC/Land Board, as well as in any future redevelopment plans for the estate.
- Rethinking and addressing the chronic under-use of The Hub without unsettling community relations and in ways which promote co-located multi-agency working.
- Related to (ii) is the need to address the lack of social space on the estate for community association. There is a resident perception that The Hub has too much institutional oversight to work as an attractive community centre. The loss of pubs – from 11 to 1 – over the years has also served to diminish the facilities for social activity.
- Embedding a governance mechanism to address the '*how will they know us?*' question. New resident/tenant recruits to the Land Board is a start but needs more collective community involvement beyond the Land Board, in ways which replace the role of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership.
- Developing new governance approaches for managing all housing, increasingly split between owner-occupiers, buy-to-let landlords, Right to Buy owners and Peak Valley, which threatens the integrity of estate management.
- Tackling the persistent levels of socioeconomic deprivation through policy innovation. Jobs fairs and skills training initiatives have had limited success and other solutions are needed. These should look to develop the endogenous capacities of Hattersley and its residents rather than rely on spatial mobility to connect residents with exogenous economic opportunities.

# CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCING OUR REPORT

## 1 INTRODUCING OUR REPORT

This report bears testimony to Peak Valley's legacy for the Hattersley estate over the 12 years from 2006 to 2018. It has been written to provide Onward, as it undertakes its stewardship of this estate, and wider housing sector, with an independent assessment of the ways in which a social landlord can improve the quality of peoples' lives in such areas. In potentially providing a template for urban regeneration activity elsewhere, we have sought to highlight Hattersley's particular socio-economic and political history. The rich culture of local community organising and poor condition of physical infrastructure that Peak Valley inherited 12 years ago was profoundly shaped by the preceding half century of various urban regeneration policies and initiatives. Our task here is to identify and appraise Peak Valley's singular contribution within this historical context.

To do so, we collated and analysed historical textual and visual documentary material and drew upon descriptive statistics of Hattersley compiled by various agencies. Our observation of the estate included walking tours and regular visits, totalling 16, over a period of three months, from October 2017 to January 2018, as well as specific multiple visits to The Hub, the Tesco, local schools, the precinct shops and railway station. We talked with a cross-section of individuals and groups of people who have had, or continue to have, a stake in the regeneration of Hattersley. This included 26 semi-structured interviews, each averaging around an hour, detailed in the Appendix. We also conducted two focus groups of five and six residents, as well as speaking informally with a variety of people we met on our walks around the estate. We recorded and later transcribed and analysed these multiple conversations to get a deeper sense of the fundamental issues raised by different stakeholders. In doing so we used the regeneration objectives detailed in the Collaboration Agreement – the founding legal document signed by all partners, underpinning Hattersley's stock transfer and regeneration process – as criteria to assess Peak Valley's performance. This approach has enabled us to develop and present a rich narrative with stakeholder testimony, which sets out Peak Valley's role within the broader story of Hattersley.

Our evaluation should be interpreted in light of the fact that the regeneration process in Hattersley is ongoing. The Collaboration

Agreement commits its signatories to a further ten years of regeneration activity. Onward commissioned this report to ensure that learning from the Hattersley case is captured and shared. This report, then, is a snapshot of an ongoing process of transformation that aims to provide lessons not only for Onward but for the wider housing association sector and for policymakers in local and central government.

Two sets of descriptive statistics, useful as a quantitative measure of Peak Valley's performance, underline the validity of this line of enquiry. On one hand, Peak Valley's own tenant surveys<sup>25</sup>, and indeed its own legacy review<sup>26</sup>, reveal high, widespread and consistent levels of satisfaction with all aspects of the organisation's activities. On the other hand, according to the Government's Indices of Multiple Deprivation, most recently compiled in 2015, Hattersley remains in the top 5% of most deprived areas in the country, a position it has maintained since these statistics were first collected in the 1990s. These statistics beg the question why levels of tenant satisfaction and service performance have continued to rise since 2006 – suggesting the interventions made by Peak Valley and its regeneration partners on the estate have been positively impactful – whilst concomitant, or indeed any statistically significant, improvements to life chances have failed to materialise. We adopt a research approach that might help explain how Peak Valley's performance in Hattersley can be viewed positively despite the



Figure 1: Aerial view over the Hattersley estate, looking west towards Manchester city centre.

persistently high levels of socio-economic deprivation prevailing upon the estate.

These facts also serve to furnish an explanation that points to fundamental structural inadequacies in the local economy, largely created by the economic restructuring of the 1980s, which successive governments' urban regeneration policies and area based initiatives have barely touched. This has left local governance organisations such as Peak Valley with limited agency to effect and offset these deep and complex socio-economic problems. It is one that also points to a failure, despite government policy, to develop sustainable local policy solutions that work with and for the local community.

Nonetheless, it is Peak Valley's agency that is the focus of this report. It is within this explanatory framework that we offer a fine-grained narrative of Peak Valley's role in the regeneration of Hattersley. In what follows we first present a short introduction to Hattersley written to familiarise the reader with the salient characteristics of the estate that resurface throughout our evaluation of the regeneration process. Here, we provide a brief history of Hattersley's socioeconomic trajectory as way of background to the stock transfer process that has defined the

regeneration since 2006. In the main part of the report, we explore in detail the various interventions that Peak Valley and its partners have made on the estate since 2006, focusing on tenure diversification, housing stock upgrading, public realm improvements, new retail and community amenities, transport infrastructure and skills training. This provides an assessment of how Peak Valley has performed against their agreed regeneration objectives captured in the Collaboration Agreement. We then proceed to examine the governance of the estate by presenting an assessment of how effectively the key local organisations, namely Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (MBC) and Peak Valley, have used their institutional influence to shape the regeneration process. We define governance here as including social actors and, in so doing, we also explore in detail how Peak Valley has engaged the local community. Finally, we consider how Peak Valley's legacy might inform Onward Homes in its ongoing stewardship of the estate. We conclude by drawing out a number of lessons learnt for estate regeneration policy and practice.

<sup>25</sup> See Peak Valley STAR surveys

<sup>26</sup> see Peak Valley Performance Legacy Review 2017

## CHAPTER 2

# INTRODUCING HATTERSLEY

## 2 INTRODUCING HATTERSLEY

Hattersley is a large housing estate that sits in the Longdendale Valley close to the Peak District National Park. It lies 13 miles to the east of Manchester on the edge of the Greater Manchester conurbation and is situated adjacent to and south of the M67 motorway which links the M60 to the trans-Pennine Manchester-to-Sheffield routes. Hattersley falls within two electoral wards of Tameside Metropolitan Borough: Hyde Godley and Longdendale. Its administrative centre is five miles away at Ashton-under-Lyne. Other nearby centres are Hyde town centre (approximately 1 mile away) and the small villages of Mottram and Broadbottom adjacent to the area.




Figure 2: Map showing Hattersley's location.

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hattersley>

The Hattersley estate was constructed by Manchester City Council between 1962 and 1972 as one of several 'overspill' estates built to accommodate the extensive post-war east city centre clearance programme during that period. Built at a cost of around £10 million on 480 acres of greenfield land, mostly farmland, Hattersley was the second largest of 22 overspill sites, housing over 12,000 people.<sup>27</sup> Providing new homes with all the 'mod cons' arranged within plentiful green open space and set against a backdrop of hills, the Peaks only a walk away, Hattersley promised its first residents, as a popular slogan had it, "Fresh Hope, Fresh Air."<sup>28</sup> For a variety of political and socioeconomic reasons, which we outline below, life on Hattersley down the decades did not always live up to such early promises.

Originally comprising 4150 properties, this had fallen to 1,725 (of which 1,404 were tenanted) by the time of the stock transfer in 2006,



Figure 3: The original outline plan for the Hattersley overspill estate.

Source: Courtesy of Manchester City Archives, Engineers Microcard Collection, Ref. 5460/12.

<sup>27</sup> Keith Kintrea, "Policies and Programmes for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods: Recent English Experience," *Housing Studies* 22, no. 2 (March 2007): 261–82, doi:10.1080/02673030601132920.

<sup>28</sup> Tameside MBC, "Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram," 2004, <https://www.tameside.gov.uk/tmbc5/hattersleyspg.pdf>.

<sup>29</sup> PVHA Annual report 2016

<sup>30</sup> Development and Delivery Strategy, 2006, English Partnerships

<sup>31</sup> ONS, Mid-year estimates 2015

<sup>32</sup> Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group

mainly due to the demolition of the notorious tower blocks, the 'Seven Sisters'.<sup>29</sup> At this time the population of the area was estimated to be around 7,000<sup>30</sup>, with an age structure biased toward the younger (5-19 years) and older (55-74) age groups. The pattern of housing tenure was weighted heavily in favour of social rented accommodation, at 70.6%, with 29.4% privately owned, almost all through the Right to Buy programme initiated a few decades earlier. By 2015 the local population had fallen slightly to 6,550<sup>31</sup>, the overwhelming majority of whom (95.5%) classified themselves as White British. The local population's age structure retained a higher than average proportion of young people aged 0-15 years although its proportion of older residents had fallen to slightly below the national average. By 2015 the pattern of housing tenure had changed to 37.8% owner occupation, 56% social rent and 6.2% in other rented accommodation<sup>32</sup>.

High levels of social and economic deprivation, relative to the rest of England, characterise this area. Deprivation and relative inequalities were entrenched, as in other parts of the country, during the economic restructuring in the mid to late 1980s. By the late 1990s Hattersley was in the top 10% of most deprived areas in the country<sup>33</sup> and these levels had shifted little by 2015<sup>34</sup>. It is now estimated that around 95% of Hattersley residents live in the top 20% of the most deprived areas in England as captured by income, employment, education and health domains<sup>35</sup>. Almost half of the children (47%) on the estate live in poverty.<sup>36</sup>

The spatial geography used to enumerate the various domains of deprivation undoubtedly mask pockets of relative affluence in nearby villages such as Mottram or indeed amongst recently arrived residents of the new-build properties within the estate itself. However, the prevalence and persistence of high levels of deprivation across most of the domains captured by these Indices should remain a policy concern. Urban regeneration policy at the time of the stock transfer, driven as

it was by recommendations of the Urban Task Force<sup>37</sup> and concerns of the New Labour Government's Social Exclusion Unit<sup>38</sup>, was based upon narrowing the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of the country to achieve the vision that '*... in ten to twenty years' time nobody should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live*'<sup>39</sup>. The causes of such persistent deprivation are complex and not the purview of this report. Suffice it to say that some comfort for local agencies and policymakers attempting to address this problem can be gained from the area's score on the domain that captures barriers to housing and services. On this measure, the physical and financial accessibility of housing and local services, the area is only in the bottom half of most deprived areas in England<sup>40</sup> – suggesting very high performance in this area relative to other domains.

Indeed, Hattersley residents are relatively well provided for by local services, amenities and employment opportunities, albeit generally low paid. These include: a local housing office; a health centre; a dentist; four primary schools; two secondary schools; a library; a sports centre;



Figure 4: Typical housing in Hattersley, with green hills always in sight

<sup>33</sup> Indices of Deprivation 2000 available online at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407204456/http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/communities/indicesofdeprivation/indicesofdeprivation/>

<sup>34</sup> English Indices of deprivation 2015 available online <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015>

<sup>35</sup> Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. Poverty here is defined as living in in families in receipt of out of work benefits, or in receipt of tax credits where their reported income is less than 60% median income.

<sup>37</sup> Department for Environment Transport and the Regions, 1999 'Towards an Urban Renaissance'

<sup>38</sup> Social Exclusion Unit (2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: national Strategy Action Plan, London SEU.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid page 8

<sup>40</sup> English Indices of Deprivation 2015 available online <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015>

a community facility (The Hub), three churches (Church of England, Catholic and Baptist); a railway station providing two 20 minute services every hour to the centre of Manchester; a regular local bus service to the nearby centres of Ashton and Hyde; a large supermarket (Tesco Extra), six local shops; one public house; and a community garden. Local employment opportunities – those within walking distance – are provided by a McDonalds, a British Gas Call Centre and the Tesco Extra; whilst a number of jobs are provided by the local housing association, Peak Valley. Four of these were won by local residents.

The high performance in public service and housing provision relative to other domains can be attributed in part to the successful management of the estate by Hattersley's dedicated community-based housing association. Peak Valley was established as a social landlord on 25<sup>th</sup> September 2006, specifically to own and manage the housing stock transferred from Manchester City Council. Its structure and name were developed and agreed with residents, Tameside officers and local councillors, and Manchester City Council. Its roots in the community can be traced back to its parent company Portico's intensive consultation exercises with residents in developing the regeneration masterplan with Tameside MBC, but also to the process by which Peak Valley was christened as such. There was a competition among tenants for the name, and the two names with the highest votes were 'Peak' and 'Valley', evoking the natural landscape of the estate. It was decided to combine the two names for Peak Valley Housing Association.



Figure 5: New district centre (The Hub and Tesco Extra car park) nestled behind housing.

<sup>41</sup> Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership (2007) 'Hattersley 40 years on' <http://www.hattersley.org.uk/videos/index.html>  
<sup>42</sup> ibid  
<sup>43</sup> 'the Hattersley Lament' on the album 'A Lancashire Lad' (1972) Mike Harding.

The way in which Peak Valley was conceived and christened illustrates the strength of community that has always marked Hattersley. From the outset, the early residents arriving in the 1960s, mainly from working class areas of East Manchester, such as Gorton, noted a 'strong sense of community'<sup>41</sup>. However, these were city dwellers used to the hustle, bustle, noise and opportunities of a big city – a marked contrast from the bucolic environment that did, and still does, characterise Hattersley. Unsurprisingly, notions of community were tempered by feelings of 'isolation and being cut off from facilities of the city'<sup>42</sup>. These feelings are still very much in evidence today. It may have been these sentiments or the fact that many of the early properties were 'jerry-built' – remaining in use well beyond their original purpose to provide temporary accommodation – that prompted the folk song the 'Hattersley Lament':

*'Ee dear what can the matter be?  
 Some silly bugger has moved us to 'attersley.  
 We've been up 'attersley three weeks on Saturday,  
 'Ee how I wish we weren't 'ere.'*<sup>43</sup>

Such lament is not a common currency amongst Hattersley residents today. If it lingers still it will be with people who, if they have heard of Hattersley at all, will know it by a reputation forged from the three dreadful, but isolated, criminal incidents that have punctuated the estate's history over the last half century, namely: the Moors' murderers; the serial killings of Dr Harold Shipman; and the recent murders



Figure 6: Some of Hattersley's first residents at a Mancunian Reunion event

of PCs Nicola Hughes and Fiona Bone. These incidents appear to have only galvanised the local community, reinforcing – certainly in older residents – their sense of isolation from the outside world and determination to overcome adversity. Many interview participants remarked to us that older residents describe themselves as living 'on' Hattersley – evoking an island cut off from the surrounding mainland – whilst newer residents live 'in' Hattersley. Others described their 'long struggle' to improve their area. This singular drive to persevere is evident in the elderly activists that maintain the influence of the Hattersley Community Forum in the management of the estate. It is also seen, albeit in a more quixotic fashion, in the last remaining individual resident still refusing to move and make way for the next phase of the new district centre, including a Lidl supermarket and a Costa coffee outlet.

The social history that bears testimony to this community spirit is inscribed not only in the memories of long-standing residents but in various outlets from the (above) 'Hattersley Lament' to groups like Mancunian Reunion.<sup>44</sup> The latter was prompted by the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership as part of the regeneration process, and now enjoys an independent life as a social group dedicated to preserving the history of the original residents of Hattersley. It is also evident in a short film for the BBC, 'Songs from Hattersley'<sup>45</sup>, where we

hear five unique and personal stories direct from the residents, who each sing their story in their own words to music specially written for the film.

It is this sense of community that has not only helped the area to cohere after the shocking criminal incidents of the past but also helped to doggedly drive much of the impressive resident engagement in the regeneration process since the late 1990s. It is perhaps no surprise that the local community newsletter published as part of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership regeneration programme was entitled, following community consultation, 'the Hattersley Terrier'<sup>46</sup>. Their dogged determination has helped Hattersley residents stay strong in the face of severe urban-economic decline and the drag brought to bear on their and their children's life chances by the persistent stigma attached to the estate. It has also informed their particular approach to engaging with, and helping shape, the regeneration process that began in earnest in the late 1990s.

<sup>44</sup> <https://mancreunion.wordpress.com/about/>  
<sup>45</sup> 'Songs from Hattersley' [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFf\\_EpGj5vo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFf_EpGj5vo)  
<sup>46</sup> [http://www.hattersley.org.uk/2011/10/hattersley\\_terrier\\_magazine/index.html](http://www.hattersley.org.uk/2011/10/hattersley_terrier_magazine/index.html)

## 2.1 A brief history of regeneration

The post-war history of housing regeneration records a general trend away from simple 'neighbourhood improvement' approaches that seek to tackle issues of housing vacancy, environmental neglect and spatially-concentrated deprivation by working directly with residents, towards more market-led and interventionist 'neighbourhood transformation' approaches that attempt to radically restructure housing estates through changing their position in the housing market hierarchy often via the introduction of new tenures.<sup>47</sup> Hattersley stands at the forefront of this historical trajectory – embodying an innovative approach to tenure diversification that not only seeks to create new opportunities for the upward social mobility of existing residents, but so too provides a sustainable source of funding for a more traditional programme of improvements in the realms of housing, retail, transport and employment. In this way, Hattersley combines both an 'improvement' and 'transformation' approach: the latter pays for the former.

Such a strategy represents an alternative route to fund the regeneration of large ex-council estates that remain expensive to regenerate owing to high levels of deprivation and dereliction and which have exhausted or been bypassed by all conventional sources of funding, such as government programmes and stock transfer receipts. This is certainly the case for Hattersley, which remained outside the political-

geographical reach of well-funded programmes such as the Housing Market Renewal Initiative Pathfinders, and whose housing stock was too low in value for Peak Valley to be able to borrow the capital investment required for expensive improvements from private providers. Due to these factors, a straightforward improvement approach to upgrading housing stock via a stock transfer process coupled with government grant – for instance, the Decent Homes Programme – was simply not an option for the regeneration partners. A more transformative solution was called for. In this section, we summarise the socioeconomic conditions and policy process that led to the birth of this approach.

Due to its physical isolation on the edge of Manchester – a city that began its industrial decline as Hattersley was conceived – economic opportunities remained limited. Since the 1970s and '80s, many of the large local employers began to close or shed their workforce in response to growing global competition and economic restructuring. Many residents have therefore struggled to find work, especially within easy reach, and unemployment soon became a major problem on the estate. Socioeconomic isolation was amplified by poor planning decisions. For instance, for much of its history, Hattersley lacked good transport links to the city: it took nearly twenty years for a train station to be built on the line running into central Manchester.<sup>48</sup> This not only deepened the sense of isolation that entrenched itself on the estate but so too cut its residents off from easy access to job opportunities outside the immediate vicinity. One of the many successes of the post-2006 regeneration of the estate – as we highlight in this report – was to improve access and use of the train station that was for so long neglected and dangerous to use.



Figure 7: notorious tower blocks 'seven sisters' coming down in 2001

<sup>47</sup> Ruth Lupton and Crispian Fuller, "Mixed Communities: A New Approach to Spatially Concentrated Poverty in England," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33, no. 4 (December 2009): 1014–28.

<sup>48</sup> Martin Dodge, "Mapping the Geographies of Manchester's Housing Problems and the Twentieth Century Solutions," in *Manchester Geographies*, ed. W Theakstone (Manchester Geographical Society, 2017), 17–34.

By the late 1990s, the situation in Hattersley – dilapidated poorly-maintained properties, 'hard-to-let' flats, escalating social problems, and deepening deprivation all concentrated in one estate, placing additional demands on already over-stretched public services – was perhaps worse than in other comparable 'overspill' estates. This was due to interlocking socioeconomic and political factors compounded by a lack of investment or maintenance by remote landlord, Manchester City Council. An accident of geography meant that the estate was owned by Manchester City Council but located outside of its administrative boundaries, in Tameside MBC, instilling little incentive to invest. Adequate investment in Hattersley was further discouraged by constraints levied by central government on local authority capabilities to borrow capital for council housing regeneration and the policy shift towards stock transfer to housing associations from the late 1980s.<sup>49</sup> This meant that conventional funding methods were simply not adequate to pay for the regeneration required. A number of regeneration programmes, including a Single Regeneration Budget bid by Tameside MBC, failed to make much headway with addressing Hattersley's acute needs.

At the turn of the century, Hattersley appeared to be in terminal decline. The estate was originally built to house around 15,000 people, but by 2006, its population had fallen to about 6,600.<sup>50</sup> Such a huge drop reflects the general decline of the estate over this period – and suggests why a radical new approach to regeneration was required. Indeed, this was recognised in the final masterplan produced in 2003 and adopted by Tameside MBC as Supplementary Planning Guidance in 2004:

*Efforts by Tameside, Manchester City Council, the Hattersley Development Trust and residents groups have seen many improvements including new schools. However they have not stemmed the tide of decline. These groups, together with English Partnerships, the Housing Corporation and Portico Housing Association are agreed that only a radical change of image, and the injection of a possible £200million investment will succeed in regenerating The Hattersley and Mottram area.*<sup>51</sup>

That radical new approach came in the form of a stock transfer proposal and Collaboration Agreement between the public, private and third sectors that guaranteed the funding necessary to transform the estate. The physical transformation since 2006, but starting in the late 1990s with interventions by Tameside MBC, has been remarkable. Figure 6 outlines the major historical milestones for Hattersley's regeneration both before and after the 2006 stock transfer, and the following provides a sketch of these changes.

At its nadir, in the late 1990s, the Hattersley estate contained vast swathes of poorly maintained timber-framed housing originally built as temporary accommodation but soon unfit for habitation, as well as 'hard-to-let' flats in notoriously unpopular tower blocks, known as the 'seven sisters'. A number of 'problem families' and amongst Manchester City Council's most vulnerable tenants were relocated to Hattersley,

which placed pressure on the already over-stretched public services managed by Tameside MBC. The estate had earned a poor reputation locally and nationally, having been vilified in the national press for a series of shocking criminal incidents. Minor criminality, drug use and gang culture were rife. Hattersley Comprehensive school had seen student numbers drop from over a thousand to around 300. The district centre was in an advanced state of dilapidation, having seen dozens of shops and small businesses close. The train station was considered dangerous and chronically under-used. This only deepened a powerful and abiding sense of physical and social 'isolation and being cut off from facilities of the city'<sup>52</sup>; that people lived 'on' rather than 'in' Hattersley, as if an island cut off from the rest of society.

Today, all that has changed. Hattersley's housing stock has been considerably upgraded and diversified, with a new mix of tenures and an unprecedented increase in new-build owner-occupation. The 'seven sisters', along with other unfit-for-purpose housing, have been demolished, and bungalows, apartments and houses built in their place. A new district centre has been developed with a Tesco Extra which employs over a hundred local people and which helped pay for a bespoke community centre, The Hub. Hattersley Comprehensive has been demolished and new schools built in different locations with more diverse catchment areas. The train station has been redesigned and use is up by 30%. All housing stock now meets Decent Homes standard and tenant satisfaction has risen dramatically. A number of skills training and community development programmes, such as community gardens, have been developed and prove popular among residents of all ages. Hattersley's reputation is improving and the new housing for sale by regeneration partner Barratt Homes is amongst their fastest selling developments in the country. For the first time since its heyday, Hattersley's population is growing once more, as new residents move in and former residents move back. We explore these interventions made by Peak Valley in greater detail in the next chapter. In chapter 4, we identify the principal factors of success.

<sup>49</sup> Tameside MBC, "Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram."

<sup>50</sup> PVHA, "10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022" (2017).

<sup>51</sup> Tameside MBC, "Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram."

<sup>52</sup> Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership (2007) 'Hattersley 40 years on' <http://www.hattersley.org.uk/videos/index.html>

Figure 8: Historical timeline of significant events

Date	Milestone
1960	Manchester City Council begins buying up farmland near Mottram
1962	Construction of the Hattersley Estate begins
May 1963	First tenants move into new homes from inner-city Manchester
1972	Hattersley estate completed
1978	Railway Station is opened
1981	Hattersley Community Forum formally constituted as charitable body
1982	Portico Housing Association formed
1997	Single Regeneration Budget programme commences
1999	Stock transfer proposals announced by Manchester City Council
2000	First masterplan produced by Harvest Housing Association
2001	Seven sisters demolished
2002	New schools built through PFI scheme by Tameside MBC
2002	Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership established
2003	Harvest business plan proves unviable and Portico invited to submit proposal
2003	Second and final masterplan produced by Portico
2004	Masterplan adopted as Supplementary Planning Guidance by Tameside MBC
2004	Portico merges with another association to form Contour Housing Group
2005	Tenants vote 'yes' for stock transfer to Contour Housing Group
2005	Mancunian Reunion established through Neighbourhood Partnership
2006	Collaboration Agreement signed by regeneration partners
Sept 2006	Peak Valley founded as a subsidiary of Contour Housing Group to take on the stock
Sept 2006	Stock transfer to Peak Valley
Oct 2007	Planning approval for Phase 1a of new Barratt developments
2008	Global financial crisis creates uncertainty for Barratt Homes and delays construction
April 2010	Phase 1 of Barratt developments begins: Hare Hill, 196 units various property types
2011	Contour Housing Group merges with Vicinity to become Symphony Housing Group
Feb 2011	Work begins at the Padstow Walk development, 8 bungalows for over 55's
July 2011	Friends of Hattersley Station founded by local residents
Aug 2011	Work begins on The Hub
2012	Tesco begins skills training scheme with Hattersley residents
July 2012	Tesco Extra officially opens
Oct 2012	The Hub officially opens
2015	Re-routing of road to Railway Station completed
March 2017	Peak Valley agrees to become part of common board at Symphony Housing Group
March 2017	Demolition of last remaining tower block, Tameside Court
May 2017	Symphony Housing Group changes name to Onward Homes
March 2018	All members of Onward Homes, including Peak Valley, now operate as one organisation and trade as Onward.

# CHAPTER 3 EVALUATION OF INTERVENTIONS

### 3 EVALUATION OF INTERVENTIONS

In this section we evaluate in detail the various interventions made by Peak Valley since 2006. First, we consider the more physical and structural interventions, such as housing upgrading, before moving onto more community-oriented and social aspects, ending with skills training. We start by considering the principal approach to regeneration, tenure diversification through the introduction of homes for sale, which frames the context for exploring housing upgrading and physical infrastructure: the new-build homes for sale and new social housing, the existing stock and public realm, and the railway station. Next we address the new retail facilities, focusing on the new district centre, and in particular the Tesco Extra, before considering the flagship project, The Hub, the new home of many public and community services, such as the library. Finally, we assess the impacts of the community investment and skills development strategies.



Figure 9: New apartments: a successful example of a more physical intervention

In sum, we find that these interventions have largely been a success, albeit to varying degrees. In order to assess the overall success of the regeneration process itself – and the contributions made by specific interventions – we have evaluated the progress achieved for each regeneration objective set out in the Collaboration Agreement. A summary of this is presented in Figure 12 below, which also acts as a guide to the Interventions section.

Figure 10: Regeneration Objectives and their achievement

Regeneration Objective	Progress made
Deliver a more sustainable mix of residential accommodation across the Project Areas in favour of owner occupation;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Achieved (<b>see section 4.2</b>)</li> <li>- from around 70:30 social/private to 60:40</li> <li>- The private element has been diversified from 100% ex-council Right to Buy to include mostly new-build owner-occupied</li> <li>- Although some problems with buy-to-let landlords are emerging</li> </ul>
Secure an increase in the resident population in the project Area;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Achieved</li> <li>- Population decline has been arrested and reversed</li> <li>- New residents are moving to Hattersley for the first time in decades</li> </ul>
Secure the development of the District Centre;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partly-achieved (<b>section 3.3</b>)</li> <li>- Tesco Extra and The Hub are complete</li> <li>- New precinct shops on Honiton Avenue are complete</li> <li>- But second site south of Ashworth Lane (for Lidl and Costa Coffee) yet to be secured</li> </ul>
Secure the delivery of sustainable facilities for the community;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partly-achieved</li> <li>- The Hub's community facilities are much improved on the old community centre, but remain under-used and poorly-managed (<b>section 3.4</b>)</li> <li>- Recreational space, particularly for young people, has been reduced through housing redevelopment, and yet to be reconstructed through the delayed public realm improvements (<b>section 3.1.4</b>)</li> </ul>
Construct the Principal Infrastructure;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Largely achieved</li> <li>- New housing and retail completed (<b>sections 3.2 and 3.4</b>)</li> <li>- Railway station improved (<b>section 3.2</b>)</li> <li>- But public realm yet to be improved (<b>section 3.1.4</b>)</li> </ul>
Assist the parties in achieving their commitment to improve Hattersley;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Highly successful (<b>section 4.4</b>)</li> <li>- The Land Board has been very effective governance model</li> <li>- Partnership approach underwritten by Collaboration Agreement very successful in maintaining commitment from all partners</li> </ul>
Deliver a landmark project in partnership with the private sector;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Largely successful</li> <li>- Partnership with Tesco has been very beneficial to the estate, through the £4 million planning gains secured for the development of The Hub (<b>section 3.3.1</b>)</li> <li>- Partnership with Barratt Homes has produced amongst their fastest selling and most popular new housing developments in the UK (<b>3.1.1</b>)</li> </ul>
Facilitate the development of a series of high quality character areas;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Largely achieved (<b>sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2</b>)</li> <li>- excellent architectural design quality in comparison with peers, in both social and private new-build housing</li> <li>- some concerns over secured-by-design character of earlier phases of Barratt developments creating defensive urbanism</li> </ul>
Engage the community in the development and regeneration of the Project Area;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partly successful</li> <li>- Consultation exercises have been carried out periodically throughout the regeneration, particularly for the masterplan, but the process was driven by public partners</li> <li>- Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership provided a useful bridge between regeneration partners and residents, until it was disbanded in 2010 (<b>section 4.4.3</b>)</li> <li>- The Land Board has two positions for resident representatives (<b>section 4.4.2</b>)</li> <li>- Peak Valley's Board also had resident representation until it was incorporated into Onward Homes in 2018 (<b>section 4.5</b>)</li> </ul>

Maximise the regeneration benefits of the parties' activities;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Successful</li> <li>- the partnership approach embedded by the Collaboration Agreement has led to parties working together for mutually-beneficial outcomes</li> <li>- synergies created for Tameside MBC and Peak Valley (e.g. school restructuring and tenure diversification, <b>section 4.2.2</b>)</li> </ul>
Encourage environmental sustainability and high quality design in the built environment throughout the Project Area;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partly achieved (<b>sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2</b>)</li> <li>- excellent architectural design quality in comparison with peers, in both social and private new-build housing</li> <li>- some concerns over drop in Building for Life standards and lower environmental sustainability than originally envisaged due to Barratt's financial difficulties post-2008 crisis.</li> <li>- More work could be done to retrofit housing stock to higher environmental standards</li> </ul>
Deliver the Development and Delivery Strategy;	- Achieved
Secure planning permissions and obtain all necessary consents and approvals required to enable all housing, infrastructure and other required works to be constructed on the Project Area to deliver the Development Milestones;	- Achieved
Service and maintain the existing Management Team and Collaboration Board;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Achieved.</li> <li>- The Land Board has had a positive and sustained presence on the regeneration process (<b>section 4.4.3</b>)</li> </ul>
Deliver the Development to an agreed design and within an agreed timescale.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partly-achieved</li> <li>- The global financial crisis has delayed the Barratt housing developments and its contributions to public realm improvements, which remain undelivered (<b>section 3.1.4</b>)</li> </ul>

### 3.1 Housing stock and public realm improvements

One of the major targets of the post-2006 regeneration process was the poor condition of the housing stock and physical environment of the estate. By the transfer date the housing stock had been reduced to 1725, mainly due to the demolition of the notorious tower blocks, the 'seven sisters'. With further demolition planned, 1,400 properties were still occupied at the time of transfer.<sup>53</sup> Much of this housing was in a really bad condition, particularly the timber-framed houses, constructed as temporary accommodation in order to rehouse decanted residents from the slum clearances swiftly, but lacking many of the modern standards of insulation and heating we now take for granted, and designed only to last around 15-20 years, as these residents recall:

*When I was a kid you could put your hand through the window frame; it was that rotted you could feel the wind blowing through it. So if you put your hand through it they'd [Manchester City Council housing maintenance team] come up with a plank of wood, cut it, chisel it and slot it, you know, it was just patchwork.*

*There was some reports in the papers that one man was complaining because he was knocking icicles off his ceiling inside his bedroom, because there was a one inch gap right at the top. Some of the houses have really been badly built, in fact just thrown up, some of the earlier ones.*

The number one priority for Peak Valley, therefore, was to demolish the stock that was unfit for purpose to make way for new-build housing. Since 2006, over 500 housing units have been demolished by Peak Valley's contracted demolition company, Connell Brothers. The housing put up in its place – both the new-build Barratt homes for sale and the replacement social housing stock – is by all accounts of far superior quality than much comparable housing in other estates. Furthermore, the remaining social housing stock has been significantly upgraded. Although the public realm works are incomplete, everyone we spoke with agreed that the interventions made to physically transform the estate have been very successful. In the following, we address each particular strand of this intervention in turn – Barratt Homes; new social housing; existing stock upgrading; and public realm improvements.

<sup>53</sup> Michael Harloe, *The People's Home?: Social Rented Housing in Europe and America* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1995).



Figure 11: Demolition of the last tower block, Tameside Court, in 2017

#### 3.1.1 Barratt Homes

The homes that Barratt have built – and are continuing to build – have been a huge success. In total, Barratt are to build some 830 new homes across 24 sites on the Hattersley estate<sup>54</sup> We have already heard how this is one of their fastest selling developments in the country. Part of this is due to the very reasonable cost at which Barratt are selling them, as this Barratt Director exclaims: “a four bed detached house for maybe 160, 170 grand it’s, you know, there aren’t many other places that offer that!” A first-time buyer, recently moved into Hattersley, explains how her new Barratt home was so much more attractive than comparable products on the market:

*We actually went to the housing estate in Denton to buy through Wimpy and they were so small and so expensive and they were so rude as well the customer service was shocking. But then when we come up here and see them all it was just like yes! It was the price... [in Denton] you was looking at over 200 [grand] for a three bed which we didn't even think about, we weren't even looking at that. It was a new estate that they had built so it was away from everybody else, one of the houses next door which is a smaller two bed was coming in at around 128 and then we got this [three bed] for 134!*

Part of the reason that Barratt have been selling the houses at such low prices is a peculiarity of Hattersley's history:

*...probably because of the value, there is a ceiling to what you can charge in Hattersley because mortgage values will only value a property up to a certain level there.* Barratt Director.

This curious consequence of the stigma attached to Hattersley – infecting the calculations of mortgage providers – has meant that, paradoxically, the new housing can only be sold at a certain price if it is ever to be granted a mortgage. This, of course, has proven very popular amongst homebuyers – helping abate the stigma. The new home-owner goes on to reveal that it was not just the price that attracted her and her partner to buy in Hattersley:

*My partner who lived in Hyde, in Godley, who obviously drives up this way because he passes it for work and we've seeing them and because of the prices I was like why not shall we just go and look at it, let's go and have a look and then once I seen them I was like "yes I'll have, I'll just have it" But yes I love the house, the area – I worried at first about coming up here just because of everything in the news, what had happened... So then we just come up, our friends actually when we was looking bought a house as well round the corner, a new build as well – they*

<sup>54</sup> Tameside MBC, "Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram."

*had no problems so I said "why not just go and do it?" and we haven't had, touch wood, one problem since. The neighbours are all lovely, the kids that hang around if you tell them to move on they're respectful they move – no issues at all.*

Of the reasons other than price that owner-occupiers had for buying here – including the excellent location and good transport connections into Manchester city centre via the railway and the M67 – it was the design quality and standard of construction that proved most persuasive. The housing built by Barratt is of excellent quality: the windows are larger than most new-build properties, the materials are of a higher standard – many clad in stone – and the designs are varied and appear to respond to local context and cartography beyond that apparent in comparable developments elsewhere. This, the Barratt executive explains, is a fortuitous product of the Residential Development Agreement that BASE (now Barratt) entered into with other regeneration partners in March 2007 in order to fulfil the objectives of the Collaboration Agreement<sup>56</sup>:

*Those early days were very difficult – mainly because of the design, it was all non-standard house types. So just to explain: Barratt like are a major builder you know we basically build, we have a core range of standard house types that we build throughout the country and they may be re-elevated to suit the local vernacular. But basically we are best when we are building the types that we know how to build that we have fully costed, it suits our systems... Using the analogy of a car manufacturer – Ford will sell you a Ford Mondeo and lots of different specs and lots of different colours but they won't sell you one with a base that's a foot longer, that would mean changing their machine – well that's like our standard house types. So phase 1 had non-standard house types and that was in response to the design criteria that was in the license agreement. Anyway to cut a long story short, it was quite challenging initially but anyway we got on with it we got on with the hurdles with the non-standard house types.*

Due the unique circumstances of the Hattersley regeneration process, Barratt were asked to build to a much higher design standard than they would do usually. This was partly due to the influence of English Partnerships in the early days of the deal – the national agency for regeneration insisted on high design specifications on the projects it helped fund. Many of the projects English Partnerships were involved with were promoted as 'sustainable communities' and exemplars to the wider regeneration industry. Although Hattersley was not formally one of EP's demonstration projects – such as the Millennium Communities Programme that gave rise to New Islington in Ancoats, Manchester, and Greenwich Millennium Village near the Dome in London – it nonetheless benefitted from having English Partnerships as one of the main regeneration partners driving forward the project. Likewise with Tameside MBC who saw Hattersley as a major political priority and exemplar for future intervention. Underwriting these commitments to high design standards was, of course, the Collaboration Agreement.

However, these design standards soon came into conflict with other priorities. Barratt Homes were caught in a near-impossible predicament in being legally-obliged to build and sell houses according to the specifications set out in the agreement yet were also prevented from selling them at a rate high enough to cover the costs of the high build quality. This was due to the mortgage lending ceiling imposed on home-buyers which translated into lower sales prices for Barratt. At the same time, the floor fell out of the market following the 2008 financial crisis – just months after Barratt signed – which meant that house prices were further deflated. It was in Barratt's interests to wait for the market to recover before embarking on building and selling properties but, as the Collaboration Agreement dictated, the payments to Peak Valley and the Land Board partners had to follow the pre-agreed annual schedule such that the regeneration process kept its momentum and the promises made to tenants were honoured. In this extraordinarily



Figure 12: construction on site of new Barratt homes

difficult context, Barratt have struggled to fulfil all their obligations without losing significant sums; indeed, it has been acknowledged by Barratt that they have not made money on the Hattersley development.

In the event, the regeneration partners took a more pragmatic and flexible approach than that written into the Collaboration Agreement and worked with Barratt to ensure that the housing was at least built rather than insist on the letter of the law and risk bankrupting the company. This involved softening the initial requirements for Building for Life Silver Standard. Part of the reason this worked for the regeneration partners was that Building for Life Silver standard entailed that the housing be built according to secured-by-design principles, which is problematic in the case of Hattersley for a number of reasons:

*The problem with that is... I was involved in a meeting where we went to see the police's consultant on phase 1 because they knew it was a high crime area they wanted really high boundary treatment walls. So 2.1 metre high brick walls and things like that around properties and I know some of the feedback from the local community was we were sort of creating a gated community. Which is exactly what the police want and it's almost like this is between that and the design standards in that Building for Life also pushes you towards an open feel in a development. You know lots of openness and no boundaries... making sure that the development itself, you know in terms of dark alleyways and things like, that those are designed out... with footpaths you know connectivity and footpaths linking different culs-de-sac. Just the kind of place you and I would want to live... whereas secured-by-design is the opposite... everything enclosed we don't really want sort of people that don't live on there coming onto the development and using the spaces etc. So all these things caused problems early on and I think if you were to even view phase 1 on Google Earth or have a drive round I think it's for the detriment of that development. You know we achieved what we needed to achieve but I don't think it really hangs together particularly well.*

Because Building for Life Silver insists on both secured-by-design accreditation by the police and on design principles that favour openness and permeability, Barratt found it almost impossible to achieve all requirements simultaneously. The result, as the Director points out, is that "in order to achieve everything you end up kind of not really achieving anything to a great standard in my view."

Aside from design inconsistencies, the regeneration partners were also at risk of alienating the local community from the new developments, if they continued to be designed and built according to such exacting secured-by-design standards. The defensive urbanism embodied by secured-by-design would only act to create new spatial divisions within the estate and hinder through-flow, interaction and social mixing between tenure types. For the new developments to be accepted by the community, and for the urban design to seamlessly integrate with existing street patterns for an interconnected and legible urban landscape, these initial design standards were quietly relaxed in further Barratt developments after phase one.

Another oversight of the Collaboration Agreement was the lack of control on subsequent sales that homeowners might make independently with buy-to-let landlords, who are becoming a problem on the estate. Although the licence agreement with Barratt places

*a very strict limit on how many sales that Barratt's can actually sell to investors buyers to let landlords. We can't do anything about subsequent sales.* Former Peak Valley official.

The growing incidence of private rented accommodation on the estate is the result of homeowners selling on their homes in this way to private landlords, who are often absentee speculative landlords with little interest or commitment in maintaining their houses to the standards expected of Peak Valley:

*The other thing I am concerned about they tell me it's the fastest selling development in the country... but I don't want to see a whole load of private landlords either because I know quite a few have been bought by the same people to rent out, it's a growing concern really I obviously have no control over it but my fear is because a lot of these private landlords will be and I'm using this is as a blanket example, from down South from London, prices look pretty reasonable to them, that we're going to have a lot of private landlords who are miles away and have absolutely no input to the area.* Local councillor.

This represents one potential grave weakness in the design of the masterplan, in that the future governance of the estate may be splintered between multiple parties who may not share the same ethos and vision – or uphold the same standards of customer service – that Peak Valley and the Land Board have for the estate and its tenants.

### 3.1.2 New social housing

One of the key objectives for Peak Valley in building new housing was to diversify the range of housing options. A problem on the estate was not just the mono-tenure nature of the stock but also the lack of different designs and sizes for particular needs, such as larger families, single people, or the elderly. Responding to rising demand from the latter, Peak Valley built a substantial number of bungalows. Building new houses for sale was thus not the only way in which the housing offer could be transformed so that different groups of people who may otherwise have moved away could be rehoused within the estate; it applies just as much to older residents with specific needs as it does to aspirational families:

*To keep that community spirit there and to keep you know successive generations in Hattersley we looked at the typologies on the estate and it was very clear that the people were saying we needed bungalows. So the first couple of phases were just to build bungalows and what that meant was that we could free the family housing up then for people that wanted to remain in the area and then obviously BASE came in and offered the housing for sale.* Architect.

<sup>56</sup> Sam Cooper, "PVHA Community Investment Strategy: June 2014" (Peak Valley Housing Association, 2014).



*Well some schemes we changed the mix on because people you know we put some housing in and people said "oh no we want more bungalows", so some of the sites changed back to bungalows. Because you know we were getting to a point where we I think we built about 70 bungalows and we were like we really need to start building some houses now...*

This relatively participatory approach to the development of new social housing – if not for the Barratt homes – has continued through to the present. The last remaining tower block, the 11-storey Tameside Court, was demolished only last year, in 2017, and involved the architects working closely with the community to design their replacement accommodation:

*The tower block's just recently come down and one of the key projects to empty that was Honiton which was to take the community in the tower block and keep it together but rehouse it in a new form of accommodation. That's where Honiton [Avenue] came from which was this sort of extra care light principle where everyone had a spacious 1 or 2 bedroomed apartment but it had a sort of centre space in the glazed atrium down the centre and we worked with those residents from day one to find the site, to design the scheme and then that meant that we could do the commercial block of shops next to Honiton. Architect.*



**Figure 13: Diverse typologies of new-build social housing for Peak Valley tenants**

The design process for the new social housing schemes was carried out in consultation with residents and there was a certain amount of flexibility built into the approach as phases were completed so as to reflect changing local demand, as one of the architects explains:

Like the Barratt homes, the new-build social housing that Peak Valley has provided on the estate to replace the stock that was demolished is of a very high standard and is universally appreciated by tenants.

### 3.1.3 Existing stock upgrading

Another big challenge for Peak Valley was in bringing all existing stock up to Decent Homes standard. A local resident and community worker describes how successful Peak Valley have been in meeting this challenge:

*You know the houses were grotty, really run down, there'd been a chronic lack of investment for a number of years from Manchester, you cannot say Peak Valley haven't rectified that, you know, the houses, they've had new windows and doors, they'd had new heating, they've had new plumbing. They've been painted a less grey colour so you know the majority of them they've been insulated properly they are warmer, the housing stock is better... [whereas] 15 years ago it was some of the grottiest houses.*

Through the multiple improvements made to existing stock since 2006, all housing stock now meets Decent Homes Standard.<sup>57</sup> This has generally been well received by tenants:

*I believe they're very nice, I mean they've done all the outside they've painted the outside, they've put new porches on, new kitchens, new heating system and I think they've put new bathrooms in. So that is a big update because they're 50 odd years old and they always need updating*

This is evident in the rising rates of satisfaction amongst tenants recorded in periodic surveys conducted by Peak Valley: from 75% satisfaction with 'quality of home' in 2008 rising to 89% in 2014; and from 70% satisfaction with 'repairs and maintenance' in 2008 rising to 84% in 2014.<sup>58</sup> One area of particular interest here is the jump in satisfaction for the 'value for money' of rent, from just 70% in 2008 to 82% by 2012, from which point it has remained steady. This can be explained by the fact that many tenants were shocked by the sudden rise in rents upon Peak Valley becoming their landlord in 2006, which was due to the higher rental rates that housing associations were enabled to charge compared to local authorities.<sup>59</sup> Part of the rise in this case – as in most stock transfers – was to cover some of the costs of improving the stock that had been neglected by Manchester City Council under the lower 'fair rents' regime. However, in the very early days of the transfer, tenants would have seen a sudden increase in their rents but not yet the corresponding improvements promised by Peak Valley, and so therefore were unsatisfied with the value for money. This tenant recalls the general mood in the community:

*so it [rents] went up twice a year didn't it, and everyone was complaining, then they [PVHA] said "well you've not had a rate increase in 3 or 4 years", "yes fine but you've not done anything so why has it suddenly gone up?" and then they started on the they started to slowly do the works .*



**Figure 14: Tameside Court being demolished in 2017, and the replacement apartments at Honiton Avenue**

The lag time between charging higher rents and making a start on the stock improvements accounts for the low satisfaction levels of 70% and the sudden jump to 82% by 2012, as the improvements began to tangibly benefit tenants.

One of the major improvements has been in re-roofing homes. Despite general success, this has highlighted the fragmented distribution of ownership on the estate and the lack of uniformity to improvements. One problem frequently voiced is the deteriorating condition of the roofs of ex-council housing bought through Right to Buy, as this councillor explains:

*I've now got people coming to see me who have bought their council houses as it was then and bought it fairly cheaply because they were entitled to the discount and now we've got houses that are falling to bits around their ears. Because they haven't got the maintenance budget and we've got houses where we're reroofing you know six on that side leaving three, we're doing another six on that side and there's and there's that to contend with and I don't want to see that any worse than it is now*

This issue has come to a head partly because Peak Valley have successfully re-roofed their housing stock, leaving owner-occupied houses, often on the same terraced row, without any improvement. Although this lies outside of Peak Valley's legal powers and responsibilities some residents believe they could have done more to address the situation, which has left some older, often more vulnerable residents 'trapped' without the resources to maintain their property:

*I used to say this when I was on Peak Valley Board: what about the owner/occupiers that are trapped in their properties? Because you're putting new roofs on all over the place and you'll see a house what hasn't got anything there and that elderly person is trapped in that property and in a way to me the Council needed to have done something about that in a way. Because they were building they were getting money Peak Valley from the Government to build bungalows and I think there should have been lock in at some of the owner occupiers to perhaps offering them the opportunity to move out of these properties and perhaps buy them their own property to do it up and to make into a family property. But they seem to be very rigid and very strict on what they were doing was just what was in the bid around there, I don't think there was any flexibility and in a way a third of the estate like I said was owner-occupiers but most of them would have been older people that would have lived there, the families have grown up... Local resident.*

For Peak Valley, and now Onward Homes, to maintain a coherent approach to governance and regeneration of the estate in future, more attention needs to be paid to those houses not directly in their purview – both new-build private rented homes owned by absentee buy-to-let landlords and ex-council housing owned by older, vulnerable tenants who exercised their Right to Buy but who may now lack the resources to maintain their properties. In order to avoid Hattersley dividing into

<sup>57</sup> PVHA, "10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022."Ibid.  
<sup>58</sup> PVHA, 'Board of Management & Peak Performance Legacy Report', Peak Valley Housing Association Board meeting, 1st March 2017.  
<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

two or three distinct estates, in respect to the condition of properties, some thought as to how a more integrated approach to governance can be achieved is required.

### 3.1.4 Public realm

Compared to the achievements made with the new and existing housing stock, improvements to the public realm are sorely lacking. Common concerns amongst tenants and other stakeholders coalesce around three principal issues: the density of the infill housing and consequent lack of green usable space; the lack of facilities for younger people, particularly for recreation; and the lack of improvements to the streets, off-road parking and verges. We will consider each in turn. It is important to note, however, that Tameside MBC, have employed a contractor and developed a plan to carry out improvements to the public realm on which they will launch a public consultation this year. The consultation will set out options for investment, including the long-term management and maintenance of the public realm.

First, some residents are fearful that the new housing developments are not leaving enough room remaining for the green open space and vegetation that Hattersley has become famous for:

*I think the infrastructure is still lacking, they've obviously built on some of the green spaces so that's left smaller green spaces and in some places no green spaces.* Local councillor

*But the thing is I don't want it to change so much that we don't have open spaces and that's what they're doing. They're building on all the open spaces, they're going to build houses near the station right the way up to where our garden site is...that's always*

*been on it was on the master plan. So we can't stop it and actually it would be better for the station because there's people overlooking it, security wise. But I don't want every single space built on this estate it was built as a green place you know open air, we've got a booklet called Fresh Air<sup>60</sup>, you know have you seen that? ...there is a need for housing but by God you don't have to cram them in like you're doing it now. It's ridiculous and every new estate if you look at every new estate it's the same thing, houses smaller gardens, well where's your fresh air?* Local resident.

It must be noted, however, that much of the open space currently on the estate is brownfield land that was once housing or the site of the old district centre, cleared in the regeneration process and awaiting redevelopment. There is a sense among practitioners that the masterplan contains sufficient green space once it is completed.

Second, there is now a notable absence of children's play areas or spaces for older children and young adults to play sport or simply gather in a convivial setting:

*We've not improved the play areas and things for young people to do. That's still an ongoing thing but as far as I'm concerned as a local councillor it's not happening fast enough... where we've knocked it down, there used to be a basketball court there and it used to be lit up at night and you could go past at any time and there would be children playing, kids playing on there... because I'm not talking about children but young adults playing on there until 10 o'clock at night and it will be lit up and they'll be playing well that's all gone. Well where have they gone?*

Local Councillor



Figure 15: Cleared housing sites and a basketball court before redevelopment as new housing (along with Tameside Court in background)

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

Interestingly, this may explain why some of the problems associated with gatherings of young people and gang culture have to some extent been displaced to nearby towns such as Hyde:

*They [residents] want the facilities with easy access but "not too close to my house please" – would you want a group of 20 kids congregating outside your house? – but you do want somewhere for the kids to go so they're not vandalising bus shelters or whatever. So it's hard isn't it...so it's taken forever to establish the new location of a multi-use games area and having established the area it's taken forever to materialise. It's not because, it's not due to finance, I'm sure there's money sat in a pot there for it, I'm sure there is.* Community worker and local resident.

Indeed, there is plenty of money set aside for improvements to the public realm, and as noted above, Tameside MBC will launch a public consultation on the detail of the improvements this year.

One of the original negotiators of the Collaboration Agreement explains how the improvements to the public realm were a fully costed component of the final masterplan, which was then translated into the annual cost schedule for Barratt written into the Collaboration Agreement:

*So we literally mapped the estate in terms of you know things like improving parking provision, improving tree planting, the provision of amenity spaces, play areas for young children older children. So all that work was included at cost schedule for the developers to price and originally it was priced at five million pounds and that was broken down, we've reduced that down through negotiation with Barratt's since then. But we have a legal agreement in place with Barratt's that they, as they draw down licenses for each*

*individual phase of residential development they're required to pay over a tranche of public realm payments totalling just over four million pounds. Planit have been appointed by Tameside Council on behalf of the partnership with HCA, Peak Valley and the Council to re-scope that original public realm work because that was done originally by GVA back in, would have been 2005/6. Things have moved on so we have a new aspirational plan to cover this four million pounds of the investment which if we were to do everything in that aspirational plan would cost significantly more than the four million*

This is another reminder of how the Collaboration Agreement can only go so far in stipulating development outcomes for Hattersley. In the event of financial difficulties and understandable delays on the part of Barratt, the regeneration partners have had to take a more pragmatic approach and re-negotiate a deal that would enable the public realm improvements to go ahead without further delay and without any additional cost to the public, by employing a new contractor.

The third complaint concerning the public realm is traffic and parking. Traffic has become a major problem in Hattersley partly because of its location at the end of the M67, where three lanes get funnelled into one in the trunk road on to Glossop, which is consequently always congested at peak hours. Many commuters have learnt to bypass this stretch of road by taking a detour through Hattersley, which unfortunately has also become congested at rush hour. This is an issue that cannot be expected to be resolved by the regeneration process but through external improvements to the road network that lie outside the remit of the regeneration partners. However, there are aspects of the urban design of the estate that have contributed to the problem, as a local councillor suggests:



Figure 16: Typical quality of public realm in Hattersley

One of the issues in Hattersley and what they did in the '60s was all these residents from Manchester didn't have cars so why put in car spaces for them. So all these houses loads of grass verges, loads of green space, nowhere to park your car or say that's your house there, you park your car over here. Well nobody's going to do that so the garages and the parking bays were away from the houses so you get all this green around your houses which you know they didn't have when they were in the terraced houses no green around there.... Now that everybody tends to have cars and we've got to try and develop it so part of the public realm is putting parking bays in. Local councillor

As a result of a lack of parking bays in front of houses, people park their cars on the grass verges that separate pavements from roads, and often on the curb, which narrows the available space for vehicles and contributes to congestion. Moreover, the car parking problem also damages the aesthetic and ecological value of the grass verges, which are often in a poor condition, more mud than grass, due to tyre damage.

Tidying up the general look and feel of the public realm – not just car parking bays and grass verges, but also boundary fences and walls, green and brownfield sites and other residual open spaces – is one of the last remaining regeneration priorities yet to be completed. This may seem a rather insignificant, cosmetic issue in comparison with some of the more substantive priorities around housing stock, retail, transport,



Figure 17: Proud winners of the Garden Competition

community facilities and skills training, but it nonetheless gives the wrong impression of how much has been achieved. The generally poor, under-maintained condition of the public realm not only fails to reflect the wider achievements of regeneration but so too seems out of kilter and jars with the generally high levels of care and attention that residents pay to their own properties and gardens. This may not have always been the case, but is certainly something that is evident today. Gardening has been further encouraged by the garden competition that Peak Valley has initiated:

People are proud of their houses... lots of people do look after their gardens. So to incentivise it we've had the garden competition running for the last 10/12 years. We get a prize and they get a prize at the end of it and we invite the residents up and go round to the gardens, give them a prize for it and then a couple of members of staff go round and they'll tell us which are the best garden. We're putting this garden in for the competition they're really good and what have you and the houses you know you get 30/40 people putting in for it it's really good so we had the presentation recently and I awarded all the prizes for it. Get a bit of money off a couple of our partners who supplied the trophies and people are dead chuffed. Local councillor.



### 3.2 Railway station

One of the most successful – and simplest – interventions made by Peak Valley and its Land Board partners over the past decade or so has been the improvements to Hattersley's railway station. Today, the direct train into Manchester Piccadilly takes only around 20 minutes, runs every half an hour, or more during business peak times, and a return ticket costs around £6, making it certainly the fastest and most convenient if not the cheapest means of transport into Manchester City Centre. This direct connection with the city represents a major piece of infrastructure for Hattersley's ongoing economic development – a crucial lifeline for daily commuters, jobseekers and shoppers alike.


However, the station has had a troubled past. Following the construction of the estate, it took almost another two decades for the station to be built, and far less time for it to fall into disuse and disrepair.<sup>61</sup> Opened in 1978 as an island platform with a covered footbridge providing access to the ticket office and the estate, the station once used to contain a glass waiting room, but this was subjected to an arson attack by local youths.<sup>62</sup> For fear of cars being vandalised, set alight or stolen, local residents refused to park in the old station car park:

It had a car park where there was only one car ever parked there from 9 to 1 was the person who was in the ticket office... that was the only person and they parked the car right just outside the ticket office so they could see it and eyeballing it from where they were sat all the time. Local resident

Sometimes when I when I left my car at the car park and went into Manchester my car would be the only car parked, the car that was there and people were saying "aren't you frightened of leaving your car there?" Local councillor

Many residents forfeited use of the station altogether and drove to the next station along the line, Broadbottom, to catch a train from there. However, it was not just for fear of their car's safety that residents chose to bypass the station. Almost as a microcosm of Hattersley itself, the station was physically cut off from the surrounding streets and houses, isolated from the estate it was meant to serve. Likewise, the deep cut central platform felt "isolated" – as many interviewees remarked – from the ticket office, only accessible via a "dingy" and "horrendous" covered walkway that "stunk of urine", which was not only slippery underfoot from the leaking roof intermittently dripping, but so too was it dark, unwelcoming, without easy escape and potentially unsafe. The lack of natural through-flow from passers-by or casual surveillance from surrounding houses, whose back garden fences backed onto the station, meant that crime could go on unobserved here. This resulted in a spiralling decline in usage, placing the station under threat of closure:

Figure 18: Railway Station improvements map



<sup>61</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>62</sup> Friends of Hattersley Station website: <https://www.friendsofhattersleystation.com/>

The numbers for the train station, the passenger usage, numbers for the train station, were going down and down and down and through it CFG was pretty clear that there was going to be a date for... when they would of just said "look it's not viable" and shut it down and people who live next to the station were actually driving to Broadbottom to get on a train because they just didn't want to use that station. Tameside council officer.

Something desperately needed to be done to save the station and realise its full potential for socioeconomic development. Tameside MBC suggested that the Land Board use some of its funds to re-route the road closer to the station. Despite initial reticence about what might seem a "bonkers idea" to "spend all this money moving a road about 30 feet" (ibid), the Land Board approved it and spent some of the regeneration funds procured through the Collaboration Agreement on redesigning Hattersley Road West so that it came around the back of the houses that then fronted it and right up to the station entrance (see figure 18). A bus stop on the road now connects the train to the local bus network for quick, easy and safe access to the station. This initial investment also enabled Tameside MBC to apply for further funding from local growth fund resources. They are awaiting the results of a bid submitted to the Government's third Growth Deal to rebuild the pedestrian footbridge and provide disabled access to the platform via a lift.

On the back of the road realignment, the Land Board has created a much more secure parking area, with a perimeter fence, monitored by CCTV in addition to natural surveillance from the street. This cost



Figure 19: New car park for railway station

<sup>63</sup> Malpass and Mullins, "Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK : From Local Initiative to National Policy Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK :"

around half a million pounds – partly from Collaboration Agreement receipts and partly from additional transport infrastructure funding. As a consequence, station use has already risen by 30%. These initial improvements have opened up possibilities and interest in further developments. Through negotiations with Network Rail and Transport for Greater Manchester, the Land Board have now secured £750,000 investment from Greater Manchester Growth Fund<sup>63</sup> to replace the booking office, and there are plans afoot to do likewise with the covered walkway, which remains the most problematic feature left to address. The open land immediately surrounding each side of the station is now being redeveloped by Barratt as homes for sale, which will contribute further to place-making efforts in creating a safe, well-used, connected and distinctive urban realm.

### 3.2.1 Friends of Hattersley Station

This is only one half of the story. In July 2011, long before the road was re-routed in 2015, the Friends of Hattersley Station was founded by local residents who come together to bring their station back from the brink. Voluntary work has since focused on planting a community garden, cleaning up and maintaining the general environment, planting and hanging flowers, painting and decorating the ticket office with colourful artistic murals by students of the local primary schools, painting the covered walkway, and hosting a number of community events, from a 'Santa at the station' and Christmas carols to Easter egg hunts and Teddy Bear Picnics. Their do-it-yourself efforts in making the



Figure 20: colourful murals painted by primary school children from Hattersley

station a better place has garnered the Friends of Hattersley Station a plethora of awards, particularly for their gardening, from the 2012 Royal Horticultural Society's North West In Bloom award to 1st prize in the 'Green Spaces' section of the annual Tameside MBC Pride of Hyde & Longendale Awards 2014. <sup>64</sup>

Not only has this helped galvanise a community spirit on the estate, so too has it placed pressure on the Land Board to act. By showing that they care through so many volunteer hours, the community has made the case for additional investment in regenerating the station and its environs. Unfortunately, their celebrated community garden was tarmacked over in 2014 for the construction of the new car park – a small price to pay, perhaps, for a safe, secure station car park – but of course replanted in a new location. A resident describes how this groundwork paved the way for the more systematic regeneration of the station:

*A lot of people put a lot of hard work into it. So what they [Friends of Hattersley Station] wanted to do was to try and encourage people to use it by making it nicer. So then with Peak Valley then saying "well fair enough we'll divert that road so all the buses go past it." The car park is more secure, more people are coming up here now so more people are using it and improving it...*

This serves as another reminder of how the regeneration of Hattersley was a dual effort between the more formal, substantive approach taken by Peak Valley and Tameside MBC coupled with, and harnessing, the more informal grassroots energy of the community. It is also a lesson in how Hattersley has had many allies and much political support over the years. The station was originally the product of tireless campaigning in the 1970s by local councillor and Hattersley resident, Paul Smith, who with the aid of local MP Lord Tom Pendry lobbied the then Department for Transport for a station to be built for Hattersley. On 19<sup>th</sup>

December 2015, the Friends of Hattersley Station dedicated to these two politicians a marble memorial seat just outside the station entrance. The marble itself was donated by Tameside MBC – a reminder of the continued commitment that the local authority makes to the estate.



Figure 21: young and old residents preparing plants together for the community garden

<sup>64</sup> <https://www.friendsofhattersleystation.com/>

### 3.3 New District Centre

One of the highest priorities in regenerating Hattersley was redeveloping the District Centre. The old district centre was built in the early 1970s and had by the late 1990s fallen into decline – much like Hattersley in general, whose population fell from around 15,000 to not much more than 6,000 over this period. The decline in population, rising deprivation and changing shopping habits combined with the district centre's poor design and layout to result in an under-used and under-maintained set of buildings suffering high vacancy and disrepair. Originally, the centre contained 30 shop units but by the late 1980s it was down to a paper shop, bookies, launderette, hairdressers, greengrocers, chippy, butchers, a post office, a Co-op shop and a Greggs. In being rationalised down to just 10 commercial units, including a credit union, an internet café, and the Hattersley development Trust offices, the majority of the original district centre site was taken up with community uses, including a community centre, library, public house, health centre, housing office, church, and the new Sure Start centre, as well as a base for the Hattersley Community Forum and Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership. Part of the problem here was that the usage of the centre was tilting far too heavily away from commercially trading businesses that provided economic activity and towards publicly-subsidised facilities – a sign of the economic dependency of Hattersley.

In the masterplanning process circa 2003-4, it was decided by the regeneration partners in consultation with the community that the old centre would be demolished entirely and rebuilt as a new district centre in a more prominent and accessible location on Stockport Road. The



Figure 22: typical dereliction in Hattersley before regeneration process

<sup>65</sup> Richardson, Gee, and Power, Fresh Hope Fresh Air: Starting A New Life In Hattersley.

land upon which the old district centre stood would then be freed up for redevelopment as new housing – a key part of the Collaboration Agreement and the means by which these improvements could be paid for. The rationale for this planning approach is outlined in the final masterplan, adopted in 2004 as Supplementary Planning Guidance<sup>65</sup>, which characterises the weaknesses of the old centre thus:

*It does not have a prominent location, being largely hidden from Stockport Road. This means the location is not attractive to new retailers, particularly supermarket operators, who could provide the anchor for additional retailers and other uses. The shop units themselves turn their back on the surrounding area with a layout that is not attractive to new users. Redevelopment of the existing site would require the relocation or temporary relocation of the existing uses. This would be disruptive and expensive and given the fact that the existing location is not attractive, redevelopment would be overly reliant on public funds and yet the centre would still not totally serve the needs or aspirations of existing residents or new residents to the area.*

Another motivating factor was to diversify the range of shops available to residents as well as diversify the locations, as this local councillor describes:

*The old centre was just all concrete blocks really, it was just a real mess; you wouldn't really go there shopping because you know it's quite dilapidated. The Co-op was in there and the Co-op was the only shop really in there, so we managed to build some more shops down at the bottom end of the estate, one shop down at Honiton and then they've obviously got the Tesco's up at the top.*

The Co-op's practices have been identified to us as particularly problematic in this regard:

*Co-ops have variable pricing structures in their shops, so if you go to a Co-op shop you don't pay the same. One of the models they adopt in deciding what the pricing structure should be is what condition are the people locally, what's the level of car ownership locally, and how easy is it for those guys to come to the shop to go somewhere else; if they can't, if the car ownership levels are low and there's no competition then they put you on the highest price band! ...it's a captive audience isn't it, you just had nowhere else to go.*

Tameside council officer.

The proposals for new retail intended to inject renewed competition into the area so that residents were no longer being treated unfairly in this way – by a dubious pricing strategy that only exacerbates high levels of deprivation and feelings of isolation. The resulting plan was to move the smaller shops into a new precinct parade to be built next to the Honiton development of apartments on the western side – or 'bottom end' – of the estate. All existing businesses that leased premises in the old district centre were offered new premises in the new precinct. The only business to object to the process was the Co-op, who consequently refused the offer. In its place, a One Stop opened, and quickly became successful:

*The One Stop just took two units and within 12 months it had smashed all its predictions and it took another unit.* Architect.

All the shops on the new site appear to be thriving. The move has been particularly successful for the chippy:

*The chippy has just recently re-opened at, there was quite a lot of excitement... it's the same guy that's running it as well.*

#### 3.3.1 Tesco

The most important part of the new retail offer was to be a new district centre with space for a retail park with larger premises for superstores as well as community facilities such as the library and Peak Valley's offices – all not far away from the old district centre, but with better access on the main arterial road, Stockport Road. A deal was struck with Tesco to take on a large part of the site – the northern side of Ashworth Lane – as a major new superstore, a Tesco Extra. Tesco had for a long time been trying to extend its existing stores in the area – Stalybridge and Glossop – to cope with rising demand. Their planning application to put a mezzanine level in their Stalybridge store was refused. They also had rising demand for online deliveries, so the natural solution was to build a new store that could act as a logistic hub for online deliveries to the wider area. The site was ideal as a superstore that could act as a distribution centre as it was located between Stalybridge and Glossop and right on, and at the end of, the M67. With such specific demands, and as the only large retailer interested in the tender for a new superstore on the site, Tesco became an increasingly central and powerful partner in the regeneration of the new district centre:

*So this area in the original SPG [Supplementary Planning Guidance] there was a requirement for a food retailer with a store capacity of about 50 thousand square feet. When we actually got to market the land and appoint a commercial developer partner for it, very soon it was established that Tesco were very interested, they were actually the only food retailer that was really interested and they soon realised that, and then Tesco do what Tesco generally do and started negotiating or renegotiating the terms of the deal – 50 thousand square feet didn't work for them. It had to be a Tesco Extra which was 90 thousand square feet plus or they were off and by the way you're not getting any increase in your rental value, so that was the deal unfortunately.*  
Peak Valley executive.

As it turned out, the deal with Tesco was far from unfortunate for the residents of Hattersley. One of the great selling points of the partnership with Tesco was their forward-thinking approach to local employment and skills training:

*Tesco has a load of critics but they were doing that in a number of places already with stores... I've got it in my mind... that there was contact with Tesco, you know over 12 months before the store opened, to start skilling people up for, and the reason I remember that was that Tesco were adamant that they wanted people who lived within you know, and I can't remember the exact distance, but definitely within under a mile of the store, as the people who would work in the store. So I mean obviously it was very good in terms of their trade but they wanted local people working at the store yes.*

Tameside council officer.

In the 12 months or so run up to the store opening on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2012, Tesco worked closely with Tameside MBC, Jobcentre Plus, Work Solutions, the Skills Funding Agency and Peak Valley to target local populations for training for the some 300 new jobs created. Over 1,500 applications were received for 301 full and part-time positions, of which a hundred were given to local people who had been out of work for over six months.<sup>66</sup> The skills training for local people was delivered through the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership based in the old district centre before it was pulled down, and was written into the contract with Tesco for a 30 year lease on a new bespoke building, which is actually owned by West Midlands Pension Fund.

Although we do not know precise figures, Tesco claim that over 90% of their employees either walk or cycle to work and are drawn from the immediate vicinity, and in particular the Hattersley estate. They also claim an unusually high staff retention rate – the highest number of retained employees, in fact, across all Tesco stores in the UK. A local councillor provides a more fine-grained picture of the good this brings for people in Hattersley:

<sup>66</sup> Kate Weir, "New Tesco in Hattersley will create 300 jobs", Manchester Evening News, 2nd July 2012

So the shop was virtually, not entirely but virtually, staffed by people from Hattersley. I understand that more have stayed than the average if you look at all the Tesco stores in the country that have done that, that more here have stayed. Which is quite an achievement considering some of them, I know one in particular that had been out of work for a considerable time, probably ten years or so a woman in her early 40s who not only went there and was successful but has been transferred to another store in a management role. I think that's probably as successful a story as you're going to get in reality!

The woman in question is highly skilled in community organising, having volunteered as a representative and campaigner for resident interests on various regeneration boards for Hattersley over the many years, decades, that she was unemployed and looking for paid work, but may never have found it were it not for the Tesco opportunity. She is also a good example of how the regeneration process itself provides opportunities that might not otherwise have existed for many residents – if perhaps the more vocal – to learn new skills and develop their talents and capacities that then become increasingly attractive and marketable to companies like Tesco. She had this to say:

*Yes I've got a very good CV – I'm a sort of like jack of all trades, master of none – that's how it came to the point where I did this 8 week training thing and I got a job at Tesco's. I was offered two jobs, so it was Team Leader on checkouts or community you know the Community Champion but that was minimum wage same as GAs. So I went for Team Leader which was a little bit more and I'm now a manager so within five years I've gone from Team Leader to Manager that's on a job for what 23 grand a year whatever it is.*

The benefit is not all one way, of course. Tesco profit from having employees who are, able to control for any minor criminality or anti-social behaviour, particularly among the younger residents who might otherwise like to congregate in and around the store were it not for the presence of their mother, father, aunt, uncle, neighbour or friend who works there.

This is an excellent example of how multiple strands in a regeneration programme – from the planning gain in development agreements with large retailers to community-based partnerships that involve local people in governance decisions – can be joined up and brought together in a holistic strategy to create synergies for multiple parties. A senior council officer explains the benefits it has brought to Hattersley and how this was the result of a robust and sustainable partnership working approach built into the architecture of the Collaboration Agreement and the Land Board from the outset:

*The Tesco development – because I was involved with that and I know how that's all happened – is a great example of how that relationship which when it comes to Peak Valley actually delivering something, that if we'd all sat around and wrung our hands a bit longer perhaps it wouldn't have happened. I don't know if you're aware that Tesco development was the last store that the Tesco board approved before they pulled the plug... if*

*you look at what benefits that has brought to Hattersley you might think well you know all they see is there's going to be traffic chaos and whatever... Tesco agreed to do the pre-employment training programme for Hattersley residents and I think something like 200 people went on that and they did that months before the store opened. Just giving people the opportunity to get themselves up to the position where they could compete for jobs when they became available and they did that completely at their cost.*

It must be acknowledged that several hundred new jobs is not insignificant for an estate with a several thousand working age population. Just like the Collaboration Agreement itself, this is another example of the pitch perfect timing – luck, some might say – that the Hattersley regeneration project has had over the years. Indeed, this was the last Extra superstore of its kind that Tesco approved before it suffered severe financial difficulties and strategically refocused its business model on the smaller neighbourhood-based Express stores. In 2015, just a few years after the Hattersley deal, Tesco recorded the UK's biggest ever retail loss – £6.4 billion – with Extra hypermarkets, superstores and city centre Metro outlets all experiencing decline in sales, and only Express stores achieving sales growth, amid a switch in shopping habits.<sup>67</sup> But just as the Collaboration Agreement was signed with Barratt a mere months before the financial crisis, so too was the deal with Tesco done – the lease signed and the store opened – just months before Tesco's strategic redirection.

Not all is so benign about the new superstore, however. There are common misgivings about the urban design, in particular the defensive urbanism of the store frontage and the way it turns its back on Stockport Road:

*Every time I drive round that roundabout and I see that fence of Tesco it galls me that, you know gosh, if there was one thing I should have insisted on it's that, but what can you do? You park up in a car park you go across the planting area and get your trousers torn to shreds as you're doing that and I think bloody hell who's bright idea was this you know?! There's a thousand and one things you would have done different.*

Here, this senior Tameside officer is referring to the compromises made with Tesco not only on the final design of the store itself but also with the way that Tesco insisted on a larger floorplate that encroached on the space allocated for The Hub, where all the community functions and Peak Valley's offices were to be relocated. As he alludes to above, as part of the development agreement Tesco invested around £4 million into the construction of The Hub and so negotiations over the amount of land granted to them were coloured by this essential source of capital funding. The end result is a building that is squeezed into a small and inconvenient corner site that slopes down back from Stockport Road. This meant that certain compromises were made on the design of the building – more vertical than horizontal and on an awkward multi-level site, which has resulted in access issues. We will discuss some of these design flaws in the section below dedicated to The Hub. We mention it here merely to point out that the deal with



Figure 23: last remaining resident refusing to move for Lidl development

Tesco was both a blessing and a curse – paying for the majority of The Hub and for the regeneration of this large site, but thereby putting pressure on the public partners to make concessions to a powerful retailer that ultimately, despite admirable efforts to employ and upskill local people, put its interests first.

Progress with the second half of the district centre, south of Ashworth Lane, has been less successful. Plans for a Lidl store as part of a retail park to complement the Tesco offering have been delayed over protracted negotiations with just one remaining resident, who refuses to move from his home. This part of the estate remains mostly cleared of its timber-framed housing and now lies overgrown and in wait for redevelopment. Peak Valley have offered the resident a number of alternative properties – including better equipped new build houses – around the estate, at no additional cost, but the resident refuses to move.

## Community concerns

Not all residents are happy with the new retail offer, seeing the new set up as a hollowing out of the middle:

*I'll tell you what we do need on this estate some more shops because all we've got, two extremes, One Stop, Tesco's there's nothing in between now since they took the old community centre down there was 7 or 8 shops there*

Indeed, this can also be understood in a wider social and spatial sense: that the regeneration process has turned the estate inside out, relocating many of the important functions for community life – the shops, community centre, the comprehensive secondary school – from the centre of the estate to the periphery, in an attempt to reorient the

estate and transform an inward-looking culture built on bonding social capital into a more (socially and spatially) mobile and outward-looking culture built on bridging social capital.

Much of the antipathy towards the new district centre appears to be motivated by a general nostalgia for how the estate used to house a variety of independent stores:

*There used to be shops at the train station, then there was other shops... when I was a kid it had toy shops, shoe shops, every kind of shop you wanted.*

This observation identifies the way in which retail has evolved in the country as a whole, rather than Hattersley per se – from small independent businesses located on every town and village high street towards larger companies located out-of-town and designed to be accessible by car rather than foot. The design of the new district centre in Hattersley, particularly Tesco where the car park takes centre stage, epitomises these wider trends.

In a similarly nostalgic sentiment, which reflects broader trends in consumption habits, almost all the residents we listened to lamented the loss of public houses on the estate. Indeed, a shocking number have closed down over the past few decades, eleven in total, including: the Hustage, Four in Hand, Centurion, New Inn, Chapman Arms, Legion, Underwood Social Club, Pack Horse, JFK (aka Flat Cap), The White Hart, and The Junction.<sup>68</sup> There is now just one pub remaining on the estate, the Harehill tavern, where Ricky Hatton can sometimes be seen having a pint at his local (when he's not boxing). This is located in the west of the estate, next to the new precinct shops, leaving large swathes of the estate without a pub within walking distance – a dramatic change from a situation where “we all had our own pubs”.

<sup>67</sup> Sarah Butler and Sean Farrell, “Tesco reports record £6.4bn loss”, The Guardian, 22nd April 2015.

<sup>68</sup> Dodge, “Mapping the Geographies of Manchester's Housing Problems and the Twentieth Century Solutions.”

Indeed, many residents complained that “there’s nowhere to go on a Saturday night” and that they now have to drive to a pub – which defeats the point – or else take an expensive taxi out of the estate. Although the decline in pubs is driven by changing leisure patterns, some believe that Peak Valley could have done more to reverse the flow:

*Looking back I think more should have been done to perhaps make them into community pubs or make them more like where the Chapman, that’s another pub which is now a nursery... But in today’s world you could have a pub that can be a little post office inside or a paper shop so it has a multipurpose use, and usually pubs are embedded in a community so they’re in good locations.*

Another gripe among residents – particularly the owner-occupiers who have recently bought their new home from Barratt – is the lack of a café or coffee shop to frequent on a Sunday morning perhaps. Although Tesco have an in-store café and The Hub has a small café run by volunteers, these appear to be rarely used by residents, perhaps partly due to their location within the estate and in buildings that principally contain other functions that run counter to being a social space. The planned development with Lidl is due to contain a Costa coffee shop, but this is still years away from completion, that is, of course, if the resistant resident ever does acquiesce.



Figure 24: Tameside Council poster (left) in nearby Ashton-under-Lyne showcasing The Hub (right)

As it stands, Hattersley suffers a lack of convenient and convivial meeting places within the estate; the famous community spirit and bonding social capital – that did so much to keep the community alive in times of adversity as well as fuel the regeneration process – is in danger of ebbing away and becoming a thing of the past. Much of what motivated Mike Harding to write the popular folk song *The Hattersley Lament* may have been resolved by the regeneration process, but there may be something more profound, albeit less tangible, that is lamentably lost in the Hattersley of the future.

### 3.4 The Hub

The Hub is the new centre of administrative and social life on the estate – the jewel in the crown of the new district centre. We have heard how it was built with planning gain accrued from the adjoining Tesco development and how this new site was chosen to be more accessible, located on the arterial Stockport Road. Indeed, it stands directly on the border between the Hattersley and Mottram sides of the estate – notoriously socially segregated in the past – as a symbol of new unity perhaps, and a way to reconcile territorial divides.

Work on The Hub began in August 2011 and was completed in October 2012, at a total cost of £3.8 million.<sup>69</sup> The exterior design is sleek and modernist and it is light and airy on the inside. There are a number of generously sized rooms on the ground floor for community use, including offices for the Hattersley Community Forum, and a library on the lower ground floor at the rear. There is also a neighbourhood police unit located here, at the entrance. On the first floor are Peak Valley’s offices and meeting rooms; whilst the second floor is used by Tameside MBC and the NHS. In sum, The Hub is celebrated by Tameside MBC as the latest addition to its roster of “prestigious civic buildings in every town” – on a par with the grand Victorian municipal architecture of Dukinfield and Hyde Town Halls and Stalybridge Civic Hall (see photo above).

However, The Hub is perhaps *the* most contentious issue of all in the various interventions made by Peak Valley, Tameside MBC and the Land Board in Hattersley. The people we spoke with had far more to say about The Hub than any other issue – including employment and skills – and so we have dedicated an entire section to it. Some go so far as to suggest that The Hub is “in danger of becoming a bit of a white elephant”, for reasons we explore below.

#### 3.4.1 Design flaws

First, there is common confusion among residents – perhaps derived from a confusion in the minds of the designers of the building themselves – about what The Hub is meant to be, what it is for. Part of the problem stems from locating so many disparate functions within the same, relatively compact space, without due delineation between uses. A council officer explains the rationale for the shared space design:

*The police were in the original community hall, they always had a post in there. So we tried to replicate what we had then the old centre, we had a police post in there and then it was just to have them in the neighbourhood and work and it worked quite well and then obviously we had the hall and everything else. So we tried to replicate that in the Hub so when we were doing the designs for the Hub we asked residents “what did you want in there?” “We want a police station in there, we want a hall, we want a café, we want this that and the other” and at the time it was viable to give all that to the community. As it’s progressed through the years over the 10 years with the cuts that we’ve had to make, we’ve had to make changes. So it’s become quite complicated now.*

The Hub currently provides offices for three public service agencies: the NHS; the police; and Tameside Council’s library. The latter, along with Peak Valley’s housing office, are the only ones that offer a directly accessible service to local residents. The NHS presence is purely administrative and not advertised and the Police office appears to be used exclusively for the convenience of the local Police and Community Safety Officers as one local resident informed us:

*You can’t go and knock on the door and report anything, it is used, people come in open the door, lock it behind them and go and do whatever they’re doing and then disappear again, it’s not part of the community*

Compounding the lack of public access is any sense that these services are located here with a rationale to join-up local service delivery. A common theme from the local councillors we interviewed was that since the demise of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership there is no one locally accessible place<sup>70</sup> in which agencies work together to co-ordinate public service provision on the estate.

This is a missed opportunity. In an era of austerity-enforced budget cuts a multi-use building like The Hub offers real potential for co-locating services for the benefit of residents and not solely the service provider. This is particularly true in light of the success of the existing library facilities. Notwithstanding the less than ideal design of the Hub there is a move towards multi-use buildings within the UK that house not just libraries but other local services as well. This sometimes proves controversial but offers big benefits both for customers, who have the convenience of more services in one place, and service-providers, who save money by sharing costs. There is no set pattern to multi-use partnerships but there are several working examples<sup>71</sup>.

It is important to note that Tameside MBC has commissioned an architect to look at how the use and design of the Hub could be improved, including whether the existing health centre in Hattersley could be relocated within the Hub, broadening its use, and to the above points, a positive starting point for co-ordinating public service provision on the estate. The architect will also look at the Hub’s disabled access and the existing position of the library.

Even though there is not much functional benefit to these providers sharing The Hub, their co-location in the same building nonetheless puts up barriers to more extensive use by the community. To residents of the estate this now appears to work against the grain of what a community centre is for, or indeed conspires against the knowledge that this even is a community centre at all. A local councillor explains the conundrum:

*We had much more of a sense of community when our community centre [in the old district centre] was a community centre. This doesn’t feel anything like a community centre... For one there’s nothing actually on the outside of the building that says it incorporates Hattersley Community Centre – anybody walking past would think that it’s Peak Valley’s offices and nothing else. The police post have got a sign up outside so they’re obviously here but there’s nothing identifying this building as part of the community and you talk to people who’ve not been living in Hattersley very long who say “oh I thought it was Peak Valley’s offices?”*

<sup>69</sup> PVHA, “10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022.”  
<sup>70</sup> There exists all of Tameside South, a much larger geography than Hattersley.  
<sup>71</sup> See for example: <https://ifalbes.wordpress.com/2017/11/15/evolution-not-extinction-making-the-case-for-co-locating-services-in-multi-use-buildings/>

A resident suggests that “what it is, it’s become an office complex... and it’s become what the community already thought it was before it was that.” Nobody is denying that the facilities themselves and the general condition of the environment is far superior to the dilapidated old district centre. However, the way in which the community facilities are designed in relation to other uses and the way they are managed is widely criticised. We will take each point – design and management – in turn in the following.

As we have already touched upon, the design of The Hub was compromised by the fact that Tesco wanted its extra store to have a larger footprint than originally intended in the masterplan. This has resulted in a somewhat squeezed footprint for The Hub, which has had to go up rather than out in order to accommodate all the functions envisaged. This, coupled with a sloping site, has resulted in a building which lacks sufficient disabled – or indeed any – access at certain times of the day. The car park is located at the back of the building, whilst the main entrance fronts onto Stockport Road at the other side. Furthermore, access from the car park is via the library entrance, which is located on the lower ground floor, accessible to the rest of the building only by a lift. Unfortunately, the library is only open certain days of the week – Monday, Tuesday and Thursday afternoons – which means that access is restricted to The Hub from the car park outside of these times. The only option in this event is to walk around the building, up the hill to the front entrance. Yet even this is made more difficult by the lack of footpaths connecting the car park at the nearest point to the street – people have to walk back on themselves, away from the building in order to access the pavement. The ‘desire line’ in this instance – that optimal route in urban design that describes where people naturally choose to walk, often in contravention of designated footpaths – is through a planting area and over a wooden fence, where you risk, as one council officer remarks, getting “your trousers torn to shreds”.

This may well appear of minor annoyance for many, but imposes considerable constraints for those with less physical mobility. A local councillor describes the problem:

*Disabled access is a major problem here, absolutely major problem. When we were discussing the building, I wasn’t there right at the very beginning, but when I became a councillor we were at the old community centre and the thing that we said is for us this building is back to front. We’ve got disabled access at the car park, when the library is closed if you’re in a wheelchair have you tried pushing a wheelchair up that hill to get in this? The architect said we didn’t know what we were talking about... well we might not be architects but we know what it feels like to push someone in a wheelchair up that hill. So we have access when the library’s open because we can use the lift but with no life when the library’s closed we’ve no access to the lift for people to go up to.*

Moreover, there is a general dependency on the lift, even when the library is closed and the lift only operates from the ground floor up. This appears to be the only route for residents or members of the public – like us – to access the first or second floors. There are a set of stairs

but these are closed to the public, accessible only by employees of Peak Valley or Tameside MBC etc. with a swipe card. With just one lift servicing Peak Valley’s offices, this sometimes causes delays and is in many respects a danger to safety in the event of a fire for instance. In general, it represents a bottleneck in the otherwise open flow of the building – and acts to dissuade rather than welcome people to the library or Peak Valley’s offices. It is a major design flaw that requires addressing through making available the stairs to members of the public. Such a design flaw, therefore, can be mitigated through more effective management of the building – an issue we turn to next.

Partly as a result of the confusion over its identity, partly due to its complex design – and partly due to its management, as explore below – The Hub is, for whatever reason, woefully under-used by residents, and in particular by the younger generation:

*For me I think it lacks an identity at the moment... when we speak to the tenants or when we deal with anybody it’s where they go to Peak Valley to sort out their housing issues on level one. So any other purpose, for example we wanted young people to use it because the [Hattersley Community] Forum does have a very strong presence there but it’s like that clique kind of atmosphere, it’s just, you’re not going to get young people coming in there and where is that next generation who’s going to keep that community kind of element of it going when the Forum kind of move on. So it does lack that to me, and I think the footfall would significantly increase if they would actually be able to engage the younger people of the estate to come in.*  
Tameside council officer.

That said, there exists a real opportunity, perhaps spurred on by the work Tameside MBC have commissioned to improve the design and use of the Hub, for the younger generation and new residents to become more engaged in it.

Whenever we have visited The Hub, the café on the ground floor – generously staffed by volunteers, invariably older residents associated with the Forum – was generally almost empty, even at peak lunchtime hours. This is odd considering the very competitive prices, in relation to the Tesco café next door, and the quality of the food – “the best cheese and ham toasties in the North West!” as one volunteer remarked. So why so little custom – at most around six or seven people at lunchtime, again almost solely older residents – in an estate of several thousand?

The reasons given for this are four-fold. First, as we have already discussed, The Hub lacks a distinctive identity universally known by residents as a community centre for their use as such. Second, for those that are aware, the multi-function and official use dissuades its use as a space to socialise or gather. For instance, many residents highlighted the fact that the presence of formal governance bodies did not exactly help create an atmosphere of conviviality:

*Looking back, you know what I mean, the community centre went and that wasn’t attached to anything that was its own little hub, you know, where people can go. Here you’ve got the community centre where the housing [office] is – who’s going to want to come in here; who’s going to want to relax in case somebody walks past*

*and says you’ve got debts yes what are you doing in here when you owe us so much for your rent? Do you see where I’m coming from? And you’ve got a police there, then you’ve got Tameside up on the top floor – do you see where I’m coming from? So you’re walking to basically offices, it’s not community.*

The third reason for the lack of use can be traced to how the community spaces are managed by the Hattersley Community Forum, who for whatever reason fail to make full use of the facilities. Whilst it is widely acknowledged that the Forum play a big part in, and do a good job for, the community – through voluntary labour – they nonetheless act as gatekeepers to The Hub. There are several issues here. Some residents feel that the representatives of the Forum receive special treatment, such as favourable room rents, and that this is unfair on the rest of the community, who due to other commitments, such as childcare and work, may not be able to give the requisite hours of volunteering to be a member. This is exacerbated by the generational divide between the Forum and the rest – Forum representatives tend to be much older, female, often retired, and who have gained this position for themselves through earlier community organising and activism. Fundamentally, the grievances among the community boil down to the relatively unaccountable discretion with which the Forum manage the rooms for hire, which are consequently under-used.

### 3.4.2 Carillion

Fourth and finally, an equally major problem is the way in which The Hub is managed outside the Forum’s hours. Whilst the Forum enjoys effective operational control over the majority of the ground floor from 9am until 4pm each working day, Tameside MBC have contracted facilities management (FM) out to a third party, Carillion. This was – up until very recently that is – part of a borough-wide FM outsourcing agreement with Carillion. Whilst the Forum charge next to nothing yet deny access on a discretionary basis, the problem with Carillion is the reverse – they market the rooms to anyone, and beyond Hattersley, but at an extremely high price. A central figure involved in the running of the local football club – very popular particularly among boys on the estate – describes how Carillion have priced the club out of using what are otherwise good facilities:

*It’s better [than the Community Centre], it’s just too expensive and not as accessible because Carillion are running it and that’s stupid – it’s crazy that’s the only reason. You talk to anyone, trying to book that space, I try and use it for the club to have meetings, it is [...], way too expensive... well I think they work out about, a meeting room is about 10 or 15 pounds an hour. But if you look at the old centre, I guess what people are probably saying is it wasn’t the accessibility in terms of where it was [...] but for me if you’ve got a community service or a community initiative based in Hattersley run by Hattersley people, so as a football club we’ve got 170 kids, majority are from Hattersley so we’re doing some really good stuff and it should qualify for one hour a month in The Hub free of charge or a nominal fee*

A similar sentiment exists among others involved voluntarily in organising recreational activities for young people:

*They’re [Carillion] pricing the community out of the buildings. So what I had at St Barnabus Church, I’ve got a kick boxing group who could take on more young people which keeps them off the street and gives them a discipline. But for health and safety they can’t have any more people in that building because everyone wants to play football, right, so they came to me and I said well we’ve got that big hall, we’ve got this, we’ve got that we’ll get you a subsidised rate, we’ll do this we’ll do that. Well then all the barriers start coming, Carillion won’t lose the money it will cost the 150 pound to have it for two hours on the Monday, how ridiculous is that?!*

It is not just high costs for hiring rooms that prevents its use. A charity youth worker who lives on the estate explains the difficulty in using what is meant to be an accessible community facility outside of the opening hours set by Carillion:

*It is tricky to use out of hours. So we were desperate to deliver, we were really wanting continuity of services for young people to move from the old community hub and cyber café to here and it took two years before we could physically use the building out of hours... You could be a key holder to the cyber café, we were key holders and it was a simple building you could be a key holder for [although] it was shocking where the kids could escape all over the place and it was really badly designed. This one’s not actually that badly designed but, and again, the local authority’s FM company Carillion couldn’t caretaker the out of hours activities. So Peak Valley opened the building in the day time and they closed at night... and when we were trying to build the building you couldn’t get funding for one that wasn’t open from 8 in the morning until 10 at night, it’s like no you can’t have a community facility that doesn’t open when people have finished work... For us it took the threat of me parking a mobile youth centre in the car park and running the youth club from a mobile youth centre to be able to get the building opened and to be able to run the youth club.*

With all these numerous problems, why would Tameside MBC employ Carillion to manage their premises? Part of the answer can be found in the prevailing practice associated with New Public Management<sup>71</sup> of outsourcing public services to big for-profit companies specialising in public sector contracts – Serco, G4S, Capita, Interserve and, of course, Carillion. Tameside were clearly not alone among public bodies in employing Carillion as their facilities management contractor. Such practices are now under increased scrutiny and may well soon be a thing of the past given recent events, not least Carillion’s dramatic financial collapse, the fallout of which is still – two months on, at the time of writing – yet to be resolved.<sup>72</sup> What motivated Tameside specifically to hire the company was a concern with cost. Tameside MBC, like its northern urban Labour-controlled counterparts, has

<sup>71</sup> Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”  
<sup>72</sup> Rob Davies, “Carillion: a month on, employees, partners and rivals feel the pain.” The Guardian, 14th February 2018.

suffered with some of the biggest budget cuts in the country: £144 million since 2010 according to the councillors we spoke with. Carillion, like the other big outsourcing firms, can undercut smaller and often more socially-conscious competitors – although as a result may also provide an unsatisfactory service as in the case of The Hub. A councillor explained to us – before the news of its financial failure – why choosing Carillion seemed like the best way to limit costs:

*It seemed a good idea at the time but looking back you know it, because we let Carillion do all our FM they take all the risk as well so it's less risk with the Council if something happens then its Carillion who take the risk. That was one of the reasons we sort of outsourced our facilities management really and plus the fact we had to make savings within the Council. So we are looking at that whether that, whether we can change that and it's something that we are looking at, now Carillion may win the contract but I'm hoping it will be a better contract than what we're getting.*

### 3.4.3 Success stories: the Library

It is not all doom and gloom, of course, for The Hub. Part of the reason Tameside MBC continue to subsidise its running costs through their support of community space and the Forum's activities – however questionable they may be – is that The Hub provides a much-needed resource and focal point for social activities outside of the home for many of the estate's most vulnerable people:

*so by subsidising the Hub with lots of people coming out, they're going in there and they're meeting up with people and they're having a chat you know they're wellbeing is far more improved which in a sense is the same for the Council. Because otherwise we might have to pick up adult social care, so there is always that about it and that's what we recognise with a lot of our community centres now especially with the elderly. You've got to try and get people, people just sit in the house they vegetate and it's not just about costs obviously people's lives but you know there's also,*

*create downstream problems I suppose. Yes it does so early intervention in a sense so rather than doing that we'd rather people coming into the Hub, give them something to get up for in the morning. Local councillor.*

One of the little known success stories of The Hub is the library. When we met the librarian, she explained to us that the old library, when it was located in the old district centre, was losing custom – a trend which, since its relocation into The Hub, has been reversed. Part of the problem with the old library was its location, on the other side of Stockport Road. This meant that residents on the Mottram side never bothered to use the library due to the territorial divide between the two sides:

*Because the estate was split by the main road always, so the people on this half as ludicrous as it sounds never bothered to cross to come down to the library which was on that side. Librarian.*

The old library, therefore, had a much smaller catchment population than the estate as a whole – “1500 users a month would be a reasonable expectation”. However, by 2010/11, usage had fallen to around about 700 per month. So there were two problems with the old library service: first, a location and catchment area that excludes a large proportion of the estate's residents and deepens social divides; second, declining usage due to poor facilities. The librarian explains how the new library in its new location has helped resolve these two issues:

*So you have Hattersley here, you have Mottram here, that's when we moved to the new Hub and of course people started to move across. Not quickly because there was a stigma attached to using Hattersley but they did come across. Now the example I can give you is every week in libraries we run what we call 'time for a rhyme' sessions aimed at babies to school age, mums, carers, fathers, whoever, come to the session and it's only half an hour but it develops children so on and so forth. At the old library in*




Figure 25: visitor figures at Hattersley Library since 2010

*the old precinct if we could scrape one it was as much as some weeks – many weeks you never even got one. Now when we moved across to the Hub we started them there, well in fact in the year prior to the library moving we had just ten children and five adults – I've got this written down – attending the session over a 12 month period, so that's all. In the 12 months after we opened in the Hub and we ran the same thing – nothing was any different – we had 400 children and 400 adults attending... Since we've moved across here, I haven't seen anything deteriorate, I would say it's done nothing but be positive for the library service.*

However, despite an initial rise in numbers in the year following the opening of the new library in October 2012 – with a record high in August 2013 and September 2014 at around 2,500 – in the past few years numbers have begun to fall back to pre-Hub levels (see graph below). One explanation for this may be to do with the budget cuts imposed by austerity, which saw opening hours and staffing levels reduce along with resources. In this light, the rise in footfall and use of the library, despite these wider trends, is a remarkable success story.



Figure 26: young residents outside The Hub

The move to The Hub, therefore, is a very positive transformation – not least in moving towards the centre of the estate and helping heal the divide between the two halves. This effect also holds for the other functions relocated to The Hub – the building itself represents a symbolic suturing of an historically territorially-divided estate. The issues with the opening hours of the library may be a product of austerity-driven budget cuts landed on a council that has dwindling resources to spend in areas suffering increasing need. The services offered by Tameside and Peak Valley in The Hub – if not the design and management of the building itself – have been relatively successful if we take into account the huge challenges presented by austerity since 2010.

## 3.5 Community Investment Strategy and skills development

Since 2013 PVHA has committed to delivering a Community Investment Strategy. PVHA owns and manages approximately 1504 homes and, like many Housing Associations, sees itself as an investor for change in its community. Indeed, with the onset of austerity driven budget cuts to other local public service providers, it may well be the biggest investor for change in Hattersley. Community investment aimed to develop sustainable communities through a process ‘...that recognises that successful neighbourhoods, and therefore successful tenancies, depend on a complex balance of social, economic and environmental conditions.’<sup>74</sup>

Peak Valley employ a dedicated officer, Sam Cooper, to deliver their strategy who has, by all accounts relayed to us, developed a trusted relationship with the local community:

*He's built up a reputation on the estate, people know him, I've seen him approach kids you know who've started causing trouble here saying "hey what's your problem?" and talking to them, you can do this you can do that and it gets them thinking. You know he's a good fella.*

The strategy presents as integral to PVHA's core values and activities. They exist as a not-for-profit organisation with any surplus generated being reinvested into the community. In 2014/15<sup>75</sup> this amounted to £53,269 spread over 11 different projects along the themes of Jobs, Training and Opportunities; Health and Wellbeing; Young people; and, Community Strengthening. Such projects included for example: a jobs fair, BASE (Barratt) construction courses and Peak valley apprentice scheme; the Zest project and Hattersley Community Gardens; Winter warmers and Peak Performance.

<sup>74</sup> Peak Valley Housing Association Community Investment Strategy: June 2014  
<sup>75</sup> These are the only years we have figures for see: Programme Report Peak Valley Symphony Housing 2014

We have already touched upon some of these projects but some like the Zest initiative and the Community Gardens were designed to not only strengthen community ties but to help address local health and well-being issues. One resident commented:

*...and it [the community garden] is pretty independent now because they sell their own fruit and veg but people who suffer with depression or mental health issues, he [Sam Cooper] gets them in there, he doesn't make them go in there, but it's like a therapy to them.*

By PVHA's own measure of social return on investment<sup>76</sup> this strategy has been successful in delivering social impact for local residents. However, there is also a wider sense here in which PVHA and its staff have gone the extra mile in community investment. This is evident in how PVHA have fostered a close working relationship with local schools to the point where they now have staff sitting as governors in the two local primary schools. The local head-teacher explains how this came about:

*They're always trying to liaise with us and it's in our interest to get the best out of them, so they're always coming up with ideas and funding streams and will help us out and we just thought it made sense to have someone from the housing stock on our Governors so we just asked and both people added greatly to the governors.*

He also is clear on how PVHA's presence and community investment strategy has benefited the schools.

*in the past we might have had some parents with housing difficulty going back before Peak Valley and you've got this family and they're going to be evicted and they owe a thousand quid or something the parents who previously were having to go to Manchester or and we would have had to phone up Tameside. So that role for the school which we weren't very good at because that's not our skills but we tried. But now that role was taken over by Peak Valley. So, now the parents' issues have been addressed so there's less agro for us and it calms them down and also I think they've also been strict with some people [...] and said if you carry on behaving like that you're not living here.*

Although Peak Valley appears to have achieved a great deal in respect to community initiatives that tackle mental health and social issues on the estate, they have been less successful at addressing the root cause of such problems: unemployment and a local skills gap.

### 3.5.1 Routes through to employment

Several skills and training initiatives, aimed at boosting employment levels in the estate, have been attempted over the period of PVHA's tenure. By far the most successful is the employment opportunities provided by the new Tesco superstore which claims that 90% of their work force either walk or cycle to work. This was no accident and while Tesco were open to employing local staff it was the Land Board



Figure 27: Hattersley Community Gardens

that ensured, with PVHA's help, that local residents were trained to successfully apply for the advertised jobs. Other schemes PVHA have initiated directly, such as their employment of (currently four) local residents as housing management staff. In addition to this they run their own apprenticeship scheme which has successfully employed one person in their property team.

The main approach to skills and training has involved partnership working. One such example was the Greater Manchester Talent Match, a Big lottery funded programme that aimed to support young people aged 18-24 on the estate who had been out of employment, education or training for twelve months or more and who needed extra support to help them along their pathway to work. A skilled professional from outside the area was employed on a two-year contract to run the programme on Hattersley. This appears to have been less than

successful as only two out of a target of ten young people were placed into full-time education or training. The recollections of the worker involved point to a number of explanations for the low take-up of this opportunity. First, in comparison to other areas Hattersley did not appear ready to fully exploit this funding opportunity given the relatively short, two year contract period:

*I think the Broughton Trust – they cleverly saw the value of the project. They had everything in place, I mean everything in place, they had the work placements in place because they'd worked for years in Lower Broughton which is very deprived. So, when they took the contract on it was just purely a case of well all we've got to do we've got the contract, we've got the lads and we've got a guy that owns an engineering firm that will take them on.*

Second, the worker also came up against residual perceptions of Hattersley isolationism:

*I'm used to working on these estates and I actively seek out these areas of... But when I first got on there, you know, I was thinking there's something strange round here, time has stood still and it's a bit here and nowhere, there's transport links, but what's wrong with these people? Why aren't they going into Manchester? There's very good transport links and let's be clear there's no work in Hattersley...*

Third, alongside this there was also the abiding problem of an outsider breaking into and earning the trust of a tightly bound community within a short period of time:

*The sheer volume of woven links that were going on: that she was related to this person who was related to that person and was it really a surprise to me? No, because I grew up on a rough old council estate in Luton and it was just exactly the same there. Everyone knew everyone, people know what's going on, people communicate with each other, you think you're going but you can't really go anywhere because everyone knows what you're up to because everyone knows what the people are doing.*

Circumstances might have been different for the Talent Match programme if it had coincided with the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership. Unfortunately, the Partnership closed in 2010, seven years prior to Talent Match. However, in the early days of PVHA's tenure on the estate they worked with the Neighbourhood Partnership to broker service level agreements, opening up local employment opportunities with contractors coming onto the estate. A local resident who used to work for the Neighbourhood Partnership recalls:

*If we had to get service level agreements with the colleges and stuff around that, Peak Valley would be there, they would be part of this group that was formed in order to like, it was called Jobs training enterprise Group and so they became a strong player on that. So even when we got the apprentices and stuff like that they would, so when their say the roofers came on the estate to do stuff they would, we would negotiate that and take so many*

*apprentices off the estate. So then Peak Valley would push that or they would say to us we're bringing a contractor in for this or for that and then they would broker a meeting with myself and the contractor.*

This partnership approach to skills and training continued with Barratt, Tameside MBC and even the Army. By 2014, a total of 53 people had attended BASE courses; 22 a Hattersley Jobs Fair; and five an Army personnel development programme<sup>77</sup>. Interviews with people who have been involved in these partnerships testify to the need to work with the prevailing cultural grain in Hattersley. This is a Tameside MBC official describing why jobs fairs and training have been organised on Hattersley:

*I liaise with Sam Cooper on a regular basis at Peak Valley Housing Association and in terms of bringing training into Hattersley because it's so hard to get people from there to actually go out regardless of what transport is available.*

The importance of PVHA's relationship with the local community is again underlined:

*I think it's been important for us to work in partnership with them [PVHA] to make sure we were making the right choices. Strategically we could go away and implement a number of things independently but in order to ensure the success of a project why would you not use the people closest to that community*

It is perhaps also significant that PVHA has understood that barriers to employment are not solely a lack of qualifications but can also be a product of poor mental health. Their contribution in this regard was acknowledged by a local councillor:

*It's been a hard slog really because it's not just about employment, you've got you've got the unemployment element of it but then you've also got health issues as well. So there's been a very it has to be a dual effort really to kind of help them, not just with physical illnesses but with mental health challenges as well. I think there's an organisation that is still operating in there called Zest so they had a kind of health element to them as well and they were supporting residents, somewhere to go and somewhere to actually get support to try and move forward. Even just work offering voluntary work for people and they've done a lot of work in that area to, so it's much wider than just the housing element of it.*

Clearly these attempts to improve the ability of local residents to access employment opportunities, given the prevailing levels of deprivation, remain important. PVHA have had some successes and the Tesco intervention is significant but more needs to be done. The lessons from the Talent Match programme are perhaps to avoid short-term projects and a full-time worker dedicated to building relationships and employment opportunities for and with the local community would be a good first step forward.

<sup>76</sup> ibid

<sup>77</sup> Programme Report Peak valley and Symphony Housing 2014

## CHAPTER 4

# KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS

## 4 KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS

The Hattersley case establishes a set of principles that can help guide the successful regeneration of any area suffering from multiple deprivation and historical neglect. Our assessment highlights five fundamentally important factors which have implications for estate regeneration policy and practice: first, the Collaboration Agreement structuring the stock transfer process and the regeneration masterplan, which enabled private sector investment whilst ensuring public sector control, high design standards and punctual delivery, and prevented speculative ‘land banking’; second, the overarching approach to regeneration through tenure diversification coupled with school catchment area restructuring; third, Peak Valley’s ‘relational’ – as opposed to ‘transactional’ – approach to the management of the estate and to its relationships with tenants and key regeneration partners, notably Tameside MBC; fourth, the robust governance structure centring on the Hattersley Land Board constituted by the Collaboration Agreement; and fifth, the deep-rooted, structural socio-economic problems often evident in regeneration estates like Hattersley are inherently complex and multi-faceted and cannot be achieved through the actions and programmes of housing associations alone. We address each in turn in this section. Lastly, we make recommendations for Onward.

### 4.1 The Collaboration Agreement

The Collaboration Agreement was a singular ‘*act of genius*’<sup>78</sup> without which the regeneration of the estate could have taken a very different turn. The demolition of some of the worst social housing and redevelopment as new homes for sale was the key strategic move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that paid for all other improvements, including to the existing stock and to the public realm, as well as for new retail, transport and community facilities. Moreover, the decision not to sell the land but only a licence to build and sell new

homes, we believe, was key to keeping the private sector developer on, albeit a slightly delayed, schedule particularly given the financial crash of 2008.

After the first stock transfer proposal from Harvest Housing Group proved unviable, Portico were invited to submit their plans for the estate. Through the successful partnership Portico established with Tameside MBC, Manchester City Council and English Partnerships, an innovative approach to the regeneration of Hattersley was conceived. The £18.5 million shortfall identified by Portico in its business plan presented the conundrum of finding an alternative source to plug the gap. The novel solution devised was a form of land value capture

<sup>78</sup> This and similar remarks can be attributed to various participants and stakeholders interviewed as part of this project.



Figure 29: Public consultation for the masterplan for Hattersley

that secured large inward investment from the private sector whilst maintaining total control of the regeneration process by the public and third sector partners.

What was eventually agreed in the Collaboration Agreement – the founding legal document for the regeneration partnership – was for the land owned by Manchester City Council to transfer directly into the hands of a newly-formed housing association, Peak Valley, set up as a special vehicle subsidiary of Contour Homes, and to offer up some of this land, on which the most derelict housing stood, for redevelopment as homes for sale by the private sector, in this case Barratt Homes. The sale of the land to Barratt would then pay for the £18.5m funding gap. However, this in itself is not such a radical proposition: consolidating public land for private redevelopment is a commonplace form of leveraging the finance needed for costly regeneration schemes. What was rather unusual – if not unique – in this case was the mechanism innovated to govern the sale.

Rather than sell the land outright – as would normally be the case in such deals – or even offer a leasehold rather than freehold arrangement, Barratt was invited to buy the “right to sell completed houses” on land that would remain under the ownership of Peak Valley throughout. In this way, Barratt was granted a licence to build new houses on land newly-owned by Peak Valley and profit from the sale

<sup>79</sup> PVHA, Peak News, vol. April 2016 (Peak Valley Housing Association, 2016). Page 14

of these houses. Upon their sale, the land, therefore, was transferred directly from Peak Valley to the new owner-occupiers, without ever passing through Barratt’s ownership. This condition of the Collaboration Agreement enabled this crucial investment whilst preventing all possibility of speculation or ‘land banking’ by the private sector.

Fortunate timing cannot be overstated as a factor of its success. The Collaboration Agreement was signed in September 2006 with BASE – a company now part of Barratt Group – only around nine months before the crash of 2007 that triggered the global financial crisis. The BASE bid for the land was £26.5 million, £7 million of which was to be paid up front on the date of the agreement and the rest in four annual instalments until 2010.<sup>79</sup> This would pay for the £18.5m shortfall in Peak Valley’s business plan and leave a substantial remainder to provide additional regeneration funding as well as pay other partners for the land that they owned. This included large swathes of land owned by Tameside MBC, particularly school sites and other public facilities that were being rationalised and rebuilt as part of the masterplan.

Had the agreement been signed a few months later, during or after the financial crisis, both the private sector partner, Barratt Homes, and the central government agency English Partnerships, who provided the financial guarantee for value of the land in case of market failure, would doubtfully have agreed to these terms. This raises a number of issues

around whether the interesting approach undertaken for Hattersley is at all replicable in our current post-crash era of political austerity, one in which regeneration policy has faded from the national government’s agenda and is all but a thing of the past.<sup>80</sup>

A key achievement of the Collaboration Agreement, as we will go on to explore in the section on Governance, is that it ensured the commitment of not just Barratt but all regeneration partners in working together towards a set of regeneration objectives.<sup>81</sup> These objectives are set out in figure 10 in chapter 3. They provide the basis for the criteria against which we assess the success of the interventions made by Peak Valley. Although our focus is on Peak Valley and its interventions, we also highlight the important roles played by the other partners in the regeneration process, notably Tameside MBC. As we show in what follows, the success of the Hattersley regeneration programme since 2006 is the product of a close partnership approach forged between the central, local and arms-length state with the private sector.

## 4.2 Tenure diversification

The most fundamental element of the post-2006 regeneration of the Hattersley estate is the restructuring of its housing stock through tenure diversification. The particularly poor state of the stock and estate – coupled with high levels of deprivation and a dearth of funding options – meant that an alternative route to fund these improvements was required. The demolition of some of the worst social housing, and redevelopment as new homes for sale, is the key strategic move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that pays for all other improvements, including to the existing stock and to the public realm, as well as for new retail, transport and community facilities. This amounted to consolidating the land on the estate into parcels marketable to the private sector for redevelopment as new houses for sale. At the same time, the plan enabled some of the most poorly-designed and under-maintained housing to be demolished and the sites cleared and consolidated for precisely this purpose. A resident actively involved in governance puts it succinctly: “it’s always been rich in land it’s not rich in money; we’ve got a lot of land, and land’s money now isn’t it, it’s like gold.”

Other than funding, this tenure diversification approach fulfilled the overall rationale for regeneration, summarised in the opening pages of the final masterplan, adopted as Supplementary Planning Guidance by Tameside MBC in 2004:

*Without new development in the area it will steadily fail to be viable as a community. It will continue to be an area that the younger more affluent and more mobile groups will tend to leave, taking with them the potential expenditure and social characteristics that are important in establishing a vibrant and stable community.*<sup>82</sup>

Regenerating Hattersley, the masterplan states, is not simply about improving existing stock for Peak Valley tenants but, crucially, about improving the environment, boosting the image of the estate and building new homes for sale in order to attract new residents, as well as retain those groups that might otherwise leave, who are purported to have the right “social characteristics” and sufficient purchasing power to establish and sustain “a vibrant and stable community”. The tenure diversification logic was pushed by English Partnerships, who were strongly influenced by the Mixed Communities agenda permeating New Labour thinking on regeneration and social exclusion at the time, as this former Peak Valley officer explains:

*One of the principles that English Partnerships wanted to address was the sort of, using that word again, the monolithic nature of the estate in terms of it was predominantly public social housing and I think the tenure mix was roughly sort of 70% social to 30% private and the private element was mainly Right to Buys. Their [EP’s] Sustainable Communities programme, which is now out of date, looked to sort of reverse that tenure mix in favour of home ownership, to about 60%, with 40% social and I think they were well on the way to sort of doing that.*

Significantly, the social housing in need of demolition was not concentrated in any one area but rather dotted around in small patches across the entire estate. This meant that the new homes for sale would also be spread out throughout the estate and relatively intermingled amongst social housing. Figure 29 from the masterplan gives an impression of the distribution, although the blue sites represent only phase 1 developments and not the complete picture. For instance, it does not record the large areas of housing demolished to make way for the new district centre to the east of Stockport Road, represented in red on the second masterplan map in figure 30.

The sites numbered 27, 28 and 32 in Figure 29 were once schools, owned by Tameside MBC. This shows how the council – a major landowner – was as intimately involved in the project as Peak Valley; and how the school rationalisation strategy that Tameside initiated in the years preceding the stock transfer was an integral part of the overall vision to break up existing mono-tenure agglomerations of social housing. The schools strategy anticipated the Mixed Communities approach towards housing, in that it broke up the concentration of secondary students on the estate in just one school – the ‘Comp’, site 27 on the map – and forced students to travel outside the estate to schools in different catchment areas with different, more mixed social class compositions. In this way, the tenure diversification project led by Peak Valley – and backed by English Partnerships – in the post-transfer period simply continued the logic of the school catchment rationalisation strategy that was first undertaken by Tameside MBC. We consider each related approach in turn, first housing, then schools.

<sup>80</sup> Dave O’Brien and Peter Matthews, *After Urban Regeneration: Communities, Policy and Place* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2015)  
<sup>81</sup> See schedule 1 (p.109) in English Partnerships, Tameside MBS, PVHA, Manchester City Council, Contour Housing (2006). Collaboration Agreement relating to Hattersley, Greater Manchester. Forshaws Solicitors.

<sup>82</sup> Peter Malpass and David Mullins, “Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK: From Local Initiative to National Policy Local Authority Housing Stock Transfer in the UK:” *Housing Studies* 17, no. 4 (2002): 673–686. page 5




Figure 29: phase 1 new housing sites




Figure 30: location of existing and new district centre on site of old housing

### 4.2.1 The impacts of tenure mixing

The Mixed Communities agenda sought to tackle spatially-concentrated poverty through a “more sustainable mix of housing types and tenures”<sup>83</sup> – where housing tenures were seen as a rough proxy for socioeconomic class.<sup>84</sup> At the heart of the mixed communities rationale is the ‘neighbourhood effect’ hypothesis which focuses on the *spatial* effects of poverty: defined by UK policy-makers as the “additional disadvantages that affect poorer people when they are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods.”<sup>85</sup> Despite ambiguous evidence for their existence, so-called ‘neighbourhood effects’ are seen to reinforce poverty through poor access to public services, social networks, role models, and employment opportunities.<sup>86</sup>

It is extremely difficult to measure how the introduction of new-build owner-occupiers for the first time on the Hattersley estate has affected the life chances of other residents. This is a notoriously tricky question in the social sciences which hinges around the methodological controversy over whether ‘neighbourhood effects’ exist in any real or observable way. Measuring them is problematic due to the difficulties in isolating the additional effects that *spatial* concentrations of poverty might have on life chances over and above more structural causes, such as a lack of access to good services, education and employment opportunities. Moreover, the mechanisms purported to affect this relationship between deprivation and spatial concentrations are highly contentious.<sup>87</sup> Many of the alleged benefits of tenure mixing for the disadvantaged rely on the emergence of meaningful social interaction between different social classes – i.e. tenure groups – which in turn rests on the assumption that spatial proximity alone translates into interaction. However, a growing body of empirical research<sup>88</sup> has found that tenure diversification in mixed communities has not resulted in any significant interaction between neighbours of different tenure classes and has, moreover, acted to increase social tensions and class divisions. Evidence of earlier mixed communities such as the post-war new towns suggests that increased mixing might cause neighbourly disputes and that residents prefer relative social homogeneity or like-mindedness in their neighbours.<sup>89</sup> Official findings from DCLG are at best ambiguous.<sup>90</sup>

Broadly consistent with the academic literature, we found little evidence of any significant social mixing between residents of the new build private houses and the longer-standing tenants of Peak Valley. However, we only spoke with a limited number of owner-occupiers – two in total – and so more in-depth research is required in order to make a robust assessment. A small number of owner-occupiers have sought to get involved in governance processes of the estate, applying to join the Land Board as well as less formal groups such as the Neighbourhood Watch. However, an existing resident reports some differences, and perhaps the emergence of tensions, between the two groups:

*I mean we have local neighbourhood watch meetings and we've got people from Barratt's coming up about the Barratt's houses as we call them and they definitely feel that they are a little bit different.*

Nonetheless, there is little evidence of any significant tensions or conflict developing between tenure groups, with suggestions that

*overall the majority of people have been happy to see new households move into the area on former derelict land – because I think 95% of the residential land portfolio is brown field land – and seeing that land being brought back into use. Former Peak Valley officer.*

Despite the controversy and lack of evidence to support the purported causal mechanisms of mixed communities, the tenure diversification project in Hattersley has had some positive impacts on the estate. For instance, over the years many residents had formed tight-knit inward-looking communities within certain streets and neighbourhoods on the estate, which fuelled existing territorial divides and tensions that meant that many residents on both sides of the imagined line between Hattersley and Mottram would not dare cross Stockport Road. Various interviewees explained how the political geography underpins some of the territorialism that has embedded itself across this divide:

*It's interesting: you cross the Stockport Road, which we're next to, and there's a different phone code and a different postcode on this side of the estate. Some people think they live in Mottram on this side because they've got an 01457 phone number and a SK146 instead of a 3... Community and youth worker.*

*It could be a whole world apart between Mottram and Hattersley and I think it's fair to say anybody in Mottram 10 years ago would never dare to go down towards Hattersley... but there was just almost like a wall them that you just wouldn't even penetrate. I would imagine if you're neighbours now they're going to Tesco by themselves or even go to the leisure centre in Hattersley. Tameside officer.*

The tenure diversification approach has helped heal this divide in a number of ways, such that residents from each have begun to use facilities on the ‘other side’. We heard anecdotes of various other territorial boundaries at smaller-scale geographies across the estate. Some streets had reputations amongst residents from other parts – with little interaction between them. Tribal loyalties emerged amongst neighbours of particular areas, contributing to gang culture amongst the younger population – in turn fuelling anti-social behaviour, criminality and an atmosphere of fear. There was not a great deal of social mixing across territorial boundaries even between Peak Valley tenants from similar cultural backgrounds whose grandparents, in some instances, would have grown up on the same street in inner-city

<sup>83</sup> ODP, Sustainable Communities: Homes for all: A Five Year Plan from the office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, 2005): p.53

<sup>84</sup> Dick Richardson, Rachel Gee, and Sharron Power, Fresh Hope Fresh Air: Starting a New Life In Hattersley (Mancunian Reunion Project, Tameside MBC, 2008).

<sup>85</sup> ODP, Sustainable Communities: People, Places and prosperity: a five year plan from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. (2005): p.52

<sup>86</sup> PVHA, “10 Year Legacy & Financial Business Plan 2017-2022.”

<sup>87</sup> Tameside MBC, “Supplementary Planning Guidance: Hattersley and Mottram.”

<sup>88</sup> Rebecca Tunstall and Alex Fenton, “In the Mix: A Review of Mixed Income, Mixed Tenure and Mixed Communities,” 2006.

<sup>89</sup> Alan Berube, “Mixed Communities in England: A US Perspective on Evidence and Policy Prospects,” Water, 2005.

<sup>90</sup> M. L. Joseph, R. J. Chaskin, and H. S. Webber, “The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development,” *Urban Affairs Review* 42, no. 3 (January 1, 2007): 369–409.

Manchester. One consequence of demolishing large swathes of social housing – particularly the largest clearance sites around Stockport Road – was to break up this pattern of socio-spatial segregation and therefore break down some of the social structures, such as gang culture, that were hindering upward mobility:

*The by-product of knocking all these houses down is that a lot of the territorial elements in the community were broken down; as somebody who lives here, a positive by product of that was it broke down a lot of the territorial nature of the families that might have, you know, since the 1960s lived in that little corner of the estate. So actually if they needed another house they would wait for one to come up on their street or house swaps and things like that – actually some of that was all changed and broken down by knocking down this patch of grotty wooden houses [on Stockport Road] that were only to make spaces for this development... Again it's little things that have happened, it might not have been the intention of them at the time, I think the by-product of it has been quite positive, I mean I am sure there's negatives as well but I try and look for the positives.* Charity worker.

A result of breaking up some of the social housing and offering tenants new homes spread out across the estate was to overcome some of the more negative aspects of close-knit communities through higher spatial mobility. This process was strengthened by relocating the district centre with all its community facilities and Peak Valley's offices at the centre of the divide, on Stockport Road, renamed The Hub, thereby creating a symbolic bridge between the two sides. We discuss this intervention in section 4.4.

However, a problematic adverse effect of breaking down boundaries and increasing spatial mobility has been what many see as the displacement of anti-social behaviour and minor criminality from Hattersley to neighbouring town centres, such as Hyde:

*I mean as somebody who's done outreach into these hot spots there are hot spots well not so much at the moment interestingly. Our rascals, a lot of them are heading into town centres to cause trouble now which presents us with challenges of engaging some of those guys because actually we can't engage them as easily in the community now.* Youth worker.

This reflects a common concern with the Mixed Communities agenda – that by moving people around and encouraging spatial mobility it tends to displace issues rather than resolve them directly<sup>91</sup>. Nonetheless, there is certainly a sense among residents that the estate is now a far safer place than it has been in the past:

*I think the crime rate's gone down...if definitely feels like a safer place to live...oh if I come home go home about 3 o'clock in the morning and I can walk like from the taxi home...and I don't feel like anything would happen...and I walk round the estate with the dog and that's fine yes... don't really see anything happening...*

*because you used to have like kids standing in the, all kids because I was a kid as well. But like the old community centre and stuff they used to be like people stood in there like a gang of groups and then you used to feel intimidated walking past them... stuff like that but nowadays I don't really see much.* Local resident.

The flipside of creating more spatial mobility is the breaking down of community togetherness which has both positive and negative outcomes. Whilst some of the problematic elements of community bonds, such as gang-based crime, may have been reduced, so too may have some of the more positive aspects been weakened, such as networks of solidarity and mutual aid amongst neighbours. One resident describes this shift from highly insular yet also interdependent social structures towards more open, yet perhaps more atomised communities with less interdependencies:

*Some of those depths of community ties – we're on an island – they will have been reduced for sure. A positive side of that is within that depth of community spirit where we're tight and we're looking after each other you might have had a low level of reported crime because crime was happening but perhaps the community felt that they could deal with something or that they wanted to deal with it themselves where the ability to I mean the community police and friends will tell you. But I think there was less fear of reporting crime now so crime stats could well have risen but actually the feel, living here the feel of some of the nonsense that goes on perhaps open dealing or you know there certainly was open drug dealing I mean on my street when I moved in where that just wouldn't happen now because people know it would get reported.*

#### 4.2.2 School catchment area restructuring

It is perhaps too early to evaluate the effects of the tenure diversification approach, for its greatest benefits are likely to accrue through combination with the schools restructuring programme. Specifically, it is the combination of both housing tenure and school catchment area mixing that will have the biggest effect on life chances in Hattersley – perhaps not so much for older residents but certainly for those younger generations currently going through the education system. The process of 'territorial stigmatization'<sup>92</sup> of Hattersley also extended to school students on the estate, whose employment prospects were often hampered the moment they left school by unfavourable associations in the minds of local and perhaps even national employers, as this community worker describes:

*I mean back then in 2001 there was the Hattersley high school, Hattersley Comprehensive, and there was certainly a stigma attached to going to that. So if you had a Hattersley High on your CV it wasn't the easiest place to get a job from because they're*

*dispersed around a number of schools now and it's not you know this is a Hattersley kids school so therefore whichever local high school you've got on your CV is less of a barrier to employment*

A local councillor explains Tameside's rationale for focusing on the schools as an indirect, long-term route to socioeconomic empowerment:

*One of the issues in Hattersley was you went to a primary school in Hattersley, you went to the Hattersley Comp and you stayed in Hattersley and then you just went on the dole basically. So that's what you tended to do and that's what all your peers did, so you're in primary school, you go up to secondary school, no aspiration there, now what are you going to do when you leave school, "oh I'll just sign on..." There was no ambition to go anywhere else...I'm not saying all the kids there but we'd had a real problem in the Hattersley school and they had about 300 children and it was built for over 1000 so we had all of the people who want to go to school in Hattersley and some of the parents were choosing to send the children to other schools other than the Hattersley Comp as well. So we took the school out of that estate and we built it in the end of Godley just down the road away from there.... we have two schools now – Alder Secondary School and then Longendale – and the children from Hattersley can go to either, and then they're mixing with other children as well... so now when you say what are you doing when you leave school, "oh I'm going to go college, I'm going to go to University."*

As the councillor describes, part of the problem with one large feeder school serving a mono-tenure ex-council estate – besides from stigma – is that it concentrates children from disadvantaged families in one learning space which may therefore mean lower standards are achieved due to the compound effects of fewer resources to address greater learning needs. Moreover, this situation, as a microcosm of the estate itself, intensified over time as social housing was 'residualised' – increasingly an option of last resort, rather than a mainstream tenure choice.<sup>93</sup> This general trend was exacerbated by Manchester City Council's purported practice of moving some of its most 'problematic' and disadvantaged tenants to Hattersley, as this local councillor attests:

*there was other suggestions that they were also rehousing people who didn't want to live in Manchester outside of Manchester... People felt that there were some very difficult households being rehoused here... speeding up a traditional cycle of decline as a housing area...*

As conditions worsened, some of the more aspirational and upwardly mobile residents who may have bought their home through Right to Buy decided to move away from Hattersley. With this population decline, the 'Comp' saw its student numbers fall, from over a thousand, as the councillor imparts above, to around 300. Not only did this make the school increasingly unviable to run, from a financial perspective, but so too decreased the diversity of its cohort still further, as more upwardly mobile families sent their children to other nearby schools.

Without the presence of these more aspirational children with greater educational support at home than their peers, the children 'left behind' lacked the kind of role models that would stretch their learning, and as a result standards declined still further, in a vicious downward spiral. This is the chain of events that the regeneration process of tenure diversification and school catchment area restructuring sought to reverse.

The introduction of the new build homes for sale may have helped reverse the trend of falling educational attainment in Hattersley in a number of ways. First, it tends to ameliorate the territorial stigma attached to Hattersley as a whole. This is evident by the fact that the new Barratt houses have proven exceptionally popular on the market, despite the notoriety of the estate. One claim frequently made by various interviewees was that the new development is Barratt's most successful in the country or that it is the bestselling new estate in the Northwest. The process of building new homes in Hattersley for the first time in decades, alongside other investments, has helped transform the image of the estate – and in turn transformed Barratt's perception of it also – as one local councillor attests:

*One of the things that Barratt's found was they tended to sort of build on the edge, they wanted to just build on the edge of Hattersley and not call the houses 'Hattersley', call them something else, with names like 'Hillside View', so anything but Hattersley. But they found that it was the best sales they had in the North West the Hattersley site and that's given them the confidence now to build on the old school site they're going to build 200 houses and that's right in the middle of the estate. So that's where they're building at the minute, you go up Field Farm Road there's, that site they've got there is right in the middle of the estate and they've got the confidence now to build there.*

Some see Barratt's new-found willingness to invest in new housing right at the heart of the estate as symbolic victory for Hattersley:

*That particular one [Hillside Central] is in my view a real game changer because it's like an estate within an estate.*

In this way, through the momentum achieved by high sales and ongoing construction, the estate has undergone a dramatic rebranding which has helped attract new residents with the "potential expenditure and social characteristics that are important in establishing a vibrant and stable community".<sup>94</sup> Moreover, this means that – for the first time in Hattersley's history – upwardly mobile residents are not forced out of the estate in search of a bigger family home but can rather buy such a home within its boundaries. As a result, a councillor remarks, many former, perhaps more 'aspirational' tenants who had moved away have actually begun to move back to the estate, into the Barratt homes:

*What we're finding now with the new housing we've got up in Hattersley that's people who are born in Hattersley and brought up in Hattersley and moved away, they're coming back now and buying the houses in Hattersley.*

<sup>91</sup> Mark Davidson and Loretta Lees, "New-Build Gentrification: Its Histories, Trajectories, and Critical Geographies," *Population, Space and Place* 16 (2010): 395–411; Mark Davidson, "Love Thy Neighbour? Social Mixing in London's Gentrification Frontiers," *Environment and Planning A* 42, no. 3 (2010): 524–44; Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees, eds., *Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth?* (Policy Press, 2012).

<sup>92</sup> Ian Cole and Barry Goodchild, "Social Mix and the 'Balanced Community' in British Housing Policy – a Tale of Two Epochs," *GeoJournal* 51 (2001): 351–360.

<sup>93</sup> DCLG, "Evaluation of the Mixed Communities Initiative Demonstration Projects: Final Report," *Communities* (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010).

<sup>94</sup> David Imbroscio, "Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 34, no. 1 (February 26, 2012): 1–20.

This effectively puts an end to the trend towards concentrating deprivation on the estate – by diversifying the income spectrum of the population.

In summing up Hattersley's tenure diversification approach, it must be noted that it was designed primarily to provide a funding mechanism for more direct means of regeneration. Any supposed benefits from social mixing can be seen as secondary effects. Moreover, the plan avoided the hostility that is usually associated with mixed communities. Perhaps the most damning critique of the mixed communities agenda is its tendency to displace existing residents in favour of more upwardly-mobile incomers – that it is 'gentrification by stealth'; a form of 'state-led gentrification'<sup>95</sup>. Such a charge cannot be levelled at the Hattersley tenure diversification programme, for all tenants of the old housing demolished to make way for the new have been rehoused by Peak Valley in better new-build housing. In many respects, this is one of its great achievements – to be able to fund improvements and replacement of existing stock, as well as new infrastructure and facilities, through the introduction of homes for sale, without displacing any existing residents.



Figure 31: the Peak Valley team outside their offices in the old district centre

## 4.3 Peak Valley's relational approach

In examining Peak Valley's role in the regeneration of Hattersley and its interaction with its community, there has been no criticism voiced of their activities. This we attribute to their 'relational' – as opposed to 'transactional' – approach to the delivery of their housing service. Such an approach potentially embodies and harnesses the concept of 'social capital' – high levels of which have been associated with socially and economically prosperous communities.<sup>96</sup> It has also been instrumental in cementing valued and trusted working relationships with all stakeholders. This has enabled a successful governance of the estate with key partners Tameside MBC and the local community. It has also enabled a productive working relationship with Barratt, the developer of the new-build homes.

In this section, we first look at Peak Valley's corporate governance structures, namely their Board of management and internal scrutiny mechanism, Peak Performance. These internal structures reflect Peak Valley's stakeholder engagement philosophy of transparency and involvement and as such we will go on to explore how they have

engaged and managed relationships with external partners. Following this, we pay close attention to how Peak Valley has engaged with its wider local community with a view to enabling more effective local governance of the estate.

### 4.3.1 Peak Valley's Board of Management.

The association was governed by a Board of non-executive members who delegated day-to-day operational control to the Managing Director and the Senior Management team. Since April 2017, this Board was subsumed into a new 'common board' in a move to simplify existing governance structures in the group. The Peak Valley Board was also struggling to attract new members and it is now better able to access investment through a larger group structure. It is mentioned here as its loss appears to signify for several interviewees, including Peak Valley tenants and external partners, a potential return to a more remote landlord, as once embodied by Manchester City Council.

Members of the Board consisted of two 'independents', one of whom was the Chairperson, two Peak Valley tenants, another resident and a local authority (Tameside MBC) nominee. They were advised by senior management of Peak Valley and met frequently to determine policy and to monitor the performance of the association. This arrangement appears to have worked to the satisfaction of residents

*'...it worked very well really I thought it worked very well and we were in I think we were in a very privileged position because we did, we managed to have our say we managed to be able to have an input'*

The move to a common board has generated concern that this prefigures a wider, physical disengagement from the local community. One local councillor commented

*there are concerns because when you think I used to be on the Peak Valley board so then I'm no longer on the Peak Valley it's gone ...my concern is that Onward have got to keep it local and they can't manage this estate remotely. You know we've got to make sure that there's people in there and they've got to be involved in what's going on and to continue the legacy that Peak Valley did. You know we've got to still keep improving it and we've still got to look at how the estate's changing over the years, still get involved you know be a partner be a true partner of the Council.*

This resident's concern, reflected in a number of interviews, was that this loss of local connection will result in a loss of local knowledge, which, in turn might lead to a diminished housing and estate management service:

*and I worried so much because so much that was my main concern when this was all coming to an end. How do these people, what do they really know about us? I know they might know the bad bits but what do they really know about us and how can they possibly I won't say do a good job because they probably will. But I just feel as though we're losing our connection now*

### 4.3.2 Peak Performance

Peak Performance was Peak Valley's internal scrutiny mechanism. It consists of nine tenant volunteers who each 'champion' a service area provided by Peak Valley. They hold Peak Valley to account for meeting published service milestones collated through the tenant survey (STAR). The tenant champion and Peak Valley staff member responsible for the service area meet monthly to review the service performance. The tenant champions also accompany Peak Valley's community officer on estate 'walk-about' to meet other tenants and examine gardens and properties. Peak Valley have appreciated the importance of this scrutiny panel and have invested in training to equip their tenant champions with the knowledge and confidence to hold the organisation to account.

The scrutiny panel was established following initial complaints from tenants on the quality of early modernisation work undertaken by CASE, a company contracted by Peak Valley to carry out improvements to the housing stock. Peak Valley realised it required a more agile and sensitive consultative mechanism to enable it to respond faster and effectively to tenant concerns. When quizzed about how the panel currently functions the tenant chair of Peak Performance simply responded, *'it's brilliant'*. He did, however, express some concern about how the panel might function effectively under the organisation restructuring and the move to Onward:

*When it gets taken over, well not taken over, but under the new regime it's a bit complicated because say like, our repairs man here he oversees all repairs and what you. He don't work here anymore he works in Didsbury so it's hard to get a champion meeting with him so we can get our information and performance. So we'll cross that bridge when we come to it...*

### 4.3.3 Relations with external partners

From the outset Peak Valley or Portico appeared to position themselves well with the key component parts of their local governance network. This was how an ex-Tameside MBC officer recalls them:

*I remember when we had the beauty parade for the first stock transfer you know there was a high level of honesty with Portico that, you know, they clearly wanted to be involved but there were viability issues. That culture seemed to permeate the organisation at Portico so everybody you dealt with was very, very straight forward. The culture was to be very honest but once they said they would do something they went off and did it..*

A local youth worker provides a similar sentiment:

*...as somebody who's watched them and watched them with an eye I think perhaps an analytical eye I think actually they have had integrity they've done what they said they'd do.*

This evident capacity for honesty and straightforwardness is an obvious asset in developing the kind of trusted relationships that are clearly required if working partnerships and networks are to function

<sup>95</sup> Loic Wacquant, "Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality," *Thesis Eleven* 91, no. 1 (November 1, 2007): 66–77.

<sup>96</sup> Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (Simon & Schuster, 2000).

effectively. Peak Valley's own legacy feedback<sup>97</sup> reflects upon how effective relationships with partners have resulted in delivering successful regeneration outcomes. We have noted above how the Land Board has benefited from such working relationships but the outcomes on the ground, in terms of physical improvement, are also appreciated by residents:

*Peak Valley were marvellous in the way they had this time table and the time table had been kept to and you know I honestly can't say that anybody's been displeased with the way that things have turned out. Because basically it's been fantastic.*

A good working relationship with the property developer Barratt has been essential in delivering the new build homes. This relationship was forged in the difficult circumstances of the 2007 financial crash when, according to an ex-Peak Valley officer, Barratt

*were in breach of the agreement in many respects because they just couldn't afford to start selling houses but we worked with them we didn't sort of beat them over the head with the agreement that would have been pointless...But having done so you know that relationships been cemented and its worked very well and long may it continue to do so.*

From Barratt's viewpoint this relationship now expedites delivery schedules in that Peak Valley represents

*somebody I could ring and ask for assistance for and even if it's sending some of the documents that we need to get signed, you know to do with road adoptions and things like that. If they're landed and they have to be a party to that just having a point of contact you can send them to and ring and sort of chivvy up... Barratt staff*

An important relationship for any social landlord is with their own tenants and we have explained above how Peak Valley has integrated tenant involvement into their decision-making structures. The existence, value and utility of this relationship is acknowledged in this comment by a Tameside MBC official:

*...to be honest we use that relationship that they have with the tenants you know why not sometimes there will be very, very difficult situations or tough decisions that have to be made and far easier for it to come from them because it's sometimes received much better than it would be coming directly from the Council.*

However, another Tameside MBC official suggests that Peak Valley's evident skill in developing good relationships with partners is not simply about a culture of honesty and straightforwardness it also embodies a public service philosophy that emphasises the relational aspect of public service delivery:

*But it's not a transaction this, is it? There's too many people who define a public service as a transaction, what a landlord does in terms of rent paid and that's just not what Peak Valley are nor what public services should be...*

This is interesting and echoes a wider, current debate amongst public administration academics and practitioners about how public services can better address the increasingly complex needs of residents. Commentators<sup>98</sup> have argued the New Public Management paradigm – privileging a bureaucratic, market led means of service delivery – rested upon assumptions that public services were products that were delivered to people. This, they argue, has been proven to be an inefficient, often unjust and costly way of meeting the contemporary requirements of individuals and communities. Rather, what is required now is a new model<sup>99</sup> of governance that emphasises a holistic, inter-agency and relational approach to service delivery; and, moreover, one that is predicated upon a notion of public service delivery as a process, the end outcome of which is likely to be more effective the more involved the service user is in the design and delivery of that process, towards a process of co-production.

There is nothing novel about multi-sectoral local partnerships assembled to tackle discrete policy objectives. Such initiatives have often been put into practice in contexts of industrial and economic decline, fragmented neighbourhoods, hard-pressed public services, and sustained under-investment in voluntary and community sector organisations. However, this way of working, or governance model, has attracted sustained criticism for delivering aspects of one policy objective at the expense of another<sup>100</sup>. This is particularly true of regeneration projects<sup>101</sup>. Indeed, Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership would serve as an example of such a partnership. Furthermore, such a critique could be currently levelled at the Hattersley regeneration initiative where the physical infrastructure has been upgraded but with little improvement in the overall levels of deprivation. This may well be a failure of the wider governance network and it is moot if Peak Valley, and indeed the Hattersley Land Board, should be assessed upon criteria other than the objectives detailed in the Collaboration Agreement.

In the absence of a more detailed comparative study it is also hard to assess the extent to which Peak Valley embodies the more relational principles promoted by the protagonists of 'New Public Governance'<sup>102</sup> – as opposed to New Public Management – models of service delivery. It is arguable<sup>103</sup> that small housing associations, such as Peak Valley, are particularly well-suited to delivering these kind of relational services: they generally deliver a local housing management service; they have a knowledge and understanding of the area; and, they tend to have strong relationships with local networks that can help to make things happen. The next section will examine how far this is

true for Peak Valley and its objective to engage the community in the development and regeneration of Hattersley.

#### 4.3.4 Relations with the local community

No-one interviewed as part of this evaluation failed to mention the word 'community'. It was typically prefixed by the adjective 'strong' or 'unique' or 'different' and we came to understand that this notion of community was central to not only the cultural identity of Hattersley residents, both old and new, but also to our account of the impact Peak Valley has visited upon Hattersley.

*'...we have a massive, massive strong community who looks after each other'. Local resident.*

*We worked across Tameside and I can honestly say working across the entire Borough this is a completely different set of, I mean, there's a completely different community here, totally different residents, they react differently to different offers and different opportunities. It's very, very different. Local councillor.*

*'But there is a definite community feel and it comes to the fore really when there's a problem you know somebody, one of our ex-pupils died and his mum came in and all the families knitted together and paid for the funeral and things like that and it's a really generous community, in that they've got no, little money but when they need to pull together they really do, I would have to say that that is the strength of this area.' Local Headmaster.*

*'I moved to Hattersley November 2015 and ever since then I've been I've been more better and welcoming I find Hattersley has Hattersley residents as a family because they're so, they're like a family to me they're so supportive and unlike where I come from...' New resident*

From the outset Peak Valley confronted a challenging set of circumstances: a physical environment in need of substantial repair and a relatively well organised, if generally inward looking, community that had learnt to be cynical of their previous landlords. Unsurprisingly, the early meetings with community members were challenging. A PVHA official involved at the time remembers:

*'When we first started with that group there was over 30 members, 30 resident members, a number of officers like myself reported to that particular group and that met monthly, and to say it was a lively group would be an understatement. It was very, very lively and quite confrontational at times but nonetheless it did serve a really a really good purpose in generating local resident support and in some respects shaping the regeneration plans for the area'. ex PVHA official.*

Many had been working to improve the conditions on their estate for many years and the following provides a sense of the depth of these activists' commitment. Here she recalls how she felt when the original preferred bidder for the stock transfer announced they were withdrawing:

*'...it was Harvest and they were involved and they promised us all sorts of things and then a fortnight before Christmas we were sat in this meeting and they said it was undo-able because it was going to cost so much money, you know, to sort out the environment as well as the housing that they didn't think it was possible to do. So, I sat in that meeting that day and that night I cried because we'd worked so hard to get to that point and it was the week before Christmas, I'll never forget it and so we had to start all over again' Local resident.*

Moreover, whilst it was true that some of the residual feelings of community insularity had begun to be addressed by the various preceding regeneration activities initiated by Tameside MBC, it remained a strong and abiding presence. The frustration of working with this mentality is palpably illustrated here:

*'There's a whole community that's been developed there that has looked at itself as like just an island really and they barely think of themselves really as even part of Tameside...it's so hard to get people from there to actually go out regardless of what transport is available, we've spoken previously about infrastructure. You know it can still be there, but it's almost psychological, the barriers are there regardless of whether we create opportunities or not.' Local council official.*

In examining Peak Valley's role in the regeneration of Hattersley and its interaction with its community we have struggled to find any substantial criticism of their activities. So, what did they do to mark themselves as a different social landlord to their predecessors, particularly with regard to the local community? The answer, we believe, lies in the comment made by the Tameside MBC official that Peak Valley did not define their service as *transactional*, choosing instead to emphasise the *relational* aspects of their service.

A relational approach to public service delivery can embody, and harness, the concept of social capital. Robert Putnam famously described social capital 'as the glue that holds society together'<sup>104</sup> and his research associated high levels of social capital in an area with high levels of socioeconomic prosperity. The concept became popular amongst the New Labour Government as, like other forms of capital, it could be viewed as a resource generated through individuals associating together, beyond the sphere of the family or market, in common endeavours whether social, recreational or political to solve common problems. It is through participating in such social networks that individuals increase levels of interpersonal trust, which in turn boosts their propensity to engage in collective activity. In this way, various policy interventions – particularly in the New Labour era<sup>105</sup> – were designed to boost this resource and thereby develop sustainable and cohesive communities. However, it is useful, for our purpose here, to distinguish the two inter-related components of the concept. One is the structural component, the social network with relational ties to, for example, friends, family, neighbours, colleagues or acquaintances. The second component is attitudinal or cognitive and is the shared norms and trust that are the foundations of co-operation.

<sup>97</sup> PVHA - Performance Legacy Report 2017

<sup>98</sup> Osborne, S (2013) A New Theory for Public Service Management: Toward a (Public) Service-Dominant Approach. *American Review of Public Administration* 43 (2) p135-158

<sup>99</sup> Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR

<sup>100</sup> Carlisle, S (2010) Tackling health inequalities and social exclusion through partnership and community engagement? A reality check for policy and practice aspirations from a Social Inclusion Partnership in Scotland. *Critical Public Health* 20(1), 117–127

<sup>101</sup> Tretter, E. (2013) Sustainability and neoliberal urban development: the environment, crime and the remaking of Austin's downtown, *Urban Studies*, 50(11) 2222-2237

<sup>102</sup> Osborne, S. (2006). The New Public Governance? *Public Management Review*, 8(3) 377-387

<sup>103</sup> Muir, R., Parker I (2014) Many to Many: how the relational state will transform Public Services. IPPR

<sup>104</sup> Putnam, R (2000) *Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster, London, New York

<sup>105</sup> see for example: Department of Communities Local Government (2006) *Strong and Prosperous Communities*.

It is apparent that Peak Valley has been successful in securing the trust of the community. An architect involved in the regeneration put it like this:

*They [Peak Valley] were always being very open with the community, they've always been very transparent, they've looked at one area, basically delivered what they promised... so they've tackled it in bite size pieces over a number of years and I think building trust with people was so important and that you know they'd had consultation in the past. They'd had people drive up the M67 promising things and it would just go into the corridors of power and either get kyboshed or we can't afford that or you know well what benefit would we get*

However, it is the 'network' or 'relational' component of social capital which is of interest here. Social networks, put simply, fall into two categories. They are either dense, comprising closely linked ties and are, classically, kinship and more likely to be 'closed' or exclusive networks. Or they are looser, more expansive, inclusive networks of ties to 'other' people outside of ones' immediate environment of family and neighbours. It is apparent which form of network predominated 'on' Hattersley:

*'So, you might have had a half dozen communities along here that would of all known each other across the back gardens and had that open and free flowing and real depth of relationship. Those people have been displaced and that greater depth of community spirit will have been affected but it's still hanging around that culture is of dense support networks and a real sense of identity where people help each other out because it's on an island right?'* Local youth worker.

This type of network is characterised by high levels of 'bonding capital' – a supportive resource in times of adversity but one that can inhibit the development and deployment of 'bridging capital' the resource that enables contact with wider networks which can, critically, be the conduit for alternative information and opportunity. It is also the bridge between an inclusive or exclusive community. Peak Valley's task was to develop this bridging capital without undermining the strong, supportive networks that held the community together through hard times and enabled it to participate so robustly in the regeneration process.

PVHA's strategy was one of intensive place-based housing management. It opened an office on the estate with an in-situ director and housing management team. Crucially, it took an early decision to recruit, as part of this team, local residents. It involved residents in all aspects of the ongoing regeneration of the estate, working with structures that already existed, the Hattersley Community Forum and the Neighbourhood Partnership and creating bespoke ones such as the Hattersley Development Steering Group. It organised for groups of residents to visit other sites and places undergoing regeneration to gain a sense of alternative solutions and what might be possible on Hattersley. It opened its own organisation to resident scrutiny through the Peak Performance mechanism and, when austerity bit after 2010, it developed and resourced its own Community Investment strategy. PVHA staff became local school governors and participated in the

running of the local football club. In other words, they attempted to immerse themselves in the fabric of the community and cultivate community capacities for local governance.

In addition to this there was an element of social engineering. The local secondary students were obliged to travel outside the estate to attend school and alongside this there was an expectation that incoming residents purchasing the newly built properties would add some bridging capital to complement the store of bonding capital in the community. So did all this work? From the criterion of gaining the trust of residents the answer is unequivocally yes. PVHA appears from our evaluation to be an organisation with an enviable and possibly rare reputation, amongst Hattersley residents and indeed wider stakeholders, for integrity:

*'I think the biggest achievement is not just about the properties of, you know, doing up the properties and building new ones it was it was the consultation with community'* Local resident

*They don't talk above you, they talk to you and that is so important. They don't think because they're, you know, service providers are any better than the people that they're serving and I think that's so important'. Local resident*

*'...it's like they're family and I've seen tenants go to that window and do that to a manager when they've come out and they know what they're talking about and they've sorted out the problems and we just don't want that personal thing to go that personal touch'* Local resident.

*'... I think that people that have lived here for years and years have a good idea about what works and what doesn't work and you know people just kind of wanted, we wanted to get rid of this stigma if you like which we really worked hard at and Peak Valley have also worked hard...'* Local resident

However, from the criterion of developing the social capital resource in the community – particularly by adding more 'bridging capital' without undermining existing networks – the answer is less clear. There has been a decline in the level of community association and involvement with the regeneration process. This is unsurprising as the motivating factor, the poor repair of the physical infrastructure, has, apart from the public realm, been resolved. Everyone we interviewed agreed that the estate was now a qualitatively better place to live. This sentiment is exemplified by a local youth worker suggesting that

*...it's gone from an area where in 2001/2 there was no way I would of wanted to bring my kids up here to a place where I am now settled with young kids.*

The plethora of community groups and activities supported by the HNP appear to have largely disappeared. It may be a consequence of the dismantling of the HNP in 2010 or the fact that some of the community activists of that time have moved from full-time activism to full-time employment. There are still individual resident and tenant involvement on the Land Board though how representative these people are remains a legitimate query raised by our evaluation. Similarly, PVHA's internal, tenant-led, scrutiny mechanism remains..

The Hattersley Community Forum is still going. Notwithstanding this, these women now present as a group largely nostalgic about their former levels of community activity and concerned about their role in the future.

*'...it's just, it's just a very, very long hard road that we've travelled you know and the community have been involved in lots of different ways for lots and lots of years. Now we seem to have lost that you see ...'* Local activist

Aside from the HCF, other local associations appear active and relevant to the community, namely: Friends of Hattersley Railway Station; Hattersley Community Gardens; the Eden (youth) project; the Hattersley Football Club; and, Mancunian Reunion. However, our interviewees did present us with a sentiment that their long valued 'sense' of community was diminished and various reasons for this are offered:

*'Now one thing that has changed in my time is a little lessening of the sense of community and that's down to the movement of the community centre from its old site on Hattersley Road.'* Local councillor

*'... over the years the pubs started arising and they used to have lots of social clubs. There was a real community spirit about it and there still is today but you know the Carnival, Hattersley Carnival and all sorts used to go on in Hattersley, clearly that doesn't happen anymore. A lot of the pubs have closed down they're not there anymore.'* Local Councillor.

*'... it's a better place to live, it's always been don't get me wrong, its always been a good place to live and what I find now what we've lost which I think is everywhere is a community. You know when it first formed the community here people came from all different areas but what we found was it was a really close-knit community. Everybody knew everybody else, we've still got that slightly but we're not the same anymore. I don't know my neighbours that live down the road from me anymore.'* Local resident

This apparent decline of community mindedness may be a consequence of the lack of social space to congregate and, again, this brings into question the role and function of the Hub. Several interviewees pointed to the closure of the old community centre in 2012 and the opening of the Hub as the tipping point for community association in the area. As one resident says:

*'I feel looking back ... the community centre went and that wasn't attached to anything that was its own little hub, you know, where people can go. Here [the Hub] you've got the community centre where the housing is – who's going to want to come in here, who's going to want to relax in case somebody walks past saying you've got debts and you've got the Police there, then you've got Tameside [MBC] up on the top floor. Do you see where I'm coming from?'*

This is a common explanation for the drop in community activity among residents today. For Putnam, however, the definitive explanatory variable for the decline in levels of social capital was age. It was, he found, the process of generational change that was replacing a civic

minded generation with less involved children and grandchildren. The challenge was, he argued, to replenish the stock of social capital through policy and structural responses to address the supply and demand for opportunities for civic engagement.

This requirement to develop the next generation of community activists is clearly understood by most of our interviewees. Many of the older community activists regret their inability to involve more young people in their activities. However, the impact of the structural regeneration of the estate may address the problem of this missing civic generation. It appears that prior to regeneration anyone between the age of 25 and 45 who had an opportunity to move left the estate and it was older, working-age families or retired people who were the more settled and the more established in the community. But now:

*'... people buying houses and moving into the estate are people in that missing generation that was you know 25 to 45 bracket where perhaps a bunch of people had moved out, actually the nice, new Barratt houses are encouraging people in that bracket to move back in... It's by the nature of that it's going to be first time buyers which is going to be that 25 to 35 bracket and so interestingly it's been a by-product of that regeneration...'* Local councillor

However, the evidence for the emergence of a less insular and more expansive community remains mixed. Some interviewees felt that there remained an 'us and them' mind-set amongst existing residents and that the attempt to dilute this mentality with 'incomers' from the 'Barratts' Homes' was work in progress:

*'I think in the long term the mix of private and rented will be fortuitous but at the moment I think some of the people of Hattersley feel like they've been a bit short changed. There is still some of that mentality there. The difference between council house tenants and owner occupiers. I mean we have a local home watch meeting and we've got people from Barratt's coming up, the Barratt's houses as we call them, and they definitely feel that they are a little bit different'* Local Councillor

In discussing the extent to which community insularity may have declined it is important to assert that high levels of social capital are not always associated with a 'public good'. On the contrary, there is a 'dark side' to social capital that is most likely to be found within closed tight knit communities. Here, levels of criminality can prosper secure in the knowledge that their close ties within the community will shield them from any criminal justice proceedings. This was – and perhaps still is – true for Hattersley. We were told of criminal networks linking Hattersley back to the communities from which the original residents were decanted in East Manchester. This, albeit a small minority of the community, remains a problem on the estate:

*'...but you do have your minorities and within this community, I mean, I'm thankful that I've known them all my life, 46 years. You know played with them, went to school with them, you name it, the lot. But what you'll find is if an outsider comes into this community you've not got a cat in hells chance of knowing anything or anything about anybody.'* Local resident.

However, the side effect of diminishing levels of social capital means these networks are now more vulnerable as a local youth worker explained:

*'... but some of those depths of community ties ... will have been reduced for sure. A positive side of that so within that depth of community spirit where we're tight and we're looking after each other you might have had a low level of reported crime because crime was happening but perhaps the community felt that they couldn't deal with something or that they wanted to deal with it themselves ...But I think there is less fear of reporting crime now so crime stats have gone up but actually the feel, living here the feel of some of the nonsense that goes on perhaps open dealing or you know there certainly was open drug dealing I mean on my street when I moved in where that just wouldn't happen now because people know it would get reported. So, it's interesting because living locally I see the openness of crime has reduced.'*

And the consequence is:

*'... without a doubt it's a safer environment to move around, in without a doubt. I mean we used to, it wasn't always a safe place to live and work for sure.'* Local resident.

## 4.4 Partnership-based Governance

Alongside Peak Valley's relational approach, we identify a general partnership-based form of governance as a critical factor in the successful achievement of regeneration objectives. This success is largely the result of the distinctive governance approach to regenerating Hattersley, which was underwritten legally by the Collaboration Agreement, but crucially hinged upon a pragmatic and flexible approach to delivering a common vision:

*it [the masterplan] was set in stone in terms of this vision. What it didn't set in stone and what was given enough flexibility – because again that's another problem with having a vision and master plan which is too prescriptive it then becomes almost like a chain around your ankles. This is flexible enough to allow things to move as opportunities emerge, so things like the train station or the public realm masterplan, all of that's happened or allowing us to change things around, to say "well don't do the public realm, give us less but we'll do it ourselves". That's worked a treat I think, but the central objectives, moving the schools out, bringing new types of residents to the area, have remained constant. Tameside MBC officer.*

Whilst the Collaboration Agreement itself was an important milestone which provided the 'hard' legal backbone, the success of the process was, as we explain in this section, largely the result of the 'softer' powers exercised by the key public partners, notably Tameside MBC. Contemporary governance practices employ a variety of structures and means for governing such as, for example through local networks,

partnerships, and the deployment of 'soft' or convening power. Accordingly, we will explore how some of these means are manifest within the local regeneration process and codified as 'hard' powers in the bespoke governance mechanisms developed specifically for the estate, such as the Hattersley Land Board and Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership. The section concludes by presenting governance concerns that residents and other local stakeholders have expressed as the management of the estate is transferred to Onward Homes.

### 4.4.1 Tameside MBC

It is hard to assess the impact Peak Valley has had upon Hattersley without understanding the role of the local authority. Power and control within local governance networks can often be obfuscated and contentious but the 'soft' or convening power of Tameside MBC has undoubtedly been – and still is – instrumental in shaping the regeneration of Hattersley.

The Hattersley estate falls within the geographical, and therefore political, authority of Tameside MBC. Perversely, and unfortunately for Hattersley residents, for the first 40 years of its existence the estate was the property of Manchester City Council. Working within this rather schizophrenic administrative arrangement was politically challenging for the local council and its officers. This challenge – to effect positive change upon the estate without ownership of the stock – was underscored by the fact that Hattersley fell within the electoral ward of the longstanding leader of Tameside Council from 1980 to 2010, Roy Oldham:

*It was particularly dear to his heart because he greeted the people from Manchester into this estate back in the '60s and '70s and it was an estate he walked at the weekend and talked to local people. ex Tameside MBC employee*

This served to focus local council officers' views on what was likely to be an acceptable standard of intervention in Hattersley:

*We tried to maintain the local environment to as high as possible, it had to be to as high as possible a level because the estate was in the ward of the leader of the Council, you know, he wasn't going to have anybody adversely affected he was responsible for...*

However, more than this, it was a political relationship that was to prove critical in securing the support of a traditionally risk-averse local authority to a raft of policy initiatives, a ground-breaking stock transfer deal and an on-going commitment to the estate:

*We had a very pragmatic Labour leader of the Council really. His view was that he would literally do, you know, virtually anything if it brought investment to the area and delivered a big improvement on what the authority had got. ex Tameside MBC employee*

This political relationship between local ward councillors, the local community and the council remains important. One of these councillors is the current Deputy Leader of the Council and is chair of the Hattersley Land Board.

The council sought to intervene strategically in those policy areas where it felt it could make a difference on Hattersley. This has been covered in the previous section but to recap: this involved obtaining for the estate SRB and European monies in the 1990s and, in 2001, the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder programme, and the decision to rationalise and relocate Hattersley's schools.

The development of a 'masterplan' – what became the agreed Supplementary Planning Guidance<sup>106</sup> (SPG) in 2004 – was a significant step change in Hattersley's fortunes and is illustrative of the pivotal, convening, role played by Tameside MBC. A council official alludes to this role in developing an effective partnership to execute their masterplan:

*My view in terms of what's actually fundamentally changed Hattersley in terms of where it is has been is the holistic mixture of which Peak Valley has been a significant part. So, there was a plan, literally there was a [master] plan and there were some significant players around that plan.*

The process to adopting the SPG as the planning guide to re-developing Hattersley necessarily involved the key stakeholders, namely, Peak Valley (or Portico as they were then known) and the local community. This process, driven by Tameside MBC, was critical in securing the backing of the then Government agency for regeneration, English Partnerships, without whom the stock transfer would have collapsed. This ex-Tameside MBC official recalls:

*English Partnerships at a very early stage wanted reassurances from you know the Local Authority and Portico that we could do this and that we had the backing of the local Council and backing of Manchester Council and the backing of the local residents. I think because of all the work we'd done with local residents and because of our work with Portico and we had done a lot of work, I think they were just about you know prepared to go along with it all...*

The involvement of residents in this process also proved decisive in effectively sealing this plan as the touchstone for all future regeneration activity on the estate. Tameside MBC conducted a series of master planning exercises with around 30 residents, an urban design consultant, local planning officers and local ward councillors. This group agreed the principle of aiming for an economically-viable regeneration model for Hattersley. In other words, one that promoted a mixed tenure estate with new private sector housing developments for sale. The significance of this plan is illustrated by this ex Peak Valley official recalling that "I carried it around with me everywhere, it just became second nature to pick it up and consult it."

Following the stock transfer, the Collaboration Agreement – embodying the principles agreed in the SPG – served to tie Tameside Council into the governance of the estate through the Land Board. Their on-going influence and commitment to the estate through this mechanism is outlined here by a council official:

*We treat it [Hattersley] high up as anything else to be honest among the portfolio of what I do. So, I go to Hattersley and service the Hattersley Land Board every month, so I tend to be lead on this and represent at that to that Land Board from the Council's point of view on a whole range of things. From housing development to work we've been doing around the train station to the public realm improvements to CPO to enable that new retail park. So, if you ask me within .... my role I'd probably say Hattersley takes about 40% of that.'*

An indication of the successful deployment of 'soft' power within a local governance context is the extent to which it serves to enable effective working relationships and partnerships. It is apparent from the comments made by the architect who worked upon the early re-development schemes on Hattersley that Tameside MBC were efficient in this regard:

*So, when we were successful with the bid we sort of said because of the enormity of the task we said we need key contact, key lines of communication into planning highways we need to have that partnership approach. So, you know, if we're doing something with Barratt's, we're not stepping on each other's toes, we're not building in each other's way you know we try and coordinate service installations you know so, we're not bringing new suppliers to our site only for you to dig that up so Tameside [MBC] kept all this from happening...*

We have largely taken an institutional view of the local governance process here. However, the role individual officers have played in this narrative should not be under-stated. If local governance is understood as a network of key agencies and local actors then individual actions and commitment at certain junctures in the process can often be decisive. This is certainly true of Tameside MBC where some officers were dedicated to finding a solution that would make a positive difference on the estate. This comment captures their endeavour:

*...we seemed to exhaust every avenue to try and get things done, well we did exhaust every avenue and we went to every Government department and every regeneration agency and every you know and we ended up with something which was quite unique really. Because nothing else would work there was no sort of tool in the tool box of housing regeneration policy and local Government policy that appeared to be around that could, lose all these terrible problems.*

This is true also of certain individuals within Peak Valley, not least the ex-Director, who worked closely with council officers – through the governance structure afforded by the Collaboration Agreement – to achieve objectives.

However, sustainable, accountable and effective governance cannot rely, in the long-term at least, on the fortuitous influence and commitment of certain political actors. People come and go, institutional structures are more durable. This is true for Hattersley, where key supporters and allies have changed over the years – although some

<sup>106</sup> See <https://www.tameside.gov.uk/tmbc5/hattersleyspg.pdf>

notable people have been present for sustained periods – but governance processes have continued in the spirit with which they were initiated. A large part of this is not just down to the governance culture and ‘soft’ convening powers that Tameside MBC and Peak Valley have cultivated over the years, but it is also written into the ‘hard’ powers of the Collaboration Agreement, signed by all partners at the outset. This is a legally-binding document and stipulates precisely the duties and responsibilities of all parties, which requires by law they be met. The culture of partnership-working and mutual commitment that has developed in Hattersley has been legally underwritten in this way. The Collaboration Agreement has been important in securing the long-term buy-in of partners in requiring a governance body to carry out and oversee the delivery of its objectives, called the Hattersley Land Board.

#### 4.4.2 The Hattersley Land Board

The Hattersley Land Board is the governing body established to provide strategic management of the regeneration objectives set down in the legally binding Collaboration Agreement. Importantly, the Board will continue to exist until these objectives have been fulfilled. The Board membership has representation from Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (TMBC), Peak Valley, Onward Homes, local residents, and Homes England (HE), previously the Homes and Communities Agency which was the successor body of English Partnerships, which was absorbed into the HCA in 2008. The Board meet on a 6 weekly cycle at The Hub. Linked to the Board, the Hattersley Project Group (officers from TMBC, Peak Valley and HE) meet regularly to service the Board.

From the outset the Board has attracted representation at senior management level from Tameside MBC and Peak Valley. The same is true politically as the Chair of the Board was the Leader of Tameside and is now the Deputy Leader. The importance of this level of representation is stated by this ex council official:

*‘it’s a strategic management board which ties in everybody at a very high strategic level and I think you know residents and everybody involved realise that if you want a comprehensive regeneration of the type we’ve had to do in Hattersley then it just gives it that importance. Because it is notoriously difficult to do these things, at the end of the day if you don’t like get high level buy in to it you’re fighting a battle against people you work with half the time’*

Unusually for local regeneration partnerships Board representation also includes HE. This is unsurprising given their level of potential investment in the estate. However, it is perhaps this level of exposure to financial risk that partly explains the high level of strategic management at the Board as it serves to reassure the HE that their investment in the estate is in relatively safe hands. As a council official stated ‘...it manages risk fantastically in a way.’

The Board appears to work effectively. Apart from improvements to the public realm it has delivered the Collaboration Agreement’s objectives largely to schedule, notwithstanding some delays associated with the uncertainty caused by the financial crash in 2008. Moreover, it

appears to have evolved into a ‘trusted space’, as a forum for resolving differences, however robustly they may be presented. It is characteristic of a trusted relationship, as described by this council official:

*I think it’s a pretty good relationship now with Peak Valley. After a length of time it ends up, so you can put stuff on the table without you know having to worry too much about upsetting each other and you can have quite a frank kind of robust discussions about differences.*

Local resident representation on the Board also appears, at least from those residents participating, to have been productive. This is one resident representative:

*I think it works very well yes, you see we get what I call our higher ups from the Council come and they have a lot a lot of input. Because a lot of it happens from the Council, there’s this very big interaction with the Council and the councillors and Peak Valley. We’ve all got an interest and I think it works really well*

Other residents looking at it from the outside are more circumspect. Whilst acknowledging the success of the Board in delivering its objectives they worry about who is being represented and about local accountability. This is epitomised by a comment from one local resident:

*‘because I mean so far you know in a way the Land Board is a success story of controlling land in a way which is publically responsible and relatively accountable and they’ve done the success and they’ve got the contract going with Barratt’s who then produced the houses that they need to produce without speculating around. Yet you’re raising issues here about democratic accountability and local governance, which aren’t necessarily reflected in that structure, but it’s quite a closed door quango isn’t it really’*

This criticism may be valid in so far as there is clearly a question mark over the representation of residents. Residents on the Land Board do not appear, for example, to be drawn from, or accountable to, a properly constituted, democratically-elected residents’ association. It may be the case that there is a loose connection to the Hattersley Community Forum but we have not found any explicit evidence of this. Moreover, there are questions over the Forum’s democratic credentials. However, all local ward councillors do attend the Board and this should, in theory at least, provide a structured route for local democratic engagement.

#### 4.4.3 Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership

The Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership was one governance structure that provided an effective conduit for residents’ involvement in the governance of the estate. Although it no longer exists – wound-up in 2010, one of the early casualties of a change in government and the on-going austerity agenda – we include it here as an important local initiative in bridging the gap between residents and governance processes.

The Partnership was established to deliver the Neighbourhood Pathfinder Programme developed by the New Labour Government in 2001. It comprised local residents and representatives of a range of service providers, such as police, health, and local authority, supported by a small professional team led by a neighbourhood manager, based in a local office in the old district centre, and sought to co-ordinate regeneration activity across the estate through a number of themed groups, namely: jobs and training; environment, housing and regeneration; children and young people; health and leisure; community safety; and older people. Once the stock transfer had been achieved it worked with Peak Valley and the Land Board to achieve the regeneration objectives. At its peak, it claimed to be involved in over 40 different community groups and activities and published a monthly magazine the ‘Hattersley Terrier’<sup>107</sup>. The official evaluation claimed that pathfinder programmes typically broadened ‘... resident engagement beyond a handful of people in the early stages to develop a strong core of 20–60 residents who are engaged in the more deliberative processes within the Pathfinder – on the Board, in working groups or helping to monitor services’<sup>108</sup>. They also claimed improved resident satisfaction with their area and an increased proportion of residents who felt able to influence local decision-making. Interestingly, opinion on its local impact appears divided:

*...there was a lot of money [from the Pathfinder scheme] for these resources to start to happen and so they had all these different groups, and it was very good and it gave us the help we needed, because you know Hattersley has not always had a good reputation which is really hard.. Local resident.*

*I think actually, that neighbourhood partnership got under the skin of it, but it was still, the first time I was in, so I thought the neighbourhood partnership was quite good. Tameside MBC official.*

*There was a huge team located at the old district centre at the time, in terms of what they actually, really achieved I would say it’s remarkably limited. Former Peak Valley official.*

The Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership was also instrumental in launching the resident led initiative, ‘Mancunian Reunion’<sup>109</sup>. This aimed to reconnect Hattersley residents with their Manchester roots and in partnership with Tameside Library they collated and archived a valuable oral and written history of this period. It also served to nurture community bonds around notions of identity and belonging.

Alongside this, the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership injected resources into community development. There existed a network of different community groups – some, like Hattersley Community Forum, longstanding; others springing up, led by community activists, to champion the various themes sponsored by the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership.

In this context, the Neighbourhood Partnership was an important arena for connecting those participating residents – and by extension their

networks – with governance issues; it was a way of developing bridging social capital. For the local ward councillors, the Neighbourhood Partnership was an important initiative as it co-ordinated different agencies’ activity on the estate. This, they feel, is a current gap in public service delivery on the estate – one which, interestingly, a number of interviewees claim, the Hub was intended to fill. In the absence of any formal governance process for community involvement since the discontinuation of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership, it is the Hub that is now expected to fulfil much of this function. We explore below in the following section on ‘Interventions’ whether The Hub lives up to these expectations.

#### 4.4.4 Governance concerns moving Onward

Onward have conducted their own market research into tenants’ views of the merger of distinct housing associations within the Symphony Group, including Peak Valley, to form Onward. The response was overwhelmingly positive. However, some of the residents we interviewed expressed surprise and a degree of confusion about the proposed merger:

*I didn’t realise it was that close and on that note I’ve got a few concerns. Because you’ve got this Onward, don’t know where they’re from, don’t know who they are, don’t know how long they’ve been established for*

*see the way I’ve read through the short letter that I got about it, it was as though because it mentions Wigan and Liverpool and it was as though it was all different Councils from all different areas are coming together as one, that’s the way I read it because it does mention Liverpool*

Similar to Onward’s research were comments that emphasised the importance of a ‘local’ or ‘personal’ service, or one that ‘knows’ its tenants. Such comments emphasise the importance of Onward taking steps to maintain the strength of local relationships that were such a valued feature of Peak Valley’s housing management service.

*Onward have got to keep it local and they can’t manage this estate remotely. You know we’ve got to make sure that there’s people in there and they’ve got to be involved in what’s going on and to continue the legacy that Peak Valley did. You know we’ve got to still keep improving it and we’ve still got to look at how the estate’s changing over the years, still get involved you know be a partner be a true partner of the Council. So and the Land Board the Land Board you know eventually will wrap up but. Local councillor*

*I mean the big worry that the residents have is that you know the organisation has become remote again and there’s a feel of a loss of control. Local resident*

*Onward’s a bit more corporate isn’t it. Local resident*

<sup>107</sup> see <http://www.hattersley.org.uk/hnp/index.html>  
<sup>108</sup>Communities and Local Government ( 2008) Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders: Final Evaluation Report p 6  
<sup>109</sup> see <https://mancreunion.wordpress.com/about/>

The closure of Peak Valley's Management board and the loss of familiar staff at the local housing office in the Hub has clearly fuelled these concerns. This is mixed up with memories of pre-Peak Valley landlord, Manchester City Council and sentiments of loss of involvement largely nurtured by the Hattersley Community Forum. There is also a concern that Onward may have competing priorities and, as a consequence, Hattersley may lose out:

*I think the group board the Onward group board will take the view well hang on a minute you're saying that there's been 100 million pounds of investment into that area, we've got 35 thousand properties across the North West and some of the areas that those are located in you know are in very deprived areas and need a significant long term investment. I think you know Hattersley's done very well thank you very much, arguably job done. Local Councillor*

However, views from those tenants still involved in mechanisms like Peak Performance are more ambivalent:

*the [Peak Valley] board and it was handy in a way because it's like on your doorstep and if you had issues you put it to them. But now it's a common board I don't know if it's going to be better it's one of them the proofs in the pudding isn't it?*

The opinion of Tameside MBC, Onward's main partner on the Land Board, on the merger is nuanced. Some officers when viewing Onward's representation at Land Board meetings are sanguine, as they see this as a sign of the organisation's commitment:

*But on the ground they're still as fully committed to the programme in Hattersley as they ever have been. So when I look at the last Land Board I've got an Exec Director from Onward, I've got a Director of Development from Onward, I've got another Area Director so the three of them turned up so I mean you can't get higher interest than that.*

Onward's problem is that they are, by comparison with Peak Valley, a de-facto remote Landlord. The new Director responsible for Hattersley will not be based there full-time as opposed to the previous Director who was a constant presence and by his own admission 'lived and breathed' Hattersley. The manager of the repairs service has also moved out of Hattersley to Didsbury, Manchester. Alongside this, other staff who have become re-assuring, familiar faces to tenants have moved out of the local office and new members of staff are not yet well known. Whilst this does signal change it does not necessarily mean a deterioration in the quality of service and Onward clearly have work to do to convince existing partners and stakeholders in their governance network. But perhaps more pressing than this is how new governance mechanisms will be devised to meet the challenge posed by this worried resident:

*How do these people, what do they really know about us, I know they might know the bad bits but what do they really know about us?*

Onward's commissioning of this report, perhaps, represents the first step in that learning process

#### 4.5 Tackling socio-economic problems

Urban regeneration policy at the time of the stock transfer, driven as it was by recommendations of the Urban Task Force<sup>110</sup> and concerns of the New Labour Government's Social Exclusion Unit<sup>111</sup> was based upon narrowing the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of the country to achieve the vision that '... in ten to twenty years' time nobody should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live.'<sup>112</sup>

Our evaluation attempts to explain a singular paradox: Peak Valley's tenant surveys<sup>113</sup>, and indeed its own legacy review<sup>114</sup>, reveal high, widespread and rising levels of satisfaction with all aspects of the organisation's activities; and yet Hattersley remains in the top 5% of the most deprived areas in the country, a position it has maintained since Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) were first collected in the 1990s. It is now estimated that around 95% of Hattersley residents live in the top 20% of the most deprived areas in England as captured by income, employment, education and health domains<sup>115</sup>. Almost half of the children (47%) on the estate live in poverty<sup>116</sup>. The causes of such persistent spatially-concentrated deprivation are complex and not the purview of this report. The fact that tenant satisfaction and service performance have continued to rise in Hattersley since 2006 despite no improvements in life chances, is instructive of the positive impact of the interventions made by Peak Valley and its regeneration partners.

Our findings point to a number of explanations:

- (i) The Hattersley estate regeneration has focused primarily on physical improvements to housing, amenities, safety and security, and infrastructure over and above more social and economic interventions. Indeed, the IMD score that relates to barriers to housing and services shows an improvement for Hattersley, in stark contrast to consistently high deprivation on other domains. For the physical and financial accessibility of housing and local services, the area is only in the bottom half of most deprived areas in England<sup>117</sup> – suggesting a very high performance in this area relative to other domains. Tenants are happy with the improvements made to their housing in particular – both the upgrading of existing stock and the construction of new housing – as well as in other physical infrastructures, such as the railway station, whose redesign has proven a significant success in making it safe and attracting greater use.

- (ii) The statistical paradox suggests that regeneration efforts undertaken by housing associations and local authorities are not enough alone to address fundamental structural inadequacies in the local economy, largely created by the economic restructuring of the 1980s, with which successive governments' urban regeneration policies and area based initiatives have struggled to contend. This has left local governance organisations such as Peak Valley with limited agency to effect and offset these deep and complex socio-economic problems. This may point to a wider national failure, despite government policy, to develop sustainable local policy solutions that work with and for local communities.

Within this constrained context, the post-2006 regeneration process may nonetheless have made significant impacts on life chances, but which have yet to materialise. Whilst relatively cosmetic improvements and consequent changes in satisfaction levels have been quick to emerge, the socioeconomic impacts of the regeneration of the Hattersley estate have been slower to take effect. There is a time lag between the interventions made and their translation into socioeconomic benefits; whilst satisfaction levels are more immediately discernible from general service and environmental improvements. We believe this is due to the generational nature of the specific regeneration process in Hattersley: young people have most to gain and are only beginning to enter the labour market. The fundamental intervention that will affect the life chances of younger generations is the innovative dual strategy of school catchment area restructuring and housing tenure diversification.

<sup>110</sup> Department for Environment Transport and the Regions, 1999 'Towards an Urban Renaissance'

<sup>111</sup> Social Exclusion Unit (2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: national Strategy Action Plan, London SEU.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid page 8

<sup>113</sup> See Peak Valley STAR surveys

<sup>114</sup> see Peak Valley Performance Legacy Review 2017

<sup>115</sup> Community Insight Profile for Hattersley, 2017. Symphony Housing Group.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. Poverty here is defined as living in in families in receipt of out of work benefits, or in receipt of tax credits where their reported income is less than 60% median income.

<sup>117</sup> English Indices of Deprivation 2015 available online <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015>

## CHAPTER 5

# CONCLUSION

## 5 CONCLUSION

Our report has evaluated the impact of the interventions by Peak Valley Housing Association upon the Hattersley estate since 2006. We have situated our evaluation in a broad historical context using resident and stakeholder recollections as testimony to the ways in which various government's urban regeneration policies, and those of local agents such as Tameside MBC, have shaped the local social and physical infrastructure prior to the stock transfer to Peak Valley in 2006. In doing so we have distinguished the key role played by Peak Valley in the regeneration process for Hattersley, but also drawn out other important factors which have contributed to its success. These can be summarised as:

- 1) The Collaboration Agreement was a singular *'act of genius'* without which the regeneration of the estate could have taken a very different turn. This is partly because the demolition of some of the worst social housing and redevelopment as new homes for sale is the key strategic move – codified in the Collaboration Agreement – that pays for all other improvements, including to the existing stock and to the public realm, as well as for new retail, transport and community facilities. Moreover, the decision not to sell the land but only a licence to build and sell new homes, we believe, was key to keeping the private sector developer on, albeit a slightly delayed, schedule particularly given the financial crash of 2008.
- 2) The general approach to regeneration was a tenure diversification programme that entailed demolishing the most poorly designed and maintained housing stock and the consolidating of these sites across the estate for redevelopment by Barratt as homes for sale. This was devised by the regeneration partners as an innovative means to attract the private sector investment required to fund the substantive interventions made to the housing stock, retail offer, public realm, community facilities and transport infrastructure. However, the tenure diversification approach was also supported by English Partnerships – the government agency who provided the crucial financial guarantee to underwrite the investments – who were at the time influenced by the Mixed Communities agenda. This held that tenure diversification was itself a direct intervention for regeneration, acting to counteract the additional disadvantages accruing through the spatial concentration of poverty over and above deprivation per se by cultivating more bridging rather than bonding social capital.
- 3) Peak Valley's relational – as opposed to transactional – approach to its housing service delivery has been instrumental in cementing valued and trusted working relationships with all stakeholders. This has enabled a successful governance of the estate with key partners Tameside MBC and the local community. It has enabled a productive working relationship with Barratt, the developer of the new-build homes. This approach has been enhanced by Peak Valley's physical presence on the estate. This is not solely about the on-site location of a local housing office, though the accessibility of this is an important factor – it is also about how Peak Valley have embedded themselves into the living fabric of the community, through for example: hiring local residents to staff the office; enabling staff to become governors of the local primary schools; their involvement in the local football club; and, sponsoring community garden projects. It is this depth of immersion in the everyday, quotidian life of the estate that explains how the organisation has become, certainly in one resident's eyes, *'...like family'*.
- 4) Peak Valley did not step into an empty cultural or political space when assuming housing management responsibility for the estate.
  - a) A cadre of community activists had been developed over the years running up to 2006, largely through adversity, when they *'...were the only ones running the estate'*. Regeneration interventions by Tameside MBC – most notably the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and Neighbourhood Partnership Pathfinder initiative – had further developed this layer of community activism. They were a key component part of the governance platform, the Hattersley Land Board, which facilitated Peak Valley's role in the regeneration process.

- b) Tameside MBC has been highly invested in the Hattersley estate for several decades, which has helped drive forward the regeneration process beyond the capabilities of Peak Valley alone. Part of this derives from the loyalty and political commitments to Hattersley shown by a number of powerful local politicians, many of whose constituents live on the estate. Some of these councillors have taken on key functions of the Land Board and helped direct council funds towards the regeneration of Hattersley. Council officers too have played an important part. The move to develop more bridging capital on the estate had already begun with Tameside MBC rationalising and relocating Hattersley's schools. This is arguably one of the most decisive factors in the regeneration process.

In assessing the overall success of the regeneration approach, we highlight the following points. Resonating with the academic critique of the mixed communities agenda, the regeneration process in Hattersley appears to have done more to improve the material environment and cosmetic image of the area – thereby attracting newcomers and ‘diluting’ the deprivation – than to directly improve the life chances of existing residents themselves. The lack of any significant change in deprivation scores in Hattersley over the past decade, despite visible improvements to the estate and to facilities, supports this assessment. In drawing this conclusion, however, we wish raise the important caveat that tenure diversification has had most impact in combination with Tameside MBC's earlier interventions in restructuring school catchment areas. We believe it is too early to measure the full effects of this approach, which may well skip a generation and inhere in greater opportunities and a more socially mixed learning environment for young people, and will therefore likely become manifest as the younger generations leave school and move through the labour market. Existing evidence suggests that tenure diversification works best when combined with school catchment area mixing.<sup>100</sup> The future outcomes for younger Hattersley residents shaped by this dual approach will therefore have important implications for housing and education policy.

The emphasis on bridging over bonding social capital, on spatial as well as social mobility, may have adversely contributed to ‘hollowing out’ what was once a very tight-knit and mutually supportive community. Many residents feel that despite the cleaner, safer environment, better amenities and more responsive and effective services on offer by Peak Valley, something perhaps more intangible has been sacrificed in this modernisation process. We can certainly see this reflected in the loss of some 10 pubs across the estate over the last decade or so – something which Peak Valley cannot, of course, be held accountable for. The Hub might therefore provide a better case in point. Located in a far more accessible location and in modern, purpose-built premises, The Hub has nonetheless failed to attract the same extensive use of its community facilities as were once enjoyed in the dilapidated old district centre. At the same time, Tesco now dominates the retail offer, and whilst providing the estate with a much-needed source of employment and affordable food, has effectively replaced what was once a diverse

range of frequently family-owned businesses, albeit rapidly dwindling by the 1990s. Whilst The Hub and the Tesco Extra are undoubtedly improvements on what went immediately before, they nonetheless reflect wider cultural trends towards social atomisation, privatisation and rising mobility, both social and spatial.

There is a risk, then, that the tenure diversification approach accelerates these trends; that it has only made Hattersley more attractive to newcomers – who have snapped up the well-designed and comparatively cheap Barratt houses in their hundreds – and failed to embed sufficient opportunities for existing residents to partake of what benefits this brings. Hattersley is at risk of becoming a dormitory settlement, in which increasing proportions of its residents commute into Manchester for work each day, and drive to Tesco to shop, rather than work or shop locally or contribute to the estate's community life.

Just as the mixed communities agenda has been critiqued<sup>101</sup> for individualising and spatializing what are essentially structural problems, mostly with the labour market, so too can the Hattersley estate regeneration be critically appraised as focusing too narrowly on raising the spatial mobility of residents, as if this by itself will lead to social mobility. Indeed, this is a product of the ‘mobility paradigm’ that is said to permeate the thinking of neo-liberal urban policy on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>102</sup> Demolishing mono-tenure concentrations of social housing and introducing new private tenures to raise local purchasing power and social aspirations; encouraging people to send their children to schools outside the estate, in more socially mixed catchment areas; rebuilding community and retail facilities towards the periphery of the estate in more accessible locations; enhancing transport connections to major centres, as in the railway station – all these interventions no doubt made great headway in breaking down some of the social boundaries within Hattersley that could be seen as problematic for socioeconomic empowerment, and no doubt they have broken down internal and external perceptions alike of Hattersley being like an ‘island’ isolated from the rest of society. Yet at the same time, some of the more positive aspects of bonding social capital have been broken down also. Moreover, this tends towards an indirect form of regeneration that relies too heavily on mobility – on (re)connecting people with neighbouring communities and the possible opportunities that exist *outside* the estate as opposed to creating new economic opportunities *within* Hattersley and focusing on increasing the capabilities of residents themselves. At its worst, the tenure diversification approach could be seen as a way to hide or dilute persistent deprivation in Hattersley rather than tackle it head on.

Skills training has been a key feature of Peak Valley's interventions in Hattersley, but one that we feel has not been central enough. Nor has there been enough attention turned towards developing the local economy by encouraging entrepreneurship, for instance, or a more localised community or social economy based around co-operatives and locally-owned assets. There are a number of examples across the country of how communities in deprived urban areas have sought to address their isolation from economic opportunities by developing their own endogenous routes through to wealth generation. Alt Valley

Community Development Trust in the Croxteth area of Liverpool is one such example where an area largely comprised of ex-council housing and with a similar demographic and socioeconomic profile as Hattersley has been transformed through the work of asset-based community development that was first initiated through local activism in resisting the closure of a school in the 1980s. There are lessons to be learnt from endeavours such as Alt Valley.

Peak Valley's challenge was to develop and manage the inter-related component parts of social capital, namely trust and the networking features related with bonding and bridging capital. It is evident that Peak Valley have developed trusted relationships. However, given the prevailing high level of deprivation on the estate it is not yet clear if it managed the trick of nurturing bridging capital – important for developing inclusive and prosperous communities – whilst maintaining healthy levels of bonding capital, a feature of strong, robust communities. As we have mentioned, the tenure diversification and school rationalisation may deliver the required levels of bridging capital nevertheless, it is apparent that some residents are mourning the loss of associational activity and community spirit. We argue that while this may be a function of appropriate social space to congregate it is also likely to be a function of age. Interestingly, the new build homes may serve to supply this missing generation of community activists as it appears that it is largely the 24-44 age group that are moving into these properties.

Nonetheless, in examining Peak Valley's role in the regeneration of Hattersley and its interaction with its community, there have been no voiced criticism of their activities. This we attribute to their relational approach to the delivery of their housing service. Such an approach potentially embodies and harnesses the concept of social capital. High levels of which have been associated with socially and economically prosperous communities. In summary, Peak Valley have:

- made a significant contribution to the regeneration of the estate by developing innovative approaches to funding, designing and delivering largely successful interventions;
- garnered an enviable institutional reputation for integrity – we found this to hold true for all stakeholders involved in the regeneration process;
- provided a local, accessible housing management service; and
- afforded sufficient weight to their social responsibilities to make a positive difference to how they are perceived upon the estate.

In light of the concerns raised in this report, the main issues to address for the future management of the Hattersley estate are:

- Ensuring that there is sufficient community involvement in the design of public realm improvements being developed by Tameside MBC/Land Board, including through the planned public consultation, as well as in any future redevelopment plans for the estate.
- Rethinking and addressing the chronic under-use of The Hub without unsettling community relations and in ways which promote co-located multi-agency working.

- Related to (ii) is the need to address the lack of social space on the estate for community association. There is a resident perception that The Hub has too much institutional oversight to work as an attractive community centre. The loss of pubs – from 11 to 1 – over the years has also served to diminish the facilities for social activity.
- Embedding a governance mechanism to address the ‘*how will they know us?*’ question. New resident/tenant recruits to the Land Board is a start but needs more collective community involvement beyond the Land Board, in ways which replace the role of the Hattersley Neighbourhood Partnership.
- Developing new governance approaches for managing all housing, increasingly split between owner-occupiers, buy-to-let landlords, Right to Buy owners and Peak Valley, which threatens the integrity of estate management.
- Tackling the persistent levels of socioeconomic deprivation through policy innovation. Jobs fairs and skills training initiatives have had limited success and other solutions are needed. These should look to develop the endogenous capacities of Hattersley and its residents rather than rely on spatial mobility to connect residents with exogenous economic opportunities.

We feel that an approach to dealing with these issues holistically is required. For example, the public realm could be viewed as a ‘common asset’ and, as such, the plan to develop it could involve meaningful and on-going community engagement that might inspire community management of this asset. This notion of developing ‘commoning’ projects is increasingly seen as viable policy option for many urban centres both in the UK and worldwide.<sup>103</sup> Such a venture could also include a view to develop Hattersley's social economy. This is socio-economic regeneration from the ‘bottom-up’ and could conceivably address levels of deprivation and play into the cultural and social isolationism prevalent amongst certain residents. Again, there are numerous examples of such initiatives to draw upon.<sup>104</sup> The problem of The Hub, which is neither community centre nor co-ordinating hub of local service delivery, is one that clearly requires wide stakeholder engagement to provide it with a meaningful identity and function. Such a process of engagement would, we feel, necessarily distinguish local community requirements from institutional ones.

This evaluation of Peak Valley's impact on the regeneration process in Hattersley is premature. The Collaboration Agreement commits its signatories to a further ten years of regeneration activity. Moreover, as we have emphasised, the ongoing generational impact of tenure diversification and school rationalisation may yet affect the social and economic prosperity of the estate. It is arguable that it is only at this future point that the impact of Peak Valley can be fully appraised. Nonetheless, it is evident that Peak Valley have made a remarkable contribution to Hattersley's regeneration, one that has left a largely positive legacy for the new social landlord, Onward Homes, and which may inform the development of future estate regeneration policy for years to come.

<sup>100</sup> Ruth Lupton and Rebecca Tunstall, “Neighbourhood Regeneration through Mixed Communities: A ‘social Justice Dilemma?’,” *Journal of Education Policy* 23, no. 2 (March 2008): 105–17. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02680930701853013>.

<sup>101</sup> Imbroscio, “Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy.”

<sup>103</sup> Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione, “The City as a Commons,” *Yale Law & Policy Review* 34, no. 2 (2016): 281–349.

<sup>104</sup> Helen Heap, Alan Southern, and Matthew Thompson, *The Scale, Scope and Value of the Liverpool City Region Social Economy* (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 2017). <https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/publicpolicypractice/images/the-scale-scope-and-value-of-the-liverpool-city-region-social-economy.pdf>.

## APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEWEES

Type	Name	Position
Peak Valley	Phil Corris	Former Managing Director
	Sam Cooper	Community Investment Office
	Nicholas Monkridge	Talent Match
	Huw Davies	Former Chair (also Tameside officer)
HCA	Julie Museoglu	Business Support Officer
Councillors	Jim Fitzpatrick	CLr Hyde Godley
	Gillian Peet	CLr Longendale
	Janet Cooper	CLr Longendale
Tameside MBC	Steven Pleasant	Chief Executive
	Ade Alao	Head of Investment
	Carole Bryant	Project manager economic growth
	John Huges	Housing Growth lead
	Denise Lockyer	Hattersley Library
	Lavinia Ferguson	Employment and skills
Private Sector	Dave Smith	Director, John McCall Architect
	Ian Hilliker	Technical Director, Barratt Homes
Residents	Brenda Duddridge	resident
	Sophie Harrison	Barratt home-owner
	Gareth Howell	Barratt home-owner
	Patrick Ghadiali	Tenant
Community Organisations	Babs Allen	Hattersley Community Garden
	Chris Bird	Chair, Hattersley Football Club
	Simon Davidson	Christian missionary, youth worker
	Elsie Dixon	Chair, Hattersley Community Forum
	Sharon Power	Founder, Mancunian Reunion; Neighbourhood Partnership
School	Steve Clarke	Primary school Headteacher





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